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Preface 
Each year, the Directorate-General for Regional Policy and Cohesion of the European 
Commission launches a number of studies in the field of regional policy and regional planning. 
These studies mainly aim at providing a basis for policy formulation internally, as well as the 
preparation of programmes and initiatives and a basis for analysing the impact of current or 
planned activities. The most interesting or innovative of these are published in a series entitled 
'Regional development studies'. 
With this series, the Directorate-General hopes to stimulate discussion and action in a wider 
sphere on the research results received. The publication of the studies is addressed to politicians 
and decision-makers at European, regional and local level, as well as to academics and experts 
in the broad fields of issues covered. 
It is hoped that by publicizing research results the Commission will enrich and stimulate public 
debate and promote a further exchange of knowledge and opinions on the issues which are 
considered important for the economic and social cohesion of the Union and therefore for the 
future of Europe. 
Readers should bear in mind that the study reports do not necessarily reflect the official position 
of the Commission but first and foremost express the opinion of those responsible for carrying 
out the study. 

Introduction 
This is the synthesis report of the Nordic impact study prepared within the framework of the Europe 2000 study pro-
gramme. 
This report includes the executive summary and a section on political implications. To a large extent the findings and 
conclusions presented here are derived from 11 special studies. 
It must be stressed, however, that this synthesis report contains a number of additional findings, analyses and con-
clusions which cannot be derived from the special studies. 
Throughout the working process — but particularly during its latest phases — we have been acutely aware that our 
findings, analyses and the conclusions derived therefrom might be marshalled in the inventories of various national 
and EC parties with a view towards strengthening their respective negotiating positions. This has not been permitted 
to influence our work. 
All through the research process we have tried to obtain the best possible information from competent and centrally 
placed authorities. Without compromising the confidential nature of the study, NordREFO conducted a symposium in 
the autumn of 1992, with responsible spokespersons for Nordic governments and regional authorities as well as all 
contributors to the special studies. The intention was to generate ideas on the construction of our main scenarios for 
Nordic impact and to avoid mistakes in the presentation of Nordic regional policies. 
Copenhagen, June 1993 
Noralv Veggeland 
Senior Executive and 
Scientific Project Coordinator 
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Executive summary 
Key issues: The Nordic countries — what impact on planning 
and development in the Union? 
1. Structure and logic 
The synthesis report is organized into six parts followed 
by a summary of political implications. 
Structurally, the synthesis report moves from more 
general and basic considerations and analyses towards 
ever more specific and — in policy terms — operative 
ones. 
Stated differently, one might say that the present volume 
proceeds from a general overview — a relevant compa-
rison between Norden and the present European 
Community (Part I) — and relevant institutional scenari-
os for Norden/European Community in the year 2000 
(Part II) to a catalogue of identifiable, potential Nordic 
impacts on Europe, whether weak or strong (Part III), to 
what we determine to be strong impacts (Part IV). 
Due to the broad nature of its discussion, Part III may 
also serve as a useful key to a further immersion in 
Volumes II to IV 
Out of the potentially strong impacts we zoom in on a 
special class of impacts which we consider to be the 
most operative and regionally, spatially and politically 
significant, i.e. transnational region-building — in other 
words the very impacts to which we think Norden and 
the Community ought to pay particular attention (Part V). 
In Part VI we have broadened the operative perspective 
to present five synopses showing the impact potentials 
of all the strong impacts which have been identified, 
described and assessed in Parts III, IV and V Here we 
attempt an integration of Nordic sectoral weight in rele-
vant areas with the major policy options of the principal 
actors, i.e. Nordic governments and the Community. 
Part VI also aims to provide a schema to test the 
robustness of policy options in regard to all potentially 
strong Nordic impacts. 
We still believe that Norden's major impact, regionally 
and spatially, on Europe will be in the area of trans-
national region-building around the Baltic and North 
Seas with vast and beneficial Implications in adjacent 
EC territories (primarily Denmark, Schleswig-Holstein 
and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania but with benefi-
cial repercussions even further south and without 
presenting any disadvantages to southern Europe). In 
addition, Part V identifies a transnational region with no 
territory currently belonging to the Community (the 
greater Barents region), but which we deem to have 
potentially great implications for the Community's gene-
ral future orientation, 
However, it is a near certainty that other strong Nordic 
impact factors (i.e. Nordic regional policy, Norden as a 
growth area and impacts from important Nordic econo-
mic sectors), as cross-analysed in the synopses, will be 
important to Europe and not least to a Norden in 
Europe (which is evidenced in the current membership 
negotiations between the Community and Norway, 
Sweden and Finland). 
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2, General overview of relevant Nordic characteristics 
2.1. A definition of Norden 
When we talk of 'Norden' and 'the Nordic area' in this 
study, we shall be referring to four Nordic countries: 
Iceland, Sweden, Norway and Finland. We shall also 
use the terms 'the Nordic countries' and 'the Nordic 
Four' to identify these four countries, none of which is, 
as yet, a member of the European Community. 
As it is an EC member, Denmark has from the outset 
been excluded from Norden in line with the provisions 
stated by the European Commission in its tender No 
90/16 which outlines the procedural rules for the study. 
Limited attention has been paid to the two self-govern-
ing areas within the Danish realm, the Faeroe Islands 
and Greenland, both of whom have chosen to remain 
outside the Community. However, being very much part 
of Norden, their impact contribution has been consid-
ered in two important fields: (i) Norden's geographical 
extension and by amplification its problems of main-
taining territorial cohesion, and (ii) their significant con-
tributions to Nordic fisheries. 
Much of Norden is high-lying or mountainous terrain. 
Only a little over half the total area (690 000 km2) lies at 
an altitude below 300 m. 
A combination of these facts indicates that the vast 
Nordic area is characterized by long distances and dif-
ficult terrain which land transport has to overcome. 
Climatically, Norden is on average colder than the rest 
of the Community, and the northernmost regions are 
classified as Arctic. This again affects transport be-
cause of the hazards of ice and snow, but it also limits 
other human activities, for example, agriculture. 
(b) Because of its very low population, 18 million 
people, Nordic integration into the Community 
would only add 5% to the total EC population. 
In spite of Norden's vast territory, implying generally low 
population density, settlements are widely dispersed. 
All the same, it is still possible to identify core regions 
where settlement and economic activity are concen-
trated. 
2.2. Norden's main geographical 
patterns 
What characterizes the geography of the Nordic Four? 
The general low-density population problem is partly 
offset as the Nordic population tends to be concen-
trated in a belt whose northern extension stretches from 
south-western Norway, through the capital city region 
of Oslo, continuing on to the Swedish capital city 
region of Stockholm, before ending in the Finnish capi-
tal city region of Helsinki and the Finnish south-eastern 
border region adjacent to Russia. 
Compared with the surface area of the Community 
(2 367000 km2), the area of the Nordic Four is large 
(1 215 000 km2). If it happens, the integration of the 
Nordic Four into the Community will increase the EC 
land area by 50%. 
This relatively densely populated area continues south-
wards into the northern part of the Community, to 
Denmark and the Baltic Sea regions of Germany. It also 
continues eastwards to the eastern Baltic rim regions of 
the St Petersburg city region in Russia, the Baltic coun-
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tries, and south­eastwards to the Baltic Sea coastal 
stretch from Kaliningrad/Königsberg to Poland. It is in 
this belt that the densest population area in the greater 
Nordic area is found. 
The most important Nordic urban agglomerations are 
situated in this belt. The capital cities act as central 
nodes in a settlement system which includes the 
European border region cities in the south and south­
east. 
The same geographical belt also offers the best condi­
tions for intensive agriculture in Norden. Production 
yields and quality equal or surpass European standards 
and averages. 
North of this belt of higher population density and grea­
ter economic activity lies the coniferous forest belt, and 
further north — beyond the Arctic Circle — lies the 
Arctic belt consisting of tundra and mixed forest. 
In these two distinct northern belts lying north of the 
Oslo­Helsinki axis, industrial clusters are raw­material 
based and consist mainly of primary industries: extrac­
tion of minerals, oil and gas forestry, fishing, etc. These 
industrial communities are often located in remote 
areas, being tied to their resource base or energy 
source, for example, hydroelectric power. 
Map 1 
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However, what is remarkable about these northern 
regions is their very advanced level of services, which 
includes universities, advanced professional training 
services, research institutes and consultancy services. 
The northernmost university centres are located in the 
towns of Tromsø in Norway, Luleå in Sweden and 
Rovaniemi in Finland. The University of Iceland is 
located in Reykjavik. 
The most important clusters of manufacturing and ser­
vice industries are also located here. 
2.3. Institutional patterns as a 
product of Nordic regional 
policies 
Historically, the Nordic countries are conceived of as 
being rather homogeneous nation States. Yet there are 
exceptions to every rule. The Samic people (Lapps) 
represent an indigenous ethnic group in the northern 
parts of Norway, Sweden and Finland. 
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Furthermore, the archipelago of Aland, lying between 
Sweden and Finland, is self-governing in important res-
pects though constituting a part of Finland. In accord-
ance with a number of international agreements, the 
first dating back to the middle of the 19th century, Aland 
has obtained a status as a demilitarized, neutral and 
culturally self-governing area. In addition, a number of 
economic and administrative rights have been con-
ferred upon the Aland Government. 
Likewise, Greenland and the Faeroe Islands have ob-
tained even more extended political and economic 
rights through time, even though they are part of the 
Kingdom of Denmark (Norden's EC neighbour). Neither 
Greenland nor the Faeroe Islands is an EC member. In 
Greenland, the majority of the population are indigen-
ous, non-Nordic-speaking people, the Inuit, with close 
cultural and linguistic links to the Inuit in Canada, Russia 
and Alaska. 
Nordic regional policy has traditionally been compensa-
tory, aimed at reducing inequalities In development 
across Norden's vast geographical expanses which are 
caused by long distances, remoteness, cold climate 
and the low-density population. The main objective has 
been to preserve the current settlement pattern across 
the vast territory and create greater geographical co-
hesion. 
The successful result of this regional policy has given 
the Nordic countries a mature, socioeconomic cohesion 
which is characterized by an evenly distributed high 
standard of living throughout the whole territory irre-
spective of geographical locality. 
However, cohesion is inadequately developed in rela-
tion to communication infrastructure. There is a great 
need to develop the infrastructure in order to connect 
peripheral Nordic areas to Nordic core areas. This in-
volves the extension and modernization of roads, rail-
ways, ferries and telecommunications and is essential if 
economic growth is to be achieved through the estab-
lishment of new businesses and necessary if people are 
to have a chance to live where they prefer. 
Development is also required in the field of soft infra-
structure, such as producer services, education, train-
ing, research and cultural activities. This is of funda-
mental importance to economic growth and maintain-
ing cohesion. 
A further characteristic of Nordic regional policies is the 
vital role played by agriculture. The reason is agricul-
ture's direct or indirect role in stabilizing settlement pat-
terns, particularly in the remoter peripheral regions 
where rural depopulation might be considered devasta-
ting. 
Decentralization is another mainstay of Nordic regional 
policy and administration. Since the Second World War, 
the debate on the division of power between the State 
and regional/local authorities has resulted In the latter 
being favoured and much institutional power is exerted 
at this lower tier level. One might say that the principle 
of subsidiarity — as it has come to be discussed after 
the Danish 'no' to Maastricht in June 1992 — owes its 
origin to the Nordic model whereby the regions control 
both planning and resources and have their own reve-
nue base. 
This means that in Norden, power is not merely delega-
ted to the regional and local authorities by central 
powers under the threat of removal if the latter so 
desire. On the contrary, the delegation of power is real 
and based on the higher authorities' acceptance of total 
competence on the part of the lower-tier authorities. 
OECD figures for 1989 reveal that in Norden as much 
as 40 to 50 % of public expenditure was undertaken by 
the lower-tier authorities, with Denmark leading the way 
with well over 50%. (It should be pointed out, however, 
that a substantial part of lower-tier level expenditures is 
mandated by the State). The European average falls 
well below this level, ranging from 10 to 30% depen-
ding on the country concerned. 
12 The Nordic countries 
3. Institutional scenarios for Norden/European 
Community in the year 2000 
Our contemplation of future Norden-EC arrangements 
is based on scenarios of an institutional nature whose 
heuristic value, spatially and regionally, will become 
apparent in the synopses (Part VI), where they are 
employed In cross-analyses with the strong geographi-
cal and sectoral impact factors identified in this study. 
Two institutional scenarios have been constructed: 
(i) A trend-based scenario implies that the Norden-EC 
integration process is continued to the effect that by 
the year 2000 the Community's 'Nordic extension' 
will have been accomplished. 
However, for some Nordic countries one must assume 
that integration will be EEA-like, while being Maastricht-
like for others. As of this reporting, it is impossible to 
Identify the exact outcome of such integrationist endea-
vours as Nordic EC-membership negotiations are still 
under way. Furthermore, despite Denmark's 'yes' to the 
Treaties of Maastricht and Edinburgh on 18 May 1993, 
the future status of the European Union in EUR 12 
appears far from determined. 
Scenario-writing necessitates the construction of a 
contrast scenario. In our context this Is particularly 
prudent as the contrast scenario illuminates what 
might happen if lack of integration or even disinte-
gration rather than integration occurs. To throw light 
on this eventuality we have deliberately chosen a 
fragmentation scenario. 
As becomes apparent in Part VI, the fragmentation 
scenario entails largely negative regional and spatial 
effects for the Community particularly as far as the new 
'regionalization' is concerned (negative in the sense that 
the outcome would appear decidedly undesirable to the 
Community as a whole and to its northern areas in par-
ticular compared to the advantages that could have 
been reaped from a continuation of the integrationist 
process). 
In this executive summary we shall refrain from des-
cribing the undesirable — and to some extent intui-
tively obvious — effects of the fragmentation scenario. 
We refer to Part VI. 
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4, Nordic regional and spatial impacts in the 
Community on the assumption of continued 
institutional integration (the trend scenario) 
4.1. Relative quantitative factors 
Any assessment of potential Nordic regionally and spa-
tially relevant impacts on Community territory must take 
into account Norden's relative quantitative weight within 
societally relevant sectors vis-à-vis the corresponding 
weight of the Community. 
In sectors where Norden has little or no relative power, 
one must — as a point of departure — assume that 
there could be little or no impact regardless of future 
institutional arrangement. 
A very basic statistical analysis shows how Norden re-
lates to the Community when comparing quantifiable 
factors and patterns of Interaction (we refer to the con-
clusion of Part I and Table IV. 1). To their considerable 
comparative advantage, the Nordic Four possess the 
following assets: 
(i) vast, untouched natural areas with extensive eco-
systems; 
(ii) vast, unused, unpopulated or sparsely populated 
areas; 
(iil) vast reserves of oil and natural gas; 
(iv) vast renewable forest reserves; 
(v) vast renewable fish resources; 
(vi) high potential as a European tourist goal. 
In addition, the Nordic Four are in possession of vast 
and significant specialized production and expertise in 
the following industries: 
(i) energy (based on hydroelectric power, thermal 
power or the enormous reserves of oil and natural 
gas); 
(ii) electro-chemicals and electro-metallurgy (based on 
the availability of localized high energy consump-
tion), timber, paper and pulp (based on the vast 
forest reserves), fishing (based on the vast fish 
resources), electronics and metals (based on 
advanced technological know-how). Important 
industrial clusters may result from the activities of 
these industries; 
(iii) offshore (based on oil and natural gas extraction). 
However, relative quantitative preponderance does not 
necessarily translate into identifiable regionally and spa-
tially relevant impacts, as we have argued in this syn-
thesis report. For example, one would be hard pressed 
to operationallze the fact of Norden's strong energy 
position into anything regionally and spatially meaning-
ful. Consequently, this strong Nordic sector has not 
been considered in the cross-analyses in Part VI. 
On the other hand, a decidedly weak Nordic sector like 
agriculture may — precisely due to its weakness and 
lack of international competitiveness — create strong 
regional Impacts on neighbouring EC territories, es-
pecially in Denmark, on the assumption of continued 
institutional integration. Therefore the potential impact 
contribution of Nordic agriculture has been considered 
in the synopses of Part VI. 
On balance — pursuant to the identification of poten-
tially strong impact factors in Parts III, IV and V and their 
cross-analyses with the integrationist institutional 
scenario in Part VI — we predict the following Nordic 
impacts on regional development and spatial organiza-
tion in the Community. 
4.2. Impacts based on Nordic regional 
policies 
Assumptions: It is unlikely that far-reaching institutional 
integration between Norden and the Community can 
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take place unless the eligibility criteria of the EC 
Structural Funds are in some measure changed to 
make allowances for such particularly Nordic concerns 
as sparse population, long distances, cold climate and 
the predicaments of Arctic agriculture. 
Norden does have one very strong argument in favour 
of such claims — an argument which would undoubt-
edly make a certain impression on a Community that 
has made European coherence a primary political goal: 
the fact that through determined regional policies the 
Nordic countries have succeeded in reducing the differ-
ences in living standards between peripheral and core 
areas to no more than 13%, implying that in important 
respects Nordic cohesion has been practically 
achieved. Due to the current fiscal crises of Nordic 
States, there is no certainty that such standards can be 
maintained in the future. Nevertheless, Europe could 
learn from the Nordic experience. 
Impacts: If Nordic integration becomes EEA-like there 
will be no impact. If a Maastricht-like integration is 
achieved, there will be relatively strong and geographi-
cally well-defined regional and spatial impacts in EC 
areas with geographical or climatic characteristics cor-
responding to those of Norden, the reason being that 
such areas would become eligible for (additional) struc-
tural support. (In Figure IV.10, Part IV, we have Identified 
a number of such potential regional beneficiaries: areas 
in central Spain, southern Portugal and northern 
Scotland.) 
A variant of the outcome of the Maastricht-like scenario 
is that the current EC members would accept only 
Arctic agriculture as deserving of Structural Fund sup-
port. In that case there would be no further impacts in 
EC territories as there are no Arctic (agricultural) zones 
within EUR 12. 
4.3. Impacts based on the emergence 
of a Nordic growth area 
Assumptions: A 'third European core area' develops in 
Norden as a consequence of the enormous economic 
potentials inherent in a Nordic-Russian/East European 
commercial and resource-management partnership, a 
general European and international Integration and a 
'new deal' in the pan-European division of labour as a 
result of transport congestion and the high environ-
mental and economic costs of further agglomeration in 
the European 'banana' areas. 
Impacts: There would be a marked tendency towards 
an additional EC preoccupation of the Nordic growth 
area. 
In the Community's northern border areas with Norden 
(most notably in Denmark and a number of northern 
German Länder) a closer integration with a new (greater 
Nordic) European growth area might contribute to 
sustained economic growth. 
In central parts of the Community — which we may 
roughly define as what is popularly referred to as 'the 
blue banana' — the growing burdens of congestion 
(delays, pollution, rising costs of location) eloquently 
described in a number of recent Commission docu-
ments might be alleviated. 
In southern parts of the Community the impacts would 
be small or negligible due to the remoteness of the 
greater Nordic area. A greater EC absorption in 
northern affairs might easily be compensated for 
through a greater pan-European revenue base. 
Consequently, the institutional integration into Europe of 
a Nordic growth area should not be considered a zero-
sum game but more likely as a plus-sum game for the 
entire Community. 
4.4. Impacts based on the develop-
ment of Nordic agriculture, 
fisheries, tourism 
and transportation 
Assumptions: Due to institutional integration and the 
resulting abolition of a number of national protective 
regulations in the Nordic countries, competition within 
the above sectors is intensified. Iceland and Norway 
increase their European market shares in fish. Physical 
transport barriers in Europe south of Hamburg, accen-
tuated by new 'green' taxes on transportation, create 
changes in market conditions favouring EC northern 
and southern regions. 
Impacts: Strong positive impacts in the agricultural 
regions, primarily of Denmark and northern Germany 
(as illustrated by Figure IV.10 in Part IV). Enhanced 
industrial competitive positions in northern EC regions 
which are able to expand their trade with less con-
gested areas. 'Sun-tourism' destinations in the western 
Mediterranean stand to lose due to a Nordic change of 
taste in the direction of cultural and green tourism (such 
a change, which is already under way, would benefit, 
among other areas, parts of Greece, as illustrated by 
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Figure IV.11 in Part IV). However, this latter effect has 
little to do with European institutional integration or dis-
integration. Fisheries-dependent local communities 
around the North Sea would be heavily impacted by 
Icelandic and Norwegian decisions to strengthen their 
positions in the European market. 
4.5. Impacts based on the 
emergence of Nordic 
transnational region-building 
Assumptions: A greater Baltic Sea region, a greater 
Barents region and a North Sea region establish them-
selves as primarily horizontally integrated areas. The 
same applies to their subregions: the west Baltic 
region, the core Baltic region and the core Barents 
region. (The extensions of the various regions are indi-
cated in Figures V.4 and V.12 in Part V). 
Two of these regions are important enough to merit a 
brief discussion in this summary: the greater Baltic Sea 
region and the greater Barents region. The third major 
region identified above, the North Sea region, is the 
subject of an independent regional impact study com-
missioned by the European Community and has been 
dealt with only summarily in the present report. 
4.5.1 . The greater Baltic Sea region 
The nation States that form the greater Baltic Sea 
region comprise Denmark, Germany, Poland, 
Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Russia, Finland, Sweden and 
Norway. 
This grouping now has a representative body, the 
Council of the Baltic Sea States, which was established 
in Copenhagen in March 1992. The agreement was 
signed by the foreign ministers of the affiliated coun-
tries. Moreover, the European Commission was repre-
sented at the founding meeting. 
Documents issued from the founding conference in-
clude an agreement to tackle a series of tasks through 
regional cooperation: the development of the infrastruc-
ture, economic development, securing of human rights, 
improving the environment, strengthening democratic 
institutions and the eventual incorporation of all the 
Baltic Sea States into the Community. 
The Baltic Sea region integrates both the northern re-
gions of the existing Community and border regions of 
Russia, the Baltic nations and Poland. Finland has a 
common border with Russia which is 1 000 km long. 
Norway also has a common border with Russia in the 
strategically important northernmost part of the Barents 
region. 
Stressing a bottom-up approach, the present study has 
identified two Baltic Sea subregions: the western Baltic 
Sea region and the core Baltic Sea region. 
The western Baltic Sea region has an infrastructural 
basis which links a network of towns, forming a rela-
tively compact urban agglomeration. Growth occurs 
along an axis starting at the Norwegian town of 
Lillehammer, passing through the Norwegian capital city 
of Oslo to the Swedish town of Gothenburg, south-
wards to Malmø, on to the Danish capital of Copen-
hagen, before ending at the three German seaports on 
the Baltic Sea coast — Kiel, Lübeck, Rostock and their 
hinterlands. 
The subregion's high urban density gives it a substanti-
al potential for vertical integration. The core agglomera-
tion will presumably be the twin-city hub of 
Copenhagen/Malmø which boasts a combined popula-
tion of 2.5 million. 
A prerequisite for this development will be the realiza-
tion of the Øresund bridge or tunnel between Malmø 
and Copenhagen which will give the two countries their 
first-ever fixed land-transport link by the turn of the cen-
tury. 
The other Baltic Sea subregion, the core Baltic Sea 
region, is a scenario anchored in an axis which starts 
with the greater Stockholm/Uppsala city zone in the 
west, crosses the Baltic Sea eastwards (to include the 
city regions along the coasts of the Gulf of Finland — 
Turku, Helsinki and St Petersburg) and southwards (to 
include Tallinn in Estonia and the Riga city region in 
Latvia). 
The core Baltic Sea region has a relatively high degree 
of urbanization: the large towns and cities have a total 
population of 14 million. Accelerated intra-regional inte-
gration will be furthered by planned improvements in 
road, rail, air and sea-ferry connections. A proposed 
motorway, the 'Via Baltica', will effectively connect the 
region to the main continent and the EC countries. 
4.5.2. The greater Barents region 
The States in the greater Barents region are all the 
Nordic countries, including Denmark, and Russia. 
Furthermore, the Community has signed the agreement 
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on this functional region. The higher political organs are 
the Barents Council and the Regional Council. 
The greater Barents region comprises seven adminis-
trative areas: in Norway: Nordland, Trams and Finn-
mark; in Sweden: Norrbotten; in Finland: Lapland; in 
Russia: the Murmansk city region and the Archangel 
city region. The aim is to establish a functional region on 
a horizontal integration basis. 
The regional task ahead demands effective cooperation 
on the following issues: polar resource utilization, trade, 
environmental problem-solving and, not least, regional 
security In light of the transition taking place in post-
communist Russia. 
The last-mentioned problem area is interesting as it is 
also a current matter of deep concern in EC regions 
adjacent to former communist States. 
The main characteristics of the greater Barents region 
may be defined as follows: 
(i) a vast territory, 
(ii) a harsh climate, 
(iii) a dispersed low-density population, 
(iv) co-existence of several indigenous peoples, 
(v) a legacy of burdens from a totalitarian past, and 
(vi) a wealth of untapped resources. 
The region-building policy tasks that will form the basis 
of Interregional and transnational cooperation within the 
greater Barents region are as follows: 
(i) how to exploit the natural resources; 
(ii) how to develop commerce and trade relations; 
(iii) how to solve threatening environmental problems; 
(¡v) how to maintain peace and security in the wake of 
the disintegration of the Soviet Union or even a 
break-up of Russia itself. 
Towards the year 2000, there is likely to be an opportu-
nity for greater integration and the development of inter-
regional networks and alliances. A variant of the scena-
rio foresees the crystallization of a subregion, the core 
Barents region, based on the major towns of 
Murmansk, Archangel, KirkenesA/adsø and Tromsø, as 
these already sizeable population concentrations will be 
well placed to act as centres for the management of 
resource exploitation, processing of raw materials, and 
as major ports of call along any sea routes which might 
eventually open up the north-east passage. 
Impacts from transnational region-building in the Nordic 
area: considerable, positive meso-regional impacts 
would be noticeable northern areas of the 
Community. Concretely, positive effects would be 
noticeable throughout the entire area from Jutland and 
Zealand to Schleswig-Holstein and Mecklenburg-
Western Pomerania where intensified economic devel-
opment and urban agglomeration would occur. 
In particular, the northern German regions should bene-
fit from closer linkages with the core Baltic Sea region 
through the planned Via Baltica (the road connection 
between the Baltic States and northern Germany), in 
addition to the advantages they would undoubtedly 
reap from the planned bridge connection between 
southern Sweden and the Copenhagen area with 
further connections to the south (see Figures V.15 and 
V.16inPartV). 
EC regions all around the North Sea from northern 
Jutland to Bruges and Aberdeen would benefit from a 
more integrated North Sea region. Jutland would ap-
pear to gain most from the realization of the planned 
west link from south-eastern Norway through northern 
Jutland and the Nordic link from the Swedish port of 
Gothenburg to the Danish port of Frederikshavn. 
Regional impacts in the Community of potential devel-
opments In the greater Barents region would be difficult 
to detect. Impacts would undoubtedly be of a macro-
spatial character, i.e. they would tend to influence 
the general orientation and macro-spatial organization 
throughout the Community. 
A few important observations should be emphasized 
particularly in regard to the greater Barents region: If 
Norway and/or Finland were to join the Community as 
full members, the eastern borders of these two nations 
would constitute the Community's only land border with 
ex-Soviet territories. The potential macro-spatial impli-
cations of such an eventuality can probably be inferred 
from the fact that although neither the initiating power 
behind the Barents effort (Norway) nor any of the other 
States whose territories participate in this cooperative 
endeavour are as yet members of the Community, the 
Commission has nevertheless officially decided to join in 
the effort. 
Of course, the general political desirability of stabilizing 
and normalizing conditions in this potentially volatile 
area plays an important role not only for the Nordic 
countries and for the Russian central and local govern-
ments but also for the Community. But perhaps equal-
ly important is the consideration that the core Barents 
region — and in particular the Barents Sea and the Kola 
Peninsula — constitutes Europe's potentially most 
valuable natural resource area. In other words, it is of 
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considerable strategic importance, as we have stressed 
in Part V of the synthesis report. 
Nor has it probably gone unnoticed among national and 
EC analysts and decision-makers that the Barents re-
gion-building endeavour constitutes a unique European 
experiment in direct regional cooperation between 
countries who might be eligible for EC membership and 
a country (Russia) that is not at the moment but with 
whom it is essential to strengthen mutually advantage-
ous ties. Thus the building of a functional region in the 
Barents area could serve as a pan-European laboratory 
whose practical results might become instructive for 
similar endeavours along the EC's eastern and southern 
rims. 
Naturally, some of the above observations also apply to 
the transnational region-building efforts that are cur-
rently undertaken in the greater Baltic Sea region. 
The Nordic countries 
5. Conclusion 
It is essential to point out that a successful 
Norderweiterung of the Community would come with 
some strings attached, not only leading to vast oppor-
tunities but also to new European commitments that go 
beyond the mere integration of 18 million northerners. 
The institutional integration of Norden into the 
Community would, therefore, entail a growing European 
macro-spatial emphasis on the European North. 
The construction of a 'Europe without frontiers', i.e. the 
completion of the institutional integration process be-
tween Norden and the Community, would undoubtedly 
give added impetus to this region-building, involving 
areas of several nation States. On the other hand, as 
pointed out in the synthesis report, the realization of a 
European 'fragmentation scenario' would in all like-
lihood dampen this region-building process, not least 
due to the fact that increased emphasis would be put 
on the national centres and on their power to effec-
tively regulate and/or monopolize activities within the 
national territory. 
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Document de synthèse 
Question clé: 
impact du développement des pays nordiques 
sur le développement régional 
et sur l'organisation territoriale de la Communauté 
1, Structure et logique 
Le rapport de synthèse comprend six parties, suivies 
d'un sommaire des implications politiques. 
Du point de vue de sa structure, le rapport de synthèse 
passe de considérations et d'analyses générales à des 
questions de plus en plus spécifiques. 
Autrement dit, le présent document commence par un 
tableau général — une comparaison entre le Nord et 
l'actuelle Communauté européenne (CE) (partie I) — et 
par des scénarios institutionnels se référant à la relation 
Nord-Communauté européenne en l'an 2000 (partie II), 
et se poursuit par un catalogue des Impacts potentiels 
de l'adhésion des pays nordiques sur l'Europe, faibles 
ou forts (partie III), jusqu'à ce que nous définissons 
comme des impacts prononcés (partie VI). 
Étant donné son caractère général, la partie III constitue 
aussi une base utile pour approfondir les parties II et IV 
Parmi les impacts potentiels prononcés, nous nous 
focaliserons sur une catégorie particulière d'impacts 
que nous considérons comme les plus actifs et les plus 
importants sur les plans régional, territorial et politique, 
à savoir la constitution de régions transnationales — en 
d'autres termes, précisément les impacts auxquels les 
pays nordiques et la Communauté européenne doivent, 
à notre avis, accorder une attention particulière (par-
tie V). 
Dans la partie VI, nous avons élargi notre perspective 
pour présenter cinq tableaux synthétiques concernant 
tous les impacts potentiels prononcés qui sont définis 
dans les études spéciales. Nous essayons d'analyser 
par recoupements: les impacts potentiels de l'adhésion 
des pays nordiques; les grandes orientations choisies 
par les principaux acteurs, c'est-à-dire les gouverne-
ments des pays nordiques et la Communauté 
européenne; les deux scénarios institutionnels, à savoir 
le scénario par intégration et le scénario par fragmenta-
tion. 
La partie VI propose également un schéma permettant 
de tester la solidité des orientations retenues par rap-
port à tous les impacts potentiels prononcés de l'adhé-
sion des pays nordiques. ' 
Nous persistons à croire que la grande incidence sur 
l'Europe de l'adhésion des pays nordiques, tant au 
niveau régional qu'au niveau territorial, sera la constitu-
tion de régions transnationales autour de la mer 
Baltique et de la mer du Nord, qui auront d'importantes 
répercussions bénéfiques sur les territoires adjacents 
de la Communauté européenne (essentiellement le 
Danemark, le Schleswig-Holstein et le Mecklembourg-
Poméranie-Occidentale, mais aussi plus au sud, sans 
pour autant être préjudiciables à l'Europe méridionale). 
En outre, la partie V identifie une région transnationale 
dont aucun territoire n'appartient actuellement à la 
Communauté européenne (la région du Grand Barents), 
mais dont nous pensons qu'elle peut avoir d'importan-
tes conséquences sur l'orientation générale future de la 
Communauté. 
Toutefois, il est presque certain que d'autres grands 
facteurs d'impact de l'adhésion des pays nordiques (à 
savoir leur politique régionale, le Nord comme zone de 
croissance et les impacts à attendre d'importants sec-
teurs économiques de ces pays), analysés par recou-
pements dans les tableaux synthétiques, seront impor-
tants pour l'Europe et surtout pour le Nord intégré à 
l'Europe (ce qui ressort des négociations d'adhésion 
actuelles entre la Communauté européenne et la 
Norvège, la Suède et la Finlande). 
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2, Présentation générale des caractéristiques 
significatives des pays nordiques 
2.1. Une définition du Nord 
Lorsqu'il est question du «Nord» ou de la «zone nordi-
que» dans la présente étude, il s'agit des quatre pays 
nordiques que sont la Finlande, la Norvège, la Suède et 
l'Islande. Nous utilisons également les termes «pays 
nordiques» pour identifier ces quatre pays dont aucun, 
à ce jour, n'est encore membre de la Communauté 
européenne. 
En tant que membre de la Communauté européenne, le 
Danemark a été exclu dès le départ des pays nordi-
ques, conformément à la déclaration de la Commission 
européenne dans son appel d'offres 90/16, qui expose 
les règles de procédure suivies dans l'étude. 
Une attention limitée a été accordée aux deux régions 
autonomes intérieures au royaume de Danemark: les 
îles Féroé et le Groenland, qui ont choisi l'une et l'au-
tre de demeurer en dehors de la Communauté. 
Toutefois, comme ces régions font partie intégrante du 
Nord, leur impact a été pris en considération dans deux 
domaines importants: l'extension géographique du 
Nord, et, partant, les problèmes posés par le maintien 
de sa cohésion territoriale, et leurs importantes contri-
butions à la pêche des pays nordiques. 
2.2. Les principales caractéristiques 
géographiques du Nord 
Qu'est-ce qui caractérise la géographie des quatre 
pays nordiques? 
a) Par rapport à la surface de la Communauté 
européenne (2 367 000 km2), les quatre pays nordi-
ques sont très étendus (1 215000 km2). Si elle se con-
crétise, l'intégration de ces quatre pays dans la 
Communauté européenne augmentera de 50% la 
superficie de cette dernière. 
Le territoire du Nord est situé essentiellement en alti-
tude, ou bien il est montagneux. À peine plus de la moi-
tié de la superficie totale (690000 km2) est à une alti-
tude inférieure à 300 mètres au-dessus du niveau de la 
mer. 
Compte tenu de ces éléments, toute la zone nordique 
est caractérisée par de longues distances et par un ter-
rain accidenté, ce qui complique le transport terrestre. 
Sur le plan climatique, le Nord est plus froid, en 
moyenne, que le reste de la Communauté européenne, 
et les régions les plus septentrionales sont classées 
zones arctiques. De nouveau, cela se répercute sur les 
transports, pour lesquels la glace et la neige constituent 
des dangers, mais cela limite aussi d'autres activités 
humaines comme l'agriculture. 
b) En raison de la très faible population des pays nordi-
ques (18 millions d'habitants), leur intégration dans la 
Communauté européenne n'augmentera que de 5 % la 
population totale de cette dernière. 
En dépit de l'étendue des pays nordiques, où la densité 
de la population est généralement faible, l'habitat y est 
très dispersé. 
De la même manière, il est possible d'identifier des 
régions nodales, c'est-à-dire où l'habitat et l'activité 
économique sont fortement concentrés. 
Le problème général de la faible densité démographi-
que est partiellement compensé par le fait que la popu-
lation des pays nordiques a tendance à se concentrer 
dans une ceinture qui commence au sud-ouest de la 
Norvège, passe par l'agglomération d'Oslo, continue 
par l'agglomération de Stockholm et se termine par 
l'agglomération de Helsinki et la région frontalière du 
sud-est de la Finlande, limitrophe de la Russie. 
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Cette zone relativement peuplée se poursuit vers le sud 
par la partie septentrionale de la CE, jusqu'au 
Danemark et aux régions allemandes de la mer 
Baltique. Elle se poursuit vers l'est par la partie orien-
tale de la mer Baltique, avec la région de l'aggloméra-
tion de Saint-Pétersbourg en Russie, les pays baltes et, 
vers le sud-est, la zone côtière de la mer Baltique allant 
de Kaliningrad (anciennement Königsberg) à la 
Pologne. C'est dans cette ceinture que l'on trouve la 
plus forte densité démographique du Grand Nord. 
Les principales agglomérations des pays nordiques 
sont situées dans cette ceinture. Les capitales sont les 
noyaux d'un système d'habitat qui englobe, au sud et 
au sud-est, les agglomérations européennes limi-
trophes. 
Cependant, chaque règle a ses exceptions. Les peu-
ples Samits (les Lapons) constituent un groupe ethni-
que indigène des régions septentrionales de la 
Norvège, de la Suède et de la Finlande. 
De plus, l'archipel d'Ahvenanmaa, situé entre la Suède 
et la Finlande, est autonome dans des domaines impor-
tants, tout en faisant partie de la Finlande. 
Conformément à un certain nombre d'accords interna-
tionaux, dont le premier remonte au milieu du XIXe 
siècle, Ahvenanmaa a obtenu le statut de zone démili-
tarisée, neutre et culturellement autonome. De plus, un 
certain nombre de droits économiques et administratifs 
ont été accordés au gouvernement d'Ahvenanmaa. 
La même ceinture géographique offre également les 
meilleures conditions d'une agriculture intensive dans le 
Nord. Les rendements et la qualité des produits attei-
gnent ou dépassent même les normes et les moyennes 
européennes. 
On y trouve aussi les plus grands regroupements d'in-
dustries manufacturières et de services. 
Au nord de cette ceinture à forte concentration hu-
maine et économique s'étend la ceinture de forêts de 
conifères; encore plus au nord — au-delà du cercle arc-
tique — se trouve la ceinture arctique, composée de 
toundra et de forêts mixtes. 
Dans ces deux ceintures septentrionales situées au 
nord de l'axe Oslo-Helsinki, les regroupements indus-
triels se sont constitués en fonction des matières pre-
mières; ils comprennent essentiellement des industries 
primaires: extraction de minéraux, de pétrole et de gaz, 
sylviculture, pêche, etc. Les communautés industrielles 
sont souvent implantées dans des zones reculées, 
puisqu'elles sont liées aux ressources ou à une source 
d'énergie, par exemple l'énergie hydroélectrique. 
Toutefois, un élément remarquable de ces régions 
septentrionales est le haut niveau de développe-
ment de leurs services, puisqu'on y trouve des uni-
versités, des services de formation professionnelle 
de pointe, des instituts de recherche et des servi-
ces de conseil. Les centres universitaires les plus sep-
tentrionaux sont situés dans les villes de Tromsø en 
Norvège, de Luleå en Suède et de Rovaniemi en 
Finlande. L'université islandaise est à Reykjavik. 
2.3. Schémas institutionnels 
issus des politiques régionales 
des pays nordiques 
Historiquement parlant, les pays nordiques sont conçus 
comme des États-nations assez homogènes. 
De la même manière, le Groenland et les îles Féroé ont 
progressivement obtenu des droits politiques et écono-
miques étendus, en dépit de leur appartenance au 
royaume de Danemark (le voisin communautaire des 
pays nordiques). Ni le Groenland ni les îles Féroé ne 
sont membres de la Communauté européenne. Au 
Groenland, l'essentiel de la population est formé par un 
peuple indigène de langue non nordique, les Inuits, 
ayant des liens culturels et linguistiques étroits avec les 
Inuits du Canada, de la Russie et de l'Alaska. 
La politique régionale des pays nordiques est tradi-
tionnellement de nature compensatoire, puisqu'elle 
cherche à réduire les inégalités en matière de dévelop-
pement dont souffrent de vastes étendues géographi-
ques du Nord, dues aux distances, à l'éloignement, au 
froid et à la faible densité démographique. Son principal 
objectif a été de préserver l'habitat actuel sur ce vaste 
territoire et de renforcer la cohésion géographique. 
La réussite de cette politique régionale a conféré aux 
pays nordiques une maturité et une cohésion socio-
économique qui se caractérise par un niveau de vie 
élevé, uniformément réparti sur l'ensemble du terri-
toire, indépendamment de la situation géogra-
phique. 
Toutefois, la cohésion est insuffisante au niveau des 
infrastructures de communication. Ces infrastructures 
doivent être considérablement développées, afin de 
rattacher les zones périphériques du Nord aux régions 
fortement développées. Cela suppose le développe-
ment et la modernisation des routes, des voies ferrées, 
des services de ferry et des télécommunications, élé-
ments essentiels si l'on veut développer la croissance 
économique par la création d'entreprises et permettre à 
la population de vivre où elle le souhaite. 
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Le développement est également nécessaire dans le 
domaine des infrastructures légères telles que les servi-
ces à la production, l'éducation, la formation, la recher-
che et les activités culturelles. Cela est extrêmement 
important pour la croissance économique et le maintien 
de la cohésion. 
Une autre caractéristique des politiques régionales des 
pays nordiques est le rôle fondamental de leur agricul-
ture, qui intervient directement ou indirectement dans la 
stabilisation des modes d'habitat, notamment dans les 
régions périphériques les plus éloignées où l'exode 
rural peut être considéré comme catastrophique. 
La décentralisation est une autre constante de la poli-
tique régionale des pays nordiques et de leur adminis-
tration. Depuis la Seconde Guerre mondiale, le débat 
sur la répartition des pouvoirs entre l'État et les auto-
rités régionales et locales a tourné à l'avantage de ces 
dernières, et c'est à leur niveau que s'exerce l'essentiel 
du pouvoir institutionnel. On pourrait dire que le prin-
cipe de la subsidiante — tel qu'il a été discuté après 
le «non» danois à Maastricht en juin 1992 — tire 
son origine du modèle nordique, dans lequel les ré-
gions contrôlent à la fois la planification et les ressour-
ces et disposent de leurs propres sources de revenu. 
Cela signifie que, dans les pays nordiques, le pouvoir 
n'est pas simplement délégué aux autorités régionales 
et locales par les autorités centrales, sous réserve, pour 
ces dernières, de le reprendre si elles le souhaitent. Au 
contraire, la délégation de pouvoir est réelle et repose 
sur l'acceptation par les autorités de rang supérieur de 
la compétence totale du pouvoir subordonné. Les chif-
fres établis par l'OCDE pour 1989 révèlent que, dans le 
Nord, 40 à 50% des dépenses publiques ont été 
engagées par les autorités subordonnées, le Danemark 
étant en tête avec un chiffre supérieur à 50 % (il est à 
noter, cependant, qu'une partie substantielle des 
dépenses des autorités subordonnées est ordonnée 
par l'État). La moyenne européenne est très inférieure à 
ce niveau, puisqu'elle s'échelonne entre 10 et 30% 
selon le pays. 
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3, Scénarios institutionnels des relations Nord-CE 
en l'an 2000 
Notre conception des arrangements entre le Nord et la 
Communauté européenne repose sur des scénarios 
d'ordre institutionnel dont la valeur heuristique, sur les 
plans territorial et régional, apparaîtra dans les tableaux 
synthétiques (partie VI), où Ils sont utilisés dans des 
analyses par recoupements, avec les facteurs d'impact 
prononcé, géographiques et sectoriels, Identifiés dans 
la présente étude. 
Deux scénarios institutionnels ont été conçus. 
Il s'agit, d'abord, d'un scénario de confirmation de la 
tendance, selon lequel le processus d'Intégration entre 
le Nord et la Communauté européenne sera poursuivi 
afin que, d'ici à l'an 2000, l'élargissement de la 
Communauté européenne aux pays nordiques soit 
achevé. 
Cependant, il ne faut pas oublier que, dans certains 
pays nordiques, l'intégration sera de type «EEE», alors 
que, dans d'autres, elle sera de type «Maastricht». Au 
moment de rédiger le présent document, il est impos-
sible de déterminer l'issue exacte de ces efforts d'inté-
gration, puisque les négociations d'adhésion des pays 
nordiques à la Communauté européenne ne sont pas 
encore achevées. De plus, malgré le «oui» danois au 
traité de Maastricht et aux décisions prises à Edim-
bourg le 18 mal 1993, le statut futur de l'Union 
européenne semble loin d'être arrêté parmi les Douze. 
L'établissement d'un scénario suppose un scénario par 
contraste. Dans le contexte qui nous intéresse, cela est 
particulièrement prudent, car le scénario par contraste 
met en valeur ce qui risque d'arriver en cas d'intégra-
tion Insuffisante, voire de désintégration. Pour mieux 
comprendre cette éventualité, nous avons délibérément 
choisi un scénario par fragmentation. 
Comme le montre la partie VI, le scénario par fragmen-
tation entraîne pour la Communauté des scénarios 
régionaux et territoriaux largement négatifs, notamment 
en ce qui concerne la nouvelle «régionalisation», négatif 
en ce sens qu'ils auraient un résultat nettement indési-
rable pour la Communauté dans son ensemble et pour 
ses zones septentrionales en particulier, alors que le 
maintien du processus d'intégration aurait été béné-
fique. 
Dans le présent rapport de synthèse, nous nous abs-
tiendrons de décrire les effets indésirables — et, dans 
une certaine mesure, relativement évidents — des 
effets du scénario par fragmentation. Nous nous 
référons à la partie VI. 
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4. Impacts régionaux et territoriaux de l'adhésion 
des pays nordiques sur la Communauté 
dans l'hypothèse de la poursuite 
d'une intégration institutionnelle 
(scénario de confirmation de la tendance) 
4.1. Facteurs quantitatifs relatifs 
Toute évaluation des impacts potentiels de l'adhésion 
des pays nordiques sur la Communauté, aux niveaux 
régional et territorial, doit tenir compte du poids relatif 
du Nord dans les secteurs importants pour la société 
par rapport au poids correspondant de la CE. 
Dans les secteurs dans lesquels le Nord a peu de pou-
voir, voire aucun, il faut partir de l'hypothèse que 
l'adhésion pourrait avoir peu d'incidence, voire aucune, 
Indépendamment des dispositions institutionnelles 
futures. 
Une analyse statistique comparative tout à fait élémen-
taire des facteurs quantifiables et des schémas d'Inter-
action révèle comment le Nord se situe par rapport à la 
CE (nous nous référons à la conclusion de la partie I, 
p. 69, et au tableau IV. 1, p. 94). Il ressort de cette 
comparaison que le grand avantage des quatre pays 
nordiques est la possession des atouts suivants: 
— vastes zones naturelles vierges, dotées d'éco-
systèmes extensifs, 
— vastes zones inutilisées, non peuplées ou, en tout 
cas, peu peuplées, 
— vastes réserves de pétrole et de gaz naturel, 
— vastes réserves de forêts renouvelables, 
— vastes réserves de poissons renouvelables, 
— potentiel élevé en tant que destination touristique 
européenne. 
En outre, les quatre pays nordiques possèdent d'im-
portantes productions spécialisées et une réelle 
compétence dans les secteurs industriels suivants: 
— énergie (énergie hydroélectrique, énergie thermique 
et énormes réserves de pétrole et de gaz naturel); 
— électrochimie et électrométallurgie (fondées sur 
l'existence d'un potentiel énergétique local consi-
dérable), bols, papier et pâte (en raison de vastes 
réserves forestières), pêche (grâce aux importantes 
ressources en poissons), électronique et métaux 
(reposant sur des techniques de pointe). Les 
activités de ces secteurs peuvent donner lieu à d'im-
portants complexes industriels; 
— industries off shore (reposant sur l'extraction du 
pétrole et du gaz naturel). 
Cependant, cette relative supériorité quantitative ne se 
traduit pas nécessairement par des impacts prononcés 
identifiables au niveau régional ou territorial, comme 
nous l'avons déjà expliqué dans le présent rapport de 
synthèse. Par exemple, il serait bien difficile de dégager 
de la position de force qu'occupent les pays nordiques 
sur le plan de l'énergie quelque conséquence significa-
tive aux niveaux régional et territorial. C'est pourquoi ce 
puissant secteur «nordique» n'a pas été pris en consi-
dération dans les analyses par recoupements pré-
sentées dans la partie VI. 
Par ailleurs, un secteur assurément faible dans les pays 
nordiques tel que l'agriculture peut très bien — pré-
cisément en raison de sa faiblesse et de l'absence de 
compétitivité au niveau international — avoir d'impor-
tants impacts au niveau régional sur les territoires voi-
sins de la CE, notamment sur le Danemark, dans l'hy-
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pothèse où l'intégration institutionnelle serait main-
tenue. C'est pourquoi l'impact potentiel de l'agriculture 
des pays nordiques a été pris en compte dans les 
tableaux synthétiques de la partie VI. 
Tout compte fait, conformément à l'identification de fac-
teurs d'impact potentiel prononcé dans les parties III 
à V et à leur analyse par recoupements selon le scéna-
rio institutionnel de l'intégration exposé dans la partie 
VI, nous prévoyons que l'adhésion des pays nordi-
ques aura les impacts décrits ci-après sur le déve-
loppement régional et sur l'organisation territoriale 
de la Communauté. 
Dans une variante du scénario de type «Maastricht», les 
États membres actuels de la CE n'accepteraient que 
l'agriculture arctique comme bénéficiaire de l'aide des 
fonds structurels. Dans ce cas, l'adhésion n'aurait pas 
d'autres effets sur les territoires de la CE, puisqu'il n'y a 
pas de zones (agricoles) arctiques dans l'Europe des 
Douze. 
4.3. Impacts reposant sur l'émergence 
d'une zone de croissance 
nordique 
4.2. Impacts fondés sur les politiques 
régionales des pays nordiques 
Hypothèses: ¡I est peu probable qu'une étroite intégra-
tion institutionnelle puisse avoir lieu entre le Nord et la 
CE si les critères d'éligibilité à l'aide des fonds structu-
rels communautaires ne sont pas partiellement modifiés 
pour tenir compte des handicaps particulièrement nor-
diques que représentent une faible population, de lon-
gues distances, un climat froid et les avatars de l'agri-
culture arctique. 
Le Nord dispose d'un argument puissant en faveur de 
la prise en considération de telles préoccupations, un 
argument qui ne devrait pas manquer de faire une cer-
taine impression sur une Communauté qui a fait de la 
cohérence européenne un objectif politique essentiel: le 
fait que, par leurs politiques régionales, les pays nordi-
ques soient parvenus à réduire à quelque 13 % les dif-
férences de niveau de vie entre les zones périphériques 
et les zones fortement développées prouve qu'à d'im-
portants égards ils ont atteint un niveau élevé de cohé-
sion. En raison de la crise budgétaire que subissent 
actuellement ces pays, il n'est pas certain que ces nor-
mes pourront être maintenues; néanmoins, l'Europe 
pourrait tirer profit de l'expérience nordique. 
Impacts: si l'intégration des pays nordiques est de type 
«EEE», elle demeurera sans effet sur la CE. S'il s'agit 
d'une intégration de type «Maastricht», elle aura des 
effets assez marqués et géographiquement bien définis 
aux niveaux régional et territorial dans les zones com-
munautaires présentant des caractéristiques géogra-
phiques ou climatiques correspondant à celles du Nord, 
la raison étant que ces zones pourraient alors bénéficier 
d'aides (supplémentaires) des fonds structurels. (À la 
figure IV10 de la partie IV, nous avons identifié un cer-
tain nombre de bénéficiaires régionaux potentiels: il 
s'agit de zones situées au centre de l'Espagne, au sud 
du Portugal et au nord de l'Ecosse.) 
Hypothèses: une troisième zone européenne à forte 
concentration se constitue dans le Nord grâce à 
l'énorme potentiel économique propre à un partenariat 
entre les pays nordiques, la Russie et l'Europe de l'Est 
en matière de commerce et de gestion des ressources, 
à une intégration générale européenne et internationale 
et à un New Deal dans la division paneuropéenne du 
travail par suite du blocage des transports et des coûts 
élevés, aux niveaux environnemental et économique, 
d'une nouvelle extension de la «banane européenne». 
Impacts: Il y aurait une tendance marquée en faveur 
d'un plus grand intérêt de la CE pour la zone de crois-
sance nordique. 
Dans les zones septentrionales de la CE situées en bor-
dure des pays nordiques (essentiellement au Danemark 
et dans un certain nombre de Lander du nord de 
l'Allemagne), une intégration plus étroite, avec une nou-
velle zone de croissance européenne (Grand Nord), 
pourrait favoriser une croissance économique sou-
tenue. 
Dans les zones centrales de la Communauté, couver-
tes, en gros, par l'expression populaire de «banane 
bleue», les charges croissantes de la congestion 
(retards, pollution, augmentation des coûts en fonction 
de l'Implantation), longuement décrites dans un certain 
nombre de documents récents de la Commission, 
pourraient être atténuées. 
Dans les réglons du sud de la Communauté, les im-
pacts seraient faibles ou négligeables en raison de 
l'éloignement par rapport au Grand Nord. 
En conséquence, l'intégration institutionnelle d'une 
zone de croissance nordique dans l'Europe ne doit pas 
être considérée comme un jeu à somme nulle, mais 
plutôt comme un jeu à somme positive pour l'ensemble 
de la CE. 
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4.4. Impacts 
reposant sur le développement 
de l'agriculture, de la pêche, 
du tourisme et des transports 
dans les pays nordiques 
Hypothèses: par suite de l'intégration institutionnelle et 
de l'abolition d'un certain nombre de régimes de pro-
tection nationaux qui en découlera dans les pays nordi-
ques, la concurrence s'accroîtra dans les secteurs pré-
cités. L'Islande et la Norvège augmenteront leurs parts 
sur le marché européen du poisson. Les barrières phy-
siques aux transports en Europe, au sud de Hambourg, 
accentuées par de nouvelles taxes «vertes» sur les 
transports, modifieront les conditions de marché en 
faveur des régions septentrionales et méridionales 
de la CE. 
Impacts: les impacts seront nettement positifs dans les 
régions agricoles, essentiellement au Danemark et dans 
le nord de l'Allemagne (comme l'Illustre la figure IV. 10 
dans la partie IV). La position concurrentielle de l'in-
dustrie s'améliorera dans les régions septentrionales de 
la CE qui sont en mesure de développer leurs échanges 
avec des zones moins congestionnées. La 
Méditerranée occidentale, destination recherchée pour 
son ensoleillement, risque de souffrir de l'évolution du 
goût des populations nordiques pour un tourisme «cul-
turel» et «vert» (ce changement, déjà constaté, favori-
sera, notamment, certaines régions de Grèce, comme 
le montre la figure IV.11 dans la partie IV). (Toutefois, 
cette dernière conséquence n'a pas grand-chose à voir 
avec l'intégration institutionnelle ou la désintégration de 
l'Europe.) Les communautés tributaires de la pêche 
autour de la mer du Nord seraient touchées de plein 
fouet si l'Islande et la Norvège décidaient de renforcer 
leur position sur le marché européen. 
4.5. Impacts 
reposant sur la constitution 
de régions transnationales 
nordiques 
Hypothèses: la région «mer Baltique élargie», la région 
du Grand Barents et la région «mer du Nord» se consti-
tuent en tant que zones intégrées essentiellement au 
niveau horizontal. Il en va de même pour leurs sous-
régions: la région «mer Baltique occidentale», la région 
«mer Baltique nodale» et la région du Barents nodal (les 
extensions de ces différentes régions sont indiquées 
dans la figure V.12 de la partie V). 
Deux de ces régions sont assez importantes pour méri-
ter un bref commentaire dans le présent sommaire: la 
région «mer Baltique élargie» et la région du Grand 
Barents. La troisième grande région identifiée ci-des-
sus, la région «mer du Nord», fait l'objet d'une étude 
d'impact régional indépendante commandée par la CE, 
et elle n'est donc traitée que sommairement dans le 
présent rapport. 
4.5.1. La région «mer Baltique élargie» 
Les États-nations qui composent la région «mer 
Baltique élargie» sont le Danemark, l'Allemagne, la 
Pologne, la Lituanie, la Lettonie, l'Estonie, la Russie, la 
Finlande, la Suède et la Norvège. 
Ce groupe dispose, maintenant, d'un organe représen-
tatif: le «Conseil des États de la mer Baltique», créé à 
Copenhague en mars 1992. L'accord a été signé par 
les ministres des Affaires étrangères des pays affiliés. 
De plus, la Commission européenne était représentée à 
la réunion constitutive. 
Parmi les documents établis lors de la conférence 
constitutive figure un accord portant sur la réalisation 
d'une série de tâches dans le cadre de la coopération 
régionale: le développement des infrastructures, le 
développement économique, la protection des droits 
de l'homme, l'amélioration de l'environnement, le ren-
forcement des institutions démocratiques et l'intégra-
tion ultérieure de tous les États de la mer Baltique dans 
la CE. 
La région «mer Baltique élargie» englobe à la fois les 
réglons septentrionales de l'actuelle CE et les régions 
frontalières de la Russie, les États baltes et la Pologne. 
La Finlande a une frontière commune avec la Russie de 
1 000 km de long. La Norvège a également une fron-
tière commune avec la Russie dans la partie hautement 
stratégique la plus septentrionale de la région du 
Barents. 
Abordant la question du niveau inférieur au niveau 
supérieur, la présente étude identifie deux sous-régions 
de la mer Baltique: la région «mer Baltique occidentale» 
et la région «mer Baltique nodale». 
La région «mer Baltique occidentale» dispose d'une 
infrastructure de base reliant un certain nombre de vil-
les et formant une agglomération relativement dense. 
La croissance se fait le long d'un axe partant de la ville 
norvégienne de Lillehammer, passant par la capitale 
norvégienne d'Oslo pour continuer par la ville suédoise 
de Göteborg, puis, vers le sud jusqu'à Malmö, elle se 
poursuit par la capitale danoise, Copenhague, avant de 
se terminer dans les trois ports de mer allemands situés 
le long de la mer Baltique: Kiel, Lübeck et Rostock, 
arrière-pays compris. 
La densité urbaine élevée de cette sous-région lui con-
fère un important potentiel d'intégration verticale. Le 
centre de l'agglomération sera probablement le noyau 
Copenhague-Malmö, qui peut faire valoir une popula-
tion totale de 2,5 millions d'habitants. 
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Une condition préalable à ce développement sera la 
construction du pont ou du tunnel reliant les deux rives 
de l'øresund entre Malmö et Copenhague, qui consti-
tuera pour les deux pays, vers la fin du siècle, la pre-
mière liaison de transport terrestre fixe. 
L'autre sous-région de la mer Baltique, la région «mer 
Baltique nodale», est un scénario reposant sur un axe 
qui commence avec l'agglomération Grand Stockholm-
Uppsala à l'ouest, traverse la mer Baltique vers l'est 
(pour couvrir les agglomérations situées le long des 
côtes du golfe de Finlande: Turku, Helsinki et Saint-
Pétersbourg) et vers le sud (pour couvrir Tallin en 
Estonie et l'agglomération de Riga en Lettonie). 
La région «mer Baltique nodale» présente un degré 
d'urbanisation relativement élevé: les grandes villes 
comprennent une population totale de 14 millions 
d'habitants. L'intégration interrégionale rapide sera 
encore accélérée par les améliorations qu'il est prévu 
d'apporter aux liaisons routières, ferroviaires, aériennes 
et maritimes (ferry). Un projet d'autoroute, la «Via 
Baltica», reliera cette région au continent et aux pays de 
la CE. 
4.5.2. La région du Grand Barents 
Les États qui constituent la région du Grand Barents 
sont tous les pays nordiques, y compris le Danemark, 
et la Russie. En outre, la CE a signé l'accord relatif à 
cette région. Les organes politiques supérieurs sont le 
conseil du Barents et le conseil régional. 
La région du Grand Barents comprend sept zones 
administratives. En Norvège: Norland, Tromsø et Finn-
mark; en Suède: Norrbotten; en Finlande: la Laponie; 
en Russie: l'agglomération de Mourmansk et celle 
d'Arkhangelsk. L'objectif est la création d'une région 
fonctionnelle sur la base d'une intégration horizontale. 
Les tâches que la région doit mener à bien supposent 
une coopération efficace dans les domaines suivants: 
utilisation des ressources du pôle, commerce, résolu-
tion des problèmes posés par l'environnement et, 
surtout, sécurité de la région compte tenu de la transi-
tion en cours dans la Russie postcommuniste. 
Cette dernière question est intéressante dans la me-
sure où c'est aussi un grand sujet de préoccupation 
dans les régions communautaires limitrophes des an-
ciens États communistes. 
Les principales caractéristiques de la région du Grand 
Barents peuvent être définies de la manière suivante: 
— un vaste territoire, 
— un climat rude, 
— une population dispersée et une faible densité 
démographique, 
— la coexistence de plusieurs peuples indigènes, 
— les fardeaux hérités d'un passé totalitaire, 
— la richesse de ressources Inexploitées. 
Les tâches à assumer pour constituer ces régions, qui 
seront à la base de la coopération interrégionale et 
transnationale à l'intérieur de la région du Grand 
Barents, sont les suivantes: 
— exploiter les ressources naturelles, 
— développer le commerce et les relations commer-
ciales, 
— résoudre les problèmes qui menacent l'environne-
ment, 
— maintenir la paix et la sécurité après la désinté-
gration de l'ancienne Union soviétique, voire un 
éventuel effondrement de la Russie. 
Vers l'an 2000, l'intégration pourrait se renforcer et les 
alliances et réseaux interrégionaux se développer. Une 
variante de ce scénario est la cristallisation d'une sous-
région, la région du Barents nodal, constituée autour 
des grandes villes de Mourmansk, d'Arkhangelsk, de 
Kirkenes-Vadsø et de Tromsø, car ces zones à forte 
concentration humaine seront bien placées pour 
constituer des centres d'exploitation des ressources et 
de transformation des matières premières ainsi que de 
grandes escales le long des voies maritimes qui pour-
raient alors s'ouvrir vers le Nord-Est. 
Impacts de la constitution transnationale 
de régions dans la zone nordique 
La constitution de régions dans la zone nordique aura 
des effets positifs considérables dans les zones sep-
tentrionales de la CE. Concrètement, ces effets positifs 
se feront sentir dans toute la région allant du Jutland et 
de la Zelande au Schleswig-Holstein et au Mecklem-
bourg-Poméranie-Occidentale, où le développement 
économique et la concentration urbaine seront accrus. 
En particulier, les régions du nord de l'Allemagne 
devraient tirer parti du projet «Via Baltica» (la liaison rou-
tière entre les États baltes et l'Allemagne du Nord), qui 
leur permettra d'avoir des liens plus étroits avec la 
région «mer Baltique nodale», en plus des avantages 
que leur procurera sans aucun doute le projet de cons-
truction d'un pont entre le sud de la Suède et la région 
de Copenhague, qui ouvrira d'autres accès vers le sud 
(voir les figures V.15 et V.16 dans la partie V). 
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Les régions communautaires situées tout autour de la 
mer du Nord, du nord du Jutland à Bruges et à 
Aberdeen, bénéficieront d'une région «mer du Nord» 
plus Intégrée. Le Jutland devrait surtout tirer profit de la 
réalisation du projet «West Link» entre le sud-est de la 
Norvège et le nord du Jutland ainsi que de la réalisation 
du projet «Nordic Link» entre le port suédois de 
Göteborg et le port danois de Frederikshavn. 
Les impacts régionaux dans la CE des développements 
potentiels à prévoir dans la région du Grand Barents 
sont difficiles à prévoir. Ils seront sans aucun doute 
d'ordre macroterritorial, c'est-à-dire qu'ils porteront 
plutôt sur l'orientation générale et sur l'organisation 
macroterritoriale de l'ensemble de la Communauté. 
Quelques observations importantes doivent être 
faites au sujet de la région du Grand Barents: si la 
Norvège et/ou la Finlande devenaient membres de la 
CE à part entière, les frontières orientales de ces deux 
nations constitueraient la seule frontière terrestre de la 
Communauté avec les territoires de l'ancienne Union 
soviétique. Le fait que, bien que ni l'autorité qui a pris 
l'initiative du Grand Barents (la Norvège) ni aucun des 
autres États dont le territoire participe à ce travail de 
collaboration ne soient encore membres de la CE, la 
Commission a, néanmoins, officiellement décidé de s'y 
joindre donne une idée des conséquences macroterri-
toriales potentielles d'une telle éventualité. 
Bien entendu, le souhait politique général de stabiliser 
et de normaliser la situation de cette région potentielle-
ment explosive est important non seulement pour les 
pays nordiques et les gouvernements centraux et 
locaux de la Russie, mais aussi pour la CE. Mais, ce qui 
est peut-être tout aussi important, c'est que la région 
du Barents nodal — et notamment la mer de Barents et 
la presqu'île de Kola — est la région européenne poten-
tiellement la plus riche en ressources naturelles. En 
d'autres termes, elle présente une importance 
stratégique considérable, comme nous l'avons souli-
gné dans la partie V du présent rapport de synthèse. 
Les analystes et les décideurs nationaux et commu-
nautaires ne sont probablement pas sans avoir remar-
qué que la tentative de constitution d'une région du 
Barents est une expérience européenne unique de 
coopération régionale directe entre des pays qui 
pourraient prétendre adhérer à l'UE et un pays (la 
Russie) qui ne le peut pas pour le moment, mais avec 
lequel il est essentiel de renforcer des liens mutuelle-
ment bénéfiques. C'est ainsi que la constitution d'une 
région fonctionnelle dans la zone du Barents pourrait 
servir de laboratoire paneuropéen et aboutir à des 
résultats pratiques susceptibles d'être utilisés dans des 
tentatives semblables le long des frontières orientales et 
méridionales de la CE. 
Naturellement, certaines des observations qui viennent 
d'être faites s'appliquent aussi aux tentatives de consti-
tution de régions transnationales actuellement effec-
tuées dans la région «mer Baltique élargie». 
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5, Conclusion 
Pour être plus clair, il importe de souligner qu'en dépit 
de certaines contraintes un élargissement réussi de la 
CE vers le Nord ouvrira d'immenses possibilités, mais 
conduira aussi à de nouveaux engagements européens 
allant au-delà de la simple intégration de 18 millions de 
Nordiques. L'intégration institutionnelle du Nord dans la 
CE aura donc tendance à accentuer l'orientation 
macroterritoriale de l'Europe sur l'Europe du Nord. 
La construction d'une «Europe sans frontières», c'est-
à-dire l'achèvement du processus d'intégration Institu-
tionnelle entre le Nord et la CE, stimulera sans aucun 
doute la constitution de régions à cheval sur plusieurs 
États-nations. Par ailleurs, comme le souligne le rapport 
de synthèse, la réalisation d'un «scénario européen par 
fragmentation» ralentira très probablement ce proces-
sus de constitution des régions, ce qui s'explique, sur-
tout, par le fait que, de plus en plus, l'accent sera mis 
sur les centres nationaux et sur leur efficacité pour 
régler et/ou monopoliser les activités sur le territoire 
national. 
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Parti 
A comparison between the Nordic countries and the 
European Community 
1.1. Introduction 
Although they share a common European culture and 
economic system, there are many differences between 
the Nordic countries and the present European 
Community of 12 nations. The purpose of Part I is to 
highlight those differences which are relevant to regional 
problems and regional policies. It should be noted that 
statistical data on Denmark do not include the autono-
mous areas of Greenland and the Faeroe Islands which 
are not members of the Community. 
1.2. Nature and environment 
Table 1.1 
Population: area and density, 1990 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany (W + E) 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
United Kingdom 
Finland 
Iceland 
Norway 
Sweden 
Population 
(1 000) 
9 948 
5 135 
79 070 
10 046 
38 925 
56 612 
3 499 
57 576 
378 
14 891 
10 337 
57 297 
4 969 
254 
4 233 
8 527 
Area 
(1 000 km2) 
30.5 
43.1 
356.9 
132.0 
504.8 
544.0 
68.9 
301.3 
2.6 
41.9 
92.0 
244.1 
338.1 
103.0 
323.9 
450.0 
Inhabitants 
(per km2) 
326 
119 
222 
76 
77 
104 
51 
191 
146 
356 
112 
235 
16 
3 
14 
21 
Source: Eurostat. 
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FIGURE 1.1 : The Greater Norden superimposed on Europe 
Source: Nord Revy. 
Norden's territorial predicament is amply illustrated if one superimposes these vast areas on a map of Europe. It 
becomes immediately apparent why infrastructural links and regional cohesion are primary Nordic concerns. 
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FIGURE 1.2: Population density, 1991 
POPULATION DENSITY 
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Source: Statistics Finland, Tietoaika, 1991. 
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As illustrated by Table 1.1 and Figure 1.1, Finland, 
Iceland, Norway (except Svalbard) and Sweden com-
prise a large surface, 1215000 km2 against the 
2367 000 km2 of the European Community. Due to 
mountains, stony soils and hard climates, most of this 
surface is not suited for economic activities. Hence the 
population is only 18 million against the 344 million of 
the Community, and the average density is only 15 per-
sons per km2 against the 145 in the Community. 
Most of Iceland and Norway consists of mountainous 
uplands. In Finland and Sweden, most of the surface 
lies lower and is more even, but rocky or stony. Good 
agricultural soils are found only in valleys and coastal 
plains, especially in southern Sweden. 
The summer climate is cool compared to most of the 
Community, but sufficiently warm for agriculture, except 
in the mountains and in the northernmost regions. 
As shown in Figure 1.2, the majority (70%) of the Nordic 
population is concentrated to the south of a line from 
Bergen to Tampere. But even in this southern part of 
the Nordic countries, the population density is low by 
European standards, 44 persons per km2, comparable 
only to the Interior of the Iberian peninsula. To the north 
of this line, the average density is only six per km2, in 
the Community matched only by the Scottish Highlands 
and Islands. Also shown in Figure 1.3 is the close 
connection between population density and urban 
development. 
The winter climate is even more different from that of the 
Community. While mean winter temperatures in the 
Community lowlands are over 0° (and in the 
Mediterranean and Atlantic regions over 5°), they are 
under 0° in most parts of the Nordic countries and 
below -10° in substantial areas. Western Norway and 
southern Iceland are milder, but are among the world's 
most wet and stormy areas. 
Due to topography, soil and climate, the use of land in 
the Community is very different from that of Nordic 
countries, as shown in Table 1.2. 
Table 1.2 
Land use, 1987 (1000 km") 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany (W + E) 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
United Kingdom 
Finland 
Iceland 
Norway 
Sweden 
Agriculture 
8 
26 
124 
39 
204 
194 
10 
122 
1 
9 
28 
70 
24 
0 
9 
30 
Permanent 
grass 
6 
2 
57 
53 
103 
119 
47 
49 
1 
11 
5 
116 
1 
23 
1 
6 
Forest 
6 
5 
103 
26 
157 
147 
3 
67 
1 
3 
36 
23 
232 
1 
83 
280 
Other uses 
11 
10 
72 
14 
40 
91 
10 
62 
0 
14 
23 
36 
81 
79 
231 
135 
Total 
31 
43 
357 
132 
505 
552 
70 
301 
3 
37 
92 
244 
338 
103 
324 
450 
Source: FAO production yearbook. 
While 35% of the Community's surface is devoted to 
agriculture and 24% to permanent grass, this is the 
case only for 5 and 3 % of the area of the Nordic coun-
tries. As a contrast, 49 % of the latter — most of Finland 
and Sweden — is forest-covered, against 24% of the 
Community area. Finally, 43% of the Nordic area is in 
the 'other uses' category — mainly tundra, barren 
mountain land and glaciers. Only 16% of the 
Community area is in this category, and here it is 
mainly urban land. 
The Nordic countries have several natural resources 
which will be described in more detail below in Section 
1.5 on 'Economic structure'. The North Atlantic is rich 
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in fish, although over-fishing is a constant threat. 
Norway has a large share of North Sea oil and natural 
gas, and there are several deposits of ores. All Nordic 
countries and especially Norway are able to produce 
considerable amounts of hydroelectric power. Due to its 
volcanic geology, Iceland can supplement by geother-
mal electricity production and heating by hot springs. 
Air pollution is modest in the Nordic countries, com-
pared to most of the Community. This is due to the low 
density of population and industry, as well as to the pre-
vailing westerly winds which bring in relatively clean air 
from the North Atlantic. 
However, the Nordic countries do have some environ-
mental problems. Acid rain has extinguished fish life in 
many lakes and rivers, as well as caused considerable 
damage in forests. Due to the low temperatures, vege-
tation is not able to recover if spoiled by sheep or 
tourists, which is a severe problem in Iceland. The 
disastrous pollution in the Kola peninsula is a serious 
danger to north-eastern Finland and Norway. 
As an environment for human beings, the Nordic coun-
tries have both positive and negative sides when com-
pared to the European Community. The climate is 
severe, and in mid-winter nights are long (24 hours to 
the north of the polar circle), but the air is clean, and 
there are large areas of unspoilt nature. 
1.3. Human resources 
As already mentioned, the population of the Nordic 
countries amounts to only 18 million, or 5% of the 1990 
Community population. 
The share of the population which participates In the 
labour force varies between the countries. There are 
minor variations in the participation rates of men, but 
the main differences are found between the female par-
ticipation rates, which are shown in Table I.3. 
Table 1.3 shows that the labour participation rate of 
women is higher in the Nordic countries than in all EC 
countries except Denmark. The rate is still quite low in 
the Mediterranean countries and Ireland. The differ-
ences in GDP per capita, which will be discussed later, 
are partly due to these differences in female participati-
on rates. Work which in the Mediterranean countries is 
done by women inside the households and thus not 
counted in the GDP (e.g. child care), Is in the Nordic 
countries often done in the 'formal economy' (e.g. in 
kindergartens) and hence included in the GDP. 
Table 1.3 
Participation rates among women 15 to 64 years old, 1990 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany (W) (1989) 
Spain 
Greece (1988) 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg (1988) 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
United Kingdom 
Finland 
Norway 
Sweden 
52.4 
78.4 
55.8 
40.9 
43.5 
56.6 
38.9 
44.5 
47.2 
53.0 
61.3 
65.1 
72.9 
71.2 
81.1 
Source: OECD labour force statistics. 
The educational level ¡s illustrated by Table 1.4, which 
shows the composition of the population in the 20 to 64 
age bracket, according to the highest level attained. 
Another way to measure the educational level is to look 
at the school enrolment ratio at the 'third school level', 
as mapped ¡n the Unesco statistical yearbook. It shows 
that In 1989, 31 to 43% of the young people were 
enrolled in Finland, Norway and Sweden as well as in 
most Community countries, whereas school attend-
ance was only 18 to 28% In Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Portugal and the United Kingdom. 
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Table 1.4 
Educational level, 1989 (%) 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany (W) 
Spain 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
United Kingdom 
Finland 
Norway 
Sweden 
Primary school 
63 
43 
22 
80 
50 
62 
74 
45 
93 
35 
42 
35 
33 
Secondary school plus short further education 
30 
47 
68 
10 
40 
30 
20 
49 
4 
54 
48 
52 
55 
University (3 years) 
7 
10 
10 
9 
7 
7 
6 
6 
4 
9 
10 
11 
12 
Source: Special report on producer services. 
The Nordic educational level equals that of the best 
Community countries, and is clearly higher than in the 
lower end of the Community (Table 1.4). 
Culturally, the Nordic countries are closely related to 
one another. This is largely due to the fact that the three 
Scandinavian languages (Danish, Norwegian and 
Swedish — the latter also the mother tongue of 6 % of 
the Finns) are so similar that they are mutually under-
standable. Icelandic and Faeroese have the same 
Norse origin but are today rather distant from the three 
Scandinavian languages. Finnish is totally different, 
being related to the Samic (Lapponian) minority lan-
guage in northern Norway, Sweden and Finland, to 
Estonian, and very remotely to Hungarian. Greenlandic 
is another totally different language, virtually the same 
as the north Canadian and Alaskan Inult language. 
While not very religious today, the Nordic countries have 
all been heavily influenced by Lutheranism. 
1.4. Production and employment 
Table I.5 
GDP per capita, 1990, by purchasing power parities 
Index EUR 12 = 100 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
United Kingdom 
Finland 
Iceland 
Norway 
Sweden 
107 
111 
118 
55 
82 
113 
72 
107 
136 
107 
58 
110 
104' 
122 
104' 
110' 
1 New Eurostat figures published November 1993. Full comparability, however, cannot be guaranteed. 
Source: Eurostat, 1992. Special report, 'Norden as periphery'. 
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The Nordic countries have a high GDP per capita, com-
pared to many EC countries. This is especially the case 
when GDPs are compared by exchange rates, but — 
due to the high Nordic price level before the 1992 de-
valuation — less pronounced when compared by 
purchasing power, as in Table I.5. 
The regional differences in GDP per capita are shown in 
Figure I.6. It should of course be remembered that 
regional GDP estimates are rather questionable, and 
that Danish and Norwegian statistical authorities now 
refuse to make them. In the Nordic countries as well as 
in the Community, the per capita GDP ¡s highest in the 
major cities and lower in rural regions. 
Another indicator of the economic level is unemploy-
ment which, however, varies much from year to year. 
Although International comparisons of unemployment 
are subject to criticism, there is no doubt that for long 
periods unemployment rates have been lower in the 
Nordic countries than in the Community. Nordic econo-
mic policies have given high priorities to employment, 
partly by very active retraining of redundant workers 
(Sweden), partly by expansionist policies which, in the 
Norwegian case, could be financed by income from 
North Sea oil. However, in recent years, these policies 
ran into an impasse which made dramatic braking 
necessary — in the Finnish case due to the collapse of 
the important Soviet export market. Hence, unemploy-
ment has increased to levels comparable to those of 
the Community countries (Table 1.6 and Figure 1.7). The 
most serious aspect of Nordic unemployment is that it 
continues to grow. Seasonally adjusted unemployment 
rates for February 1993 were as follows: Finland 18%, 
Norway 5.8%. For Sweden there are at present no 
seasonally corrected figures for 1993. For the entire 
Community Eurostat estimates the seasonally adjusted 
figure for March 1993 to be 10.2%. 
Table 1.6 
Unemployment rates (% of labour force) 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany (W) 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
United Kingdom 
Finland 
Norway 
Sweden 
1991 
7.5 
8.9 
4.2 
7.7 
16.3 
9.5 
16.2 
10.0 
1.6 
7.0 
4.1 
9.1 
7.6 
4.7 
2.6 
1992 
8.2 
9.5 
4.5 
n. a. 
18.0 
10.0 
18.8 
10.2 
1.9 
6.7 
4.8 
10.8 
13.1 
5.4 
4.8 
NB: The East European countries SU, AU and CIS are not included. 
"New figures from Eurostat, published November 1993, indicate another pattern of the Nordic regional PPS adjusted to new country standards, see 
Table I.5. Full comparability, however, cannot be guaranteed. 
Source: Eurostat 1992. Special report, 'Norden as periphery', own calculation. 
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FIGURE 1.6: Purchasing power parities, 1989 
PURCHASING POWER PARITIES 
1989 
EEC: Rapid Reports (EUROSTAT) 
The Nordic countries as Periphery » 
(special study) 
The Eastern European Countries, SU, AU and CIS are not included 
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FIGURE 1.7: Unemployment, 1991 
UNEMPLOYMENT 1991 
% unemployed o"F 
total number of employed 
EEC: Europe in numbers (EUROSTAT) 
Eurooon: The basis projekt, OECO 
Sweden: Statistiska Centralbyrån, 1991 
Finland:Statìstikcentralen 1991 
Norway: Statistiske Sentralbyrå, 1991 
The Eastern European Countries, SU, AU and CIS are not included 
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1.5. Economie structure 
The overall composition of the economy in the Nordic 
and the EC countries may be Illustrated by Table I.7. 
The overall structure of the economies of Norden is 
roughly similar to that of the northern and central 
Community countries, though all Nordic countries 
except Sweden tend to have slightly larger primary sec-
tors in terms of employment. This is partly due to the 
large fishing sectors in Iceland and Norway, partly to the 
low productivity in Finnish and Norwegian agriculture. 
If we go into more details, there are, of course, several 
differences as regards the economic structure. In a 
number of sectors, one or more Nordic countries are 
relatively important producers, compared to the 
Community. We shall first focus on these sectors. 
Table I.7 
Employment shares in main sectors (% of total employment) 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany (W+E) 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
United Kingdom 
Finland 
Iceland 
Norway 
Sweden 
1991 
1990 
1990 
1990 
1991 
1991 
1990 
1991 
1991 
1991 
1991 
1991 
1990 
1988 
1990 
1990 
Primary 
3 
5 
4 
24 
11 
6 
15 
9 
3 
4 
17 
2 
8 
10 
6 
3 
Secondary 
30 
28 
40 
26 
33 
30 
29 
32 
29 
25 
34 
31 
31 
30 
24 
29 
Tertiary 
67 
67 
56 
50 
56 
64 
56 
59 
68 
70 
49 
67 
61 
60 
69 
68 
Sources: Eurostat and Nordic statistical offices. 
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FIGURE 1.8: Employment, 1991, employed within agriculture 
EMPLOYMENT 1991 
employed within Agriculture 
EEC 1991: Eurochon 
Sweden: Statistiska Centralbyrån 
Norway: Statistisk Sentralbyrå 
Finland: Statistikcentralen 
The Eastern European Countries, SU, AU and CIS are not included 
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FIGURE 1.9: 
EMPLOYMENT 1991 
employed within Industry 
EEC 1991: Eurocnon 
Sweden: Statistiska Centralbyrån 
Norway: Statistisk Sentralbyrà 
Finland: Staüsttoentraten 
The Eastern European Countries, SU, AU and CIS are not included 
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FIGURE 1.10: 
EMPLOYMENT 1991 
employed within Services 
EEC 1991: Eurochon 
Sweden: Statistiska Centralbyrån 
Norway: Statistisk Sentralbyrà 
Finland: Statistikcentralen 
The Eastern European Countries, SU, AU and CIS are not included 
t^ZP^ 
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Table 1.8 
Fishery and fish products 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany (W) 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
United Kingdom 
Faeroe Islands 
Finland 
Greenland 
Iceland 
Norway 
Sweden 
Fish catches 
average 1986-881 
(1000 t) 
41 
1842 
205 
128 
1419 
876 
246 
563 
433 
381 
919 
366 
127 
107 
1684 
1897 
227 
Employees1 
(100) 
13 
73 
19 
402 
891 
180 
79 
n.a. 
33 
389 
224 
23 
n.a. 
80 
62 
200 
n.a. 
Fish products, 19882 
(1 000 t) 
18.5 
210.9 
76.4 
14.8 
360.6 
211.5 
138.2 
174.7 
69.7 
80.1 
214.0 
60.6 
29.7 
30.7 
270.4 
388.5 
44.0 
Sources: 'Special report, 'The interaction between the development of Nordic and European fishing regions'; 
Includes frozen, salted, dried, smoked, and tinned fish. 
' UN, Yearbook of industrial statistics. 
Fisheries ¡s one of them, as will be seen from Table 1.8. 
The fish catches of the Nordic countries correspond to 
62 % of those of the Community. Iceland and Norway 
are among the most important European fishing nati-
ons, alongside Denmark (which has particularly large 
catches of fish for non-food uses), France, Spain, and 
the United Kingdom. As a comparison of the first two 
columns hints, productivity is high in Nordic fishing, 
compared to the Mediterranean. It should be noted that 
for Iceland, the Faeroe Islands, and Greenland, fish and 
fish products are by far the most important export 
goods and thus absolutely vital for their economies. In 
many regions, it is virtually the only economic activity. A 
good deal of the Nordic catches are treated in the 
Danish fish industry. 
The forestry and wood industry is another important 
sector in several Nordic countries, as illustrated by 
Table I.9. 
Table I.9 
Wood and wood products, 1989 
Belgium-Luxembourg 
Denmark 
Germany (W) 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
United Kingdom 
Finland 
Norway 
Sweden 
Roundwood 
(million m3)1 
4.8 
2.1 
35.3 
3.3 
17.2 
43.7 
1.5 
8.8 
1.3 
10.3 
6.5 
46.3 
11.0 
55.7 
Wood products 
(1000 m3)2 
3 265 
1 170 
18 979 
715 
4 521 
13 040 
366 
5419 
520 
2 424 
3 643 
9 024 
2 915 
12 393 
Wood pulp 
(1000t)2 
482 
70 
2418 
18 
1 667 
2 135 
n.a. 
709 
164 
1 482 
594 
9118 
2 224 
10 052 
Paper 
(1000t)2 
1 500 
462 
15 275 
367 
5 254 
9 858 
63 
8 066 
3 895 
1 175 
6 296 
11 186 
2 165 
12 343 
Sources: 'UN, Statistical yearbook. :VN. Yearbook of industrial statistics. 
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The production of wood in the Nordic countries 
roughly equals that of the Community, and Sweden and 
Finland are among the leading European nations as 
regards wood products and paper production. In many 
regions, it is the most important economic activity. 
The production of hydroelectric power as well as of oil 
and natural gas is an extremely important sector in 
Norway, which has a significant share of the North Sea 
oil field and prospects of further production in the North 
Atlantic and Barents Sea (see Table 1.10). 
Table 1.10 
Production of hydroelectricity, oil and natural gas 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany (W) 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Netherlands 
United Kingdom 
Finland 
Iceland 
Norway 
Sweden 
Hydroelectricity, 1990 
(1 000 GWh)1 
1 
0 
18 
2 
26 
57 
1 
35 
0 
7 
11 
4 
121 
73 
Crude oil, 1991 
(1 000 barrels/day)2 
n.a. 
150 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
1 895 
n.a. 
n.a. 
1 905 
n.a. 
Crude oil, 1989 
(1 000 t)3 
0 
5.5 
5.4 
0.9 
1.0 
3.2 
0 
4.7 
3.4 
87.4 
0 
0 
72.6 
0 
Natural gas, 1989 
(petajoules)3 
0 
105 
493 
6 
61 
121 
85 
594 
2 264 
1 724 
0 
0 
1 292 
0 
Sources: 'International Energy Agency, Energy statistics of OECD countries. JSpecial report, 'Nordic energy and European integration'. 3UN, 
Yearbook of industrial statistics. 
Nordic production of hydroelectric power is bigger than 
that of the Community. The Norwegian production of oil 
¡s now — with further increases since 1991 — almost 
as large as that of the Community as a whole. It tends 
to be exported in the crude state. Its main shore base 
is Stavanger on the south-west coast, but the admin-
istration and R&D functions tend to locate in Oslo. 
The Nordic countries have, when compared to the 
Community, some strongholds in the ore mining and 
metallurgical sector, as shown in Figure 1.11 and Table 
1.11. They have two origins: partly local ores, in particu-
lar iron ores in central and northern Sweden and partly 
aluminium production from imported raw materials, 
using the hydroelectric energy in Norway and Iceland. 
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Table 1.11 
Ore mining and metal production (per 1 000 employees) 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany (W) 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
United Kingdom 
Finland 
Iceland 
Norway 
Sweden 
Iron ore 
1988 
(1 000 t)1 
0 
0 
n.a. 
460 
1925 
3225 
0 
0 
0 
0 
8 
60 
405 
0 
1681 
12670 
Crude steel 
1989 
(million t)1 
11.0 
0.6 
41.1 
1.0 
12.6 
19.3 
0.3 
25.6 
3.7 
5.7 
0.7 
18.7 
2.9 
0 
0.7 
4.7 
Aluminium 
1989 
(1 000 t)1 
0 
0 
0 
16 
0 
9 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
26 
13 
0 
55 
0 
Nickel unwrought 
1989' 
(1000 t) 
54 
0 
272 
n.a. 
55 
129 
n.a. 
158 
14 
30 
13 
114 
17 
1 
21 
49 
Source: 'UN, Yearbook of industrial statistics. 
Sweden has been a major producer of iron ore and 
steel. However, in the Nordic countries iron mining and 
steel production have been reduced even more than in 
the European Community. 
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FIGUREI. 11 : 
Ore Mining 
in the Nordic Countries 
Sulphide Mines: 
Silver Ni Nickle 
Gold Pb Lead 
Cobolt S Sulfur 
Chromite W Tungsten 
Copper Zn Zinc 
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The manufacturing sector is of course extremely 
heterogeneous, and all countries have a number of 
subsectors where they are competitive. For instance, 
the Nordic countries have strong 'design' branches in 
furniture, textiles and glassware. Statistically, they are 
spread over various sectors. However, if one looks at 
the main sectors, the following are strong in the Nordic 
countries. 
Metal products and machines (including means of 
transport and electronics) are major manufacturing sec-
tors everywhere, not least In the Nordic countries. Data 
from selected sectors are shown in Table 1.12. 
Table 1.12 
Metal products and machines 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany (W) 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
United Kingdom 
Finland 
Iceland 
Norway 
Sweden 
Passenger 
cars, 1989 
(1000)1 
0 
0 
4 536 
0 
1 696 
3415 
0 
1 971 
0 
110 
0 
1 308 
37 
0 
0 
384 
Lorries, 1989 
(1000)1 
0 
0 
274 
0 
407 
577 
0 
240 
0 
12 
0 
327 
1 
0 
0 
82 
Electric 
heaters, 1988 
(million)1 
0 
0 
2.3 
0.1 
2.0 
3.7 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0.1 
0 
0.4 
0 
1.2 
0 
Television receivers, 
1988 
(million)1 
0.9 
0.1 
3.7 
0 
1.6 
2.0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0.4 
3.0 
0.5 
0 
0 
0.4 
Employees in metal 
production and machine 
industries, 19882 
(1 000) 
252 
195 
4 246 
n.a. 
826 
1 837 
n.a. 
1 578 
8 
361 
205 
2 372 
153 
3 
144 
431 
Sources: 'UN, Yearbook of industrial production. 'Eurostat, Enterprises in Europe. 
Sweden in particular, with a number of large firms, has 
a leading position in mechanical industries, mainly 
located in the central part of the country: SKF, L. M. 
Ericsson, Volvo, Saab, Electrolux, ABB, Alfa-Laval, etc. 
Shipyards used to be a strong Nordic sector, too, but, 
as in the Community, a substantial reduction has taken 
place. 
persuaded the companies to return from convenience 
flag countries, see Table 1.13. 
The Norwegian shipping activity was earlier spread 
along the coast, but is now largely concentrated in 
Oslo. 
The shipping sector has traditionally been strong 
in Norway. After a weak period, new regulations have 
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Table 1.13 
Merchant fleets, 1989 (1000 gii) 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany (W+E) 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
United Kingdom 
Finland 
Iceland 
Norway 
Sweden 
2 044 
4 963 
4 467 
21 324 
3 962 
4413 
167 
7 602 
3 655 
726 
7 646 
944 
183 
15 597 
2 167 
Source: UN, Statistical yearbook. 
Public services (mainly education, health and social 
welfare services) should finally be mentioned as a sec-
tor where the Nordic countries are strong compared to 
most Community countries. If the tax burden is high in 
the Nordic countries, this is not so much due to income 
transfers, but mainly to the amount and quality of ser-
vices provided to the citizens. In recent years, the 
'crisis of the welfare state' has meant a stop to the 
general increase of these services, in some subsectors 
even a reduction, but they remain on a high level, see 
Table 1.14 (it should be noticed that these data include 
private personal services), 
Table 1.14 
Employment in community and personal services 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany (W) 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
United Kingdom 
Finland 
Iceland 
Norway 
Sweden 
Employment in public 
health, social welfare, 
1989 
1990 
1989 
1988 
1990 
1990 
1989 
1990 
1990 
1990 
1990 
1990 
1990 
1988 
1990 
1990 
administration 
organizations, 
education, R&D, 
personal services 
(% of total employment) 
36.9 
35.7 
27.8 
18.7 
23.5 
31.2 
28.7 
28.6 
29.5 
35.1 
23.3 
30.4 
29.9 
29.1 
36.2 
37.4 
Source: ILO, Yearbook of labour statistics. 
In some Nordic as well as in some EC countries, the 
public sector percentage of the local economy is higher 
in some peripheral regions than elsewhere, in spite of 
the concentration of central government administration, 
major research institutions, etc. in the largest cities. This 
geographical distribution reflects the use of public ser-
vices as a tool of regional policy. 
In some sectors the Nordic countries are weak com-
pared to the Community countries. This is the case in 
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agriculture and the food industry. The high primary 
employment in the Nordic countries, shown by Table 
1.7, does not reflect this weakness, partly because it 
includes fishery employment, partly because labour 
productivity is rather low in Finland and Norway, as 
shown in Table 1.15. 
Table 1.15 
Productivity and employment in agriculture and the food industry 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany (W) 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
United Kingdom 
Finland 
Norway 
Sweden 
Relative labour productivity 
¡n primary sector' 
0.71 
0.62 
0.62 
0.46 
0.33 
0.47 
0.58 
0.34 
0.67 
0.83 
0.31 
0.52 
0.54 
0.45 
0.70 
1 000 employees in food and 
beverage industry, 1988 
95 
97 
768 
n.a. 
321 
579 
n.a. 
354 
4 
152 
120 
494 
67 
52 
73 
' Rest of the economy in each country = 100. 
Sources: Special report, 'The Nordic countries and the agriculture and the agro-industry in the EC'; Eurostat, Enterprises in Europe. 
Southern Sweden forms an exception in the 
Nordic countries, with a relatively stronger agricultural 
and agro-industrial sector. It should be observed, 
however, that in some regions in Iceland, Norway, 
the Faeroe Islands and Greenland, fish processing is 
the only manufacturing industry. 
The textile, clothing and leather industry is another 
sector where the Nordic countries are generally weak, 
as shown in Table I.I6. 
Table 1.16 
Employment in the textile, clothing and leather industry, 1988 (1000 employees) 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany (W) 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
United Kingdom 
Finland 
Iceland 
Norway 
Sweden 
97 
31 
535 
n.a. 
352 
445 
n.a. 
997 
1 
n.a. 
375 
657 
41 
2 
10 
23 
Source: Eurostat, Enterprises in Europe. 
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This sector is relatively strongest in southern Europe. 
Competition may be expected from Eastern Europe, for 
example, Poland, if and when import barriers are re­
duced. 
Table 1.17 
Employment in the chemical industry, 1988 
(1000 employees) 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany (W) 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
United Kingdom 
Finland 
Iceland 
Norway 
Sweden 
73 
22 
614 
n.a. 
190 
308 
n.a, 
262 
1 
91 
40 
341 
24 
1 
15 
n.a. 
Source: Eurostat, Enterprises in Europe. 
In the chemical industry as a whole, Germany domi­
nantes Europe. 
Turning away from manufacturing industries, construc­
tion, trade, transport, and personal services are less 
interesting in this connection, because they mainly 
serve domestic markets in more or less efficient ways. 
(Of course there are exceptions, such as the above­
mentioned shipping sector). However, a couple of inter­
esting sectors remain to be scrutinized. 
Tourism is generally weak in the Nordic countries 
(though locally it may be important), as well as in the 
northern Community countries, compared to the 
Mediterranean countries, as illustrated by Figure 1.12. 
The chemical industry may also be mentioned as a 
weak Nordic sector compared to the Community, as 
illustrated by Table 1.17. 
In recent years, the dominance of mass tourism to the 
Mediterranean coast seems to have diminished in 
favour of more varied and individualized types of 
tourism, among which the cultural attractions of Central 
European countries is noted. It is possible that the rela­
tively unspoilt environments of the Nordic countries 
may cause an increase there, but will hardly turn them 
into centres of massive tourism. 
Finally, producer services, including finance, multinatio­
nal head offices and international organizations is a 
sector where the position of the Nordic countries is 
slightly weaker than the countries in the core of 
Western Europe (the 'blue banana'), but stronger than 
that of the south European countries see Table 1.18. 
FIGURE 1.12: International tourist receipts and expenditures, 1989 (USD million) 
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Table 1.18 
Employment in finance and business services (% of total employment) 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany (W) 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
United Kingdom 
Finland 
Iceland 
Norway 
Sweden 
1989 
1990 
1989 
1988 
1990 
1990 
1989 
1990 
1990 
1990 
1990 
1990 
1990 
1988 
1990 
1990 
8.5 
9.2 
7.9 
4.4 
5.4 
9.9 
4.8 
4.2 
8.9 
10.2 
4.4 
11.7 
8.2 
7.9 
7.4 
8.6 
Source: ILO, Yearbook of labour statistics. 
1.6. Transport and 
telecommunications 
The low population densities in the Nordic countries, 
compared to the Community, imply of course that in-
ternal distances are long. The peripheral position of the 
Nordic countries also implies long distances to the 
European centre of gravity. These facts, combined with 
the hard climate and topography explain why economic 
development In the Nordic countries has lagged behind 
the most advanced European countries. In the 19th 
century, the Nordic countries were still a poor part of 
Europe. 
Inevitably, accessibility is still less easy than in the 
centre of Europe. But the difference is far less pro-
nounced than one or two centuries ago, due to modern 
means of transport and telecommunications. 
Undoubtedly, this fact is part of the explanation for the 
present relative prosperity in Norden. 
Of course, low population densities mean that the per 
capita investments in transport infrastructure must be 
high if one wishes to reach a certain standard. Per 1 000 
km2, there are fewer motorways, railways and airports in 
the Nordic countries than in the Community — see 
Table 1.19 and Figures 1.13 and 1.14. Still, per million 
inhabitants, the transport infrastructure of the Nordic 
countries ¡s good. In particular, the network of interna-
tional and domestic airlines — well suited to overcome 
long distances — ¡s dense. And Sweden is constructing 
an ambitious system of high-speed railways. 
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FIGURE 1.13: 
Motor traffic 
on main international traffic arteries 
1985 
EUROPE 2000. Outlook for the development" 
of the community's territory. 1991. 
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TRANSEUROPEAN HIGHSPEED NETWORK 
Horizon 2000 
Railway Type 
New Unes >250 km/h 
Upgraded lines +/-200km/h 
160 km/h 
< 140 km/h 
Link lines 
New lines or upgraded 
lines to be negociated 
Ferry 
European Key Links 
Source: 
International Union of European Railways 
High Speed Railways. 
A network of Europe, April 1992 
Sfc : 
Table 1.19 
Transport, 1990 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany (W+E) 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
United Kingdom 
Finland 
Iceland 
Norway 
Sweden 
100 km 
16 
7 
88 
1 
24 
53 
0.3 
62 
1 
21 
3 
32 
2 
0 
4 
9 
Motorways' 
per 1000 km2 
52 
16 
25 
1 
5 
10 
0.4 
21 
0 
57 
3 
13 
1 
0 
1 
2 
per million 
inhabitants 
161 
136 
111 
9 
62 
94 
9 
108 
206 
141 
29 
56 
45 
0 
94 
106 
100 km 
35 
23 
440 
25 
143 
341 
19 
196 
3 
28 
31 
169 
59 
0 
40 
113 
Operated ra 
per 1000 km2 
113 
53 
123 
19 
28 
62 
27 
65 
104 
76 
34 
69 
17 
0 
12 
25 
Iways' 
per million 
inhabitants 
352 
448 
556ÍW) 
249 
367 
602 
54 
340 
714 
188 
300 
295 
1187 
0 
945 
1325 
Scheduled airlines 1989 
million km 
flown2 
69 
54 
339 
54 
188 
386 
42 
175 
4 
158 
52 
578 
55 
17 
82 
114 
km per 
Inhabitant 
6.9 
10.5 
5.4 
5.4 
4.8 
6.8 
12.0 
3.0 
10.6 
10.6 
5.0 
10.1 
11.1 
66.9 
19.4 
13.5 
' Source: UN annual bulletin of transport statistics. 
- National and international flights. SAS flights have been allocated to Denmark (2/7), Norway (2/7) and Sweden (3/7). Source: UN statistical 
yearbook. 
It should be added that shipping and ferries form an 
important mode of transport in the Nordic countries 
which may help circumvent the north German bottle-
neck for road transport between northern and central 
Europe. 
Telecommunications provide another means of over-
coming distances, being well suited to low density 
countries (see Table 1.20). 
Table I.20 
Telephones and telefax, 1990 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany (W) 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
United Kingdom 
Finland 
Iceland 
Norway 
Sweden 
Telephone main lines 
per 1 000 inhabitants 
401 
566 
432 
385 
324 
482 
279 
387 
483 
462 
226 
444 
534 
496 
502 
681 
Telefax 
per 1 000 inhabitants 
15 
20 
11 
1 
4 
4 
10 
3 
n.a. 
n.a. 
1 
13 
15 
n.a. 
20 
20 
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The Nordic countries are generally as well equipped 
with telephones and faxes per inhabitant as the best 
Community countries — Sweden even better. 
1.7. Political system and subsidiarity 
In broad terms, the political systems in the Community 
and the Nordic countries are similar, both being based 
on democratic principles. As already mentioned, the 
public sectors are relatively large in the Nordic welfare 
model, but fundamentally the economies are market 
based. 
A special characteristic of the Nordic countries is the 
high degree of devolution of power to regional and local 
governments. One might say that the subsidiarity prin­
ciple is carried very far — most decisions are delegated 
to the lowest possible level. The distribution of real 
power is of course difficult to measure, but the relative 
size of regional and local government expenditure 
(Figure 1.15) may serve as an indicator. Its share of total 
public expenditure is clearly higher in the Nordic coun­
tries than in the Community countries (except 
Denmark). 
FIGURE 1.15: Municipal spending as a percentage of total public expenditure, 1989 
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Source: OECD. 
Regarding Norden's realization of the subsidiarity princi­
ple, it should also be pointed out that the Nordic coun­
tries have a long-standing tradition of self-governing 
areas. In some respects the Aland Islands form an 
autonomous part of Finland. Similarly, the Faeroe 
Islands and Greenland have high degrees of autonomy 
from Denmark, even including some foreign-policy mat­
ters, for example, the two home rule areas have chosen 
to remain outside the Community. 
It may be concluded that economically and politically 
the Nordic countries are similar to the most advanced 
Community countries. Peripherality does not in this 
case imply economic backwardness. However, the low 
population densities, long distances and hard climate 
create regional problems which are different from the 
problems of low per capita production characteristic of 
the Objective 1 regions of the Community of Twelve. 
1.8. Flows between Norden 
and the European Community 
In what regions will the impact of increased integration 
between the Nordic countries and the European 
Community be heavy, in what regions will it be insignifi­
cant? That depends on the amount of trade and other 
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kinds of interaction between the regions. Only regions 
which have much to do with one another are likely to 
exert and to be subjected to significant impacts. Hence, 
in this section we shall examine the trade flows and 
other types of interaction between the Nordic and the 
Community countries. 
Unfortunately, statistical data on flows and interactions 
are — except for trade — much scarcer than data on 
static characteristics. In particular, almost no regional 
data are available on international flows. Hence, we 
shall mainly discuss trade and other interactions be­
tween nations, and only in a few cases focus on indivi­
dual regions. 
International trade in goods 
Finland's main trading partner in the Community is 
(western) Germany, followed by the United Kingdom, 
France, Italy, the Netherlands and Denmark. 
Iceland's main trading partner in the Community is the 
United Kingdom, followed by (western) Germany, 
Denmark, the Netherlands and France. Icelandic 
exports mainly consist of fish, and the EC importers are 
shown in Figure 1.18. A special feature are the rather 
large Icelandic exports to Spain and Portugal. 
Norway's main trading partner in the Community is the 
United Kingdom, followed by (Western) Germany, the 
Netherlands, France and Denmark. The export of fish to 
the Community is shown in Figure 1.20. The Danish 
import is primarily destined for processing from the fish 
industry. 
Figures 1.16, 1.17, 1.19, and 1.21 illustrate the trade in 
goods between the Nordic and the EC countries in 
1990, in million US dollars. 
Sweden's main trading partner in the Community is 
(Western) Germany, followed by the United Kingdom, 
Denmark, France, the Netherlands and Italy. 
FIGURE 1.16: Finland's trade with the European Community in 1990 (USD million) 
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FIGURE 1.17: Iceland's trade with the European Community in 1990 (USD million) 
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Source: Nordic statistical yearbook. 
FIGURE 1.19: Norway's trade with the European Community in 1990 (USD million) 
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Source: Nordic statistical yearbook. 
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FIGURE 1.20: 
Trade in Fish 
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FIGURE 1.21: Sweden's trade with the European Community in 1990 (USD million) 
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Source: Nordic statistical yearbook. 
Altogether Germany has the largest trade exchange 
with the Nordic countries (with a surplus of German 
exports), followed by the United Kingdom (with a sur­
plus of British imports), Denmark, France and the 
Netherlands. Clearly, it is the northern EC countries, 
situated nearest to the Nordic countries, who account 
for the largest trading flows to and from Norden, 
and among the northern EC countries especially the 
two biggest economies, Germany and the United 
Kingdom. 
Table 1.21 
Trade with Nordic countries as a share of total international trade, 1990 
Source: UN, International trade statistics yearbook. 
For Denmark, the Nordic countries are important trad­
ing partners, accounting for one fifth of its international 
trade. For other EC countries, the Nordic countries are 
trading partners of secondary importance, accounting 
for 4 to 7 % of the total international trade of the United 
Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands and — rather sur­
prisingly — Portugal, and 2 to 3% in the rest of the 
Community. 
(%) 
Belgium­Luxembourg 
Denmark 
Germany (W) 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
United Kingdom 
Exports 
to Norden 
2.5 
20.8 
4.6 
2.8 
2.0 
2.2 
3.3 
2.3 
3.0 
7.1 
4.9 
Imports 
from Norden 
3.7 
19.5 
4.9 
2.7 
3.0 
3.7 
3.2 
2.5 
4.6 
3.6 
7.8 
Total 
3.1 
20.2 
4.8 
2.7 
2.6 
3.0 
3.2 
2.4 
3.8 
5.0 
6.5 
Tourism 
The tourist flows, as measured by guest nights in hotels 
and thus including business travel represent a kind of 
trade with services. In some regions, tourism is eco­
nomically very important. As already mentioned, the 
Nordic countries as well as most northern Community 
countries have a negative balance. They send more 
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tourists to other countries than they receive. The 
Mediterranean countries, on the contrary, have positive 
balances (Figure 1.22). 
Figure 1.23 shows that the most important EC receiver 
of Nordic tourists in 1989 was Greece, followed by 
Germany, Denmark, Italy, the United Kingdom, Spain 
and Portugal. Thus, the Mediterranean countries are 
much more important as Nordic tourist destinations 
than as trading partners. But there are also many 
Nordic guest nights in the hotels of northern 
Community countries — most of them undoubtedly due 
to business travel. 
FIGURE I.22: Balance in international tourism, 1990 (USD million) 
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The share of the Nordic countries in the total Ingoing 
and outgoing tourism of the EC countries is shown in 
Table 1.22. 
Table 1.22 
Nordic countries as origins and destinations of EC tourism, 1989 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany (W) 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
United Kingdom 
Nordic guest nights in EC hotels 
% international guest nights 
2.71 
42.1 
8.0 
11.2 
1.9' 
n.a. 
n.a. 
2.7 
3.0 
5.5 
7.6 
5.5 
EC guest 
% 
nights in Nordic hotels 
EC guest nights in Europe 
n.a. 
14.0 
1.2 
n.a. 
n.a. 
1.2 
n.a. 
1.02 
n.a. 
1.1 
n.a. 
1.1 
' Excluding Finland. 
' Excluding Norway. 
Source: Special report, 'Nordic tourism in Europe and European tourism in Nordic countries'. 
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FIGURE 1.23: 
66 The Nordic countries 
FIGURE 1.24: 
o sources: 
1990, World Tourism Organization 
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Table 1.22 shows that Nordic tourists are responsible for 
almost half of all international guest nights in Denmark. 
They also form a significant share of tourism in Greece 
and Portugal, but in 1989 a surprisingly small share of 
tourism in Spain. In these countries, the well-known 
seaside destinations of charter tours dominate. In other 
Community countries, Nordic tourists account for 5 to 
8% of international guest nights in Germany, the United 
Kingdom and the Netherlands, 2 to 3 % elsewhere. The 
big cities are the most important destinations in non-
Mediterranean areas of the European Community. 
EC tourism to the Nordic countries is much more 
modest. Danish tourists spend 14% of their guest 
nights abroad in the Nordic countries, other EC tourists 
only about 1%. 
The special study on 'Nordic tourism in Europe and 
European tourism in Nordic countries' expects that 
Nordic tourism to (especially west) Mediterranean coun-
tries may stagnate and decrease, but to other 
Community countries increase. If a clean environment 
and space become important factors in tourism, more 
EC tourists may visit the Nordic countries, but the latter 
will never turn into destinations of mass tourism. 
ments abroad in this period. The most important target 
was the United Kingdom, followed by the Netherlands, 
France, Germany, Ireland and Denmark. EC direct 
investments in Sweden primarily came from France, the 
Netherlands and Germany. 
As regards direct investments, EC interaction with the 
Nordic countries is clearly concentrated in Germany, the 
United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands and 
Denmark. 
Migration 
We now turn to other types of flows, one being migra-
tion. While data on migration flows vary considerably 
from year to year, data on the number of foreign resi-
dents show the integrated results of such flows (see 
Figure 1.25). Unfortunately, the data on Nordic residents 
in the individual EC countries and vice versa are far from 
complete. 
In Finland, the number of foreign residents is very 
modest. Germans form the most important EC group, 
followed by UK citizens. Data on Finnish residents in EC 
countries are very incomplete. 
Unfortunately, statistical data on other types of service 
trade, including transport, finance and producer ser-
vices, etc., are insufficient for closer analysis. 
Direct investments abroad 
Data on net direct investments (excluding reinvested 
profits) vary considerably from year to year. For the five-
year period 1987-91, the Nordic countries showed the 
following flows: 
Finnish direct investments in EC countries formed 44% 
of all Finnish direct investments abroad. The most 
important target was the United Kingdom, followed by 
the Netherlands, France, Germany, Belgium and 
Denmark. Data on EC direct Investments in Finland are 
not available. 
Norwegian direct investments in EC countries (only 
1990 and 1991) primarily went to Denmark and the 
United Kingdom. EC direct investments in Norway in 
this period were negative, due to substantial UK 
disinvestments. 
Iceland has an important number of Danish residents, 
indicating the close links in earlier, colonial times. Data 
on Icelandic residents in EC countries are very incom-
plete. 
In Norway, most EC residents are Danish, followed by 
UK citizens, Germans and Dutch. Norwegians ¡n EC 
countries are most numerous in Denmark, followed by 
Germany and the United Kingdom. 
In Sweden, Danes followed by Germans, UK citizens 
and Greeks are the most important EC groups. Swedes 
in EC countries are primarily found ¡n Germany and the 
United Kingdom, followed by Denmark. 
Altogether, the main exchange of people between the 
Nordic countries and the Community has touched 
Denmark, Germany and the United Kingdom. These 
migration flows tend to be rather stable. There are more 
Danes in Norway and Sweden than vice versa, and 
more UK citizens In Norway. Finland and Iceland, on the 
other hand, tend to send more citizens to the EC coun-
tries than they receive from them. 
Swedish direct investments in EC countries accounted 
for 73 % of the very substantial Swedish direct invest -
The migrational exchange of the EC countries with 
Norden is illustrated in Table 1.23. 
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Table 1.23 
Nordic residents in the European Community, and EC residents in the Nordic countries, 1988 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany (W) 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
United Kingdom 
Residents in Nordic countries 
as % of all residents in other 
EC' and Nordic countries 
1.5 
64.4 
12.5 
2.5 
1.7 
2.3 
5.8 
0.6 
2.7 
1.4 
9.0 
Residents from Nordic countries 
as % of all residents from 
other EC and Nordic countries 
n.a. 
46.2 
2.0 
6.52 
2.4 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
1.82 
n.a. 
n.a. 
' Except residents in France, Ireland, Italy and the United Kingdom. 
:' Except residents from Finland. 
Source: N. Ploug, Befolkningsvandringer mellem Norden og EF. Socialforskningsinstituttet, Copenhagen, 1990. 
Table 1.23 shows that roughly half of the Danish popula-
tion exchange with Nordic and EC countries is with the 
Nordic ones. A considerable number of German, UK 
and Irish citizens live in the Nordic countries, whereas 
few emigrants from other EC countries have moved to 
Norden. In the Mediterranean countries, the Nordic 
share of immigrants is generally very modest. A small 
Nordic retirement migration into the Mediterranean 
countries can be traced, however. 
1.9. Conclusions 
An examination of the data in Part I indicates that, in 
general, the northern EC countries have the most inter-
action among themselves: Denmark, Germany, the 
United Kingdom, the Netherlands. The exceptions are 
rather special cases, for example, the Iberian market for 
Icelandic fish, or the Mediterranean tourist and retire-
ment resorts. Hence It is in the northern Community that 
the positive and negative impacts of closer integration 
between the Nordic countries and the Community are 
likely to be most important. 
Clearly, one reason for the strong interaction between 
the Nordic countries and the northern Community is the 
short distances and hence the relatively low transport 
costs between them. 
Indeed, the very reason why the Nordic countries are 
now a rather prosperous and well-developed part of 
Europe (as shown earlier in this part) has been low 
transport costs to the main European markets and cen-
tres of innovation. Earlier, and even as late as the 19th 
century, the Nordic countries formed a poor and back-
ward periphery, due to slow and expensive transport to 
and from the economic and cultural core regions. 
However, distances and transport costs cannot alone 
explain the pattern of trade flows and interaction. For 
instance, distances between Belgium and the Nordic 
countries are only marginally longer than distances be-
tween the Netherlands and the Nordic countries. Yet 
the Netherlands has considerably more exchange with 
the Nordic countries than has Belgium. Beside 
distances, at least two more factors may play a role. 
Firstly, the Netherlands has 50% more people than 
Belgium, and a GDP that is also 50% higher. Clearly, 
the more people and the more economic activity, the 
more exchange there must be. 
Secondly, a number of cultural factors may play a role. 
Attitudes, language, religion, etc. may make communi-
cation and interaction easier or more difficult. The high 
volume of Danish trade with the Nordic countries, even 
after 20 years of EC membership, is evidence of this 
fact. It is well known that when Danish firms start ex-
porting, they almost invariably make their first attempts 
in Norway and Sweden, though the transport costs to 
Germany may be lower, because it is easier to com-
municate with the Scandinavian trading partners. 
Thus, an analysis of the pattern of interaction must take 
into account the factors of magnitude of population 
and economic activity, of distances and of cultural 
proximity. Traditional theories of international trade do 
not do that. 
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FIGURE 1.25: 
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Partii 
Institutional scenarios for Norden/EC 
in the year 2000 
2,1. Methodology 
The scenarios to be presented will be seed 'scenarios'. 
According to accepted professional tradition, the scena-
rios will be successful if they create a debate on the 
future development within Europe in which Norden and 
the Community are actors. However, they will fail if used 
to justify particular choices. 
Scenarios may be considered more or less likely, they 
may be more or less well-constructed from a profes-
sional point of view, but they cannot by their very nature 
be considered true or false. 
In the course of our working process we have distin-
guished between naive and complex trend scenarios. 
Naive trend scenarios are based on somewhat rough 
extrapolations of quantifiable or otherwise demonstrable 
developmental tendencies, whilst complex scenarios 
are built on a mixture of statistics, sociopolitical facts 
and qualified, visionary opinions. 
One obvious example of a naive scenario would be to 
conclude that the mere fact that the governments of 
Norway, Sweden and Finland have declared their inten-
tion of joining the European Union (i.e. accepting 
Maastricht) constitutes a certainty that they will join, 
One look at the consistent results of public opinion polls 
conducted in Norway and Sweden is enough to raise 
doubts as to whether the governments and the parlia-
mentary majorities of at least some Nordic countries 
may not in fact be heading for trouble on the issue of 
institutional integration. Accordingly, we have opted for 
a broader and more differentiated integration scenario, 
as will become plain later In this section. 
The difference between naive and complex sce-
narios might be better illustrated in the following two 
figures: 
FIGURE 11.1 : Two diagrams of the naive and complex trend scenarios 
Future 
Present 
Past 
(a) Naive trend scenario: the future is unilinear and certain. 
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Possible futures 
Present 
Past 
(b) Complex trend scenario: the future is multilinear and uncertain. 
A multiple and complex view of the future will be applied 
throughout this study. Both quantitative and qualitative 
methods will be applied to demonstrate impacts and 
explain scenarios more thoroughly. 
mination than, say, Germany or France, but where the 
European centre cannot hold due to centrifugal forces 
at play. 
A further distinction will be made between trend-based 
scenarios and contrast-based scenarios. 
A trend-based scenario corresponds to a likely course 
of events at any decision-making point in time, taking 
into account the tendencies implicit in a starting situa­
tion. Thus, the trend-based scenario, contrary to what 
is suggested by its name, does not necessarily corres­
pond to a pure and simple extrapolation of trends. A 
measure of likelihood is involved. Certainly, in the recent 
past, when the world changed less rapidly than today, 
the most likely development was a more or less 
mechanical continuation of current trends. However, the 
situation is very different today. 
A contrast-based scenario is the exploration of a deli­
berately different course of future events. Whereas the 
trend-based scenario corresponds to an exploratory 
approach from a development to a situation scenario, 
the contrast-based scenario is derived from a norma­
tive approach, i.e. the fixation of some future, imagin­
ative situation. This method is in trend with accepted 
professional tradition. As our point of departure we have 
chosen European political and institutional fragment­
ation. Thus the contrast scenario strongly differs from 
the trend-based integration scenario. 
On reflection it is evident that there need be no logical 
contradiction between the two scenarios. Norden may 
well become institutionally integrated with EC-Europe, 
and Europe may still lose its political, ideological and 
indeed institutional cohesion, i.e. become fragmented, 
for reasons having little or nothing to do with Norden. 
This eventuality would correspond to a situation where 
Norden seeks European integration with no less deter-
2.2. Scenarios 
2.2.1 . Norden in the era of spontaneous 
internationalization 
One would have to go far back into Nordic history to 
encounter 'national economies' with a reasonable 
degree of correspondence between economy and 
territory. In spite of its peripheral position in relation to 
Europe's innovative, trading and cultural centres, the 
fact remains that from early times the Nordic economies 
have been open and highly dependent on international 
trade and innovative impulses from the outside. 
The sort of spontaneous internationalization of econo­
mic relations that we are dealing with in the present 
report (and which is outlined in detail in,for example, the 
special study on Nordic industry, see Volume III of this 
report) bears no resemblance to conscious, politically 
initiated or regulated actions, but is primarily due to the 
emergence of the world market during the 19th century. 
Since World War II this internationalization has received 
a new decisive impetus from pioneer, technical innova­
tions, primarily within the fields of Information, commu­
nication and transport. Briefly, this technological revolu­
tion has entailed the following changes: 
After the genesis of the world market, the way was 
paved for the internationalization and globalization of 
production. 
In a physical sense this globalization has resulted in an 
explosive growth of transportation. Commodities are 
now being assembled from components produced in all 
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corners of the world. Consumer taste is becoming 
increasingly cosmopolitan, etc. 
Economically, internationalization has increased the 
costs of maintaining 'nationally defined' economic areas 
(protectionism) ad absurdum. This fact greatly contribu-
ted to the downfall of Eastern Europe's centralized 
economies. 
Spontaneous internationalization leads to irresistible 
pressures against national currencies which are based 
on economically irrational internal production systems 
or overburdened with too many social or regional trans-
fers. 
Politically, spontaneous, economic internationalization 
makes it nigh-on-impossible to sustain national public 
sectors whose relative size exceeds the sources of 
taxation generated by commercially efficient economic 
activities. It makes no difference whether the public 
sector mainly covers traditional areas such as adminis-
tration, health, social services, education, hard infra-
structures, etc., or, in addition, burdens Itself with shel-
tering certain economic sectors from open competition. 
One further outcome of spontaneous internationaliza-
tion ought to be mentioned: spontaneous reglonaliza-
tion — spontaneous in the sense that, in the majority of 
cases, the region building is initiated from 'below' in 
direct response to challenges and opportunities gener-
ated by the other effects of internationalization enumer-
ated above. One may point to numerous examples of 
'bottom-up' regionalization all over Western Europe and 
Norden. 
2.2.2. The effects of spontaneous inter-
nationalization in Norden 
Needless to say, spontaneous internationalization pre-
sents serious challenges to a 'Nordic model' which has 
for decades (until the 1980s and 1990s) been charac-
terized by: (i) 'demand-incited' welfare entitlements; and 
(ii) vast regional policy and settlement stabilizing trans-
fers intended to compensate disadvantaged areas and 
shelter internationally uncompetitive economic sectors. 
Norden's experience over recent years and months 
indicates that the policy of upholding a traditional 
Nordic model which cannot be paid for through the 
taxation of commercially viable industrial sectors seems 
unsustainable. 
The deeper 'systemic' causes of Norden's current econ-
omic difficulties may still not be completely understood. 
On the other hand, the effects are amply clear: deva-
luations and floating currencies in Finland, Sweden and 
Norway, general cuts in State transfers for social welfa-
re and the maintenance of territorial cohesion in Finland, 
Sweden and Denmark, dramatic falls in living standards 
in the Faeroe Islands, as well as caustic criticism of 
Norway's massive transfers to sheltered economic sec-
tors. In addition, recent months have witnessed severe 
increases in unemployment in Norway and Sweden, 
bordering on catastrophic increases in Finland (see 
Table I.6). 
Following the demise of socialism in the former Soviet 
Union, it has moreover become obvious that the afflu-
ence enjoyed in parts of Norden was not based on 
competitive, productive strength, but on advantageous 
Eastern political ties. To a large extent, Finland's current 
economic difficulties may be explained by the Soviet 
downfall. 
2.2.3. Spontaneous barriers against 
spontaneous internationalization 
Spontaneous internationalization is modified or counter-
acted by a number of equally spontaneous barriers of a 
non-economic and non-political nature. 
Two of these barriers emanate wholly, or in part, from 
economic internationalization itself. These are first and 
foremost physical and spatial barriers, and secondly 
ecological barriers. 
A third barrier is cultural in origin. 
As clarified in several of the special studies which are 
part of this final report, internationalization leads to an 
increasing demand for transport. (Theoretically one 
might well argue that, in reality, modern communication 
and information technology ought to allow for the 
smooth functioning of international production systems 
without the need for vast increases in physical trans-
port. However, from an empirical point of view, this 
potential has not been utilized.) The result is traffic con-
gestion to a degree which makes it in fact either physi-
cally impossible or prohibitively expensive to carry out 
the amount of goods transport that might be desirable 
seen from a purely economic point of view. 
The special study 'Infrastructure' in Volume IV refers to 
one such barrier across Germany just north of 
Hamburg. Severe traffic congestion may well lead to 
changes in regional competitiveness throughout the 
whole of Europe. The otherwise 'ideal' European divisi-
on of labour will have to adapt itself to the laws of phy-
sics (see the impact maps In Volume I, Part V of this 
report). 
In the same vein, nature itself imposes barriers. Ecology 
sets limits to the conduct of economic activities. Recent 
European Commission documents insist that a free 
European single market and the resulting intensification 
of the international division of labour must not lead to an 
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unlimited growth in physical transport and energy use. 
As indicated in, for example, the Commission's Green 
Paper on sustainable mobility, transport is among the 
main culprits when it comes to threatening the environ-
ment. 
If we assume that Europe keeps its promise to add the 
external (environmentally related) costs of production 
and transport to the final price of goods and services 
(as it will indeed some day be forced to do unless the 
environmental problems related to physical transport 
are solved through technical breakthroughs and their 
actual implementation), the relevant, regional conse-
quences will be analogous to those presented by the 
abovementioned congestion problem. 
Cultural barriers (the third principal barrier area enumer-
ated above) are among the hardest to overcome. In 
many respects, the culturally informed person is the 
very antithesis of the 'economic man' lauded by econ-
omic science. A common historical and cultural inheri-
tance intensified by a common language impels nations 
to nurture rationally uneconomical, anachronistic 'heir-
looms' such as sheltered economic sectors that could 
not survive free competition. 
Furthermore, one must never forget that culture is 
quintessential^ subtle and complex, an unspoken 
metalanguage beyond the reach of mundane semantics 
and syntax, which is why few foreign salesmen ever 
succeed in completely unravelling its mysteries and in 
marketing their wares at the local, microregional level. 
of the future. As indicated in the beginning of this report, 
we have based our report on the complex scenario 
concept. 
In addition to this fundamental scenario assumption, it 
has already been stated as our ambition to present two 
consciously contrasting main scenarios: on the one 
hand, this involves a 'trend-based' scenario which, to 
be sure, is in no way based on simple extrapolations 
from trends recorded up till now. On the other hand, we 
wish to present a deliberately contrasting scenario. 
The institutional scenarios have been labelled the 'inte-
gration scenario' and the 'fragmentation scenario' res-
pectively 
It must be emphasized that we have deliberately re-
frained from ascribing degrees of likelihood to the two 
contrasting scenarios. Thus we have made no attempt 
to evaluate whether one main scenario is more likely 
than the other. Given the current uncertainty, not to say 
turmoil, in European affairs, such an exercise would 
appear futile. 
Both scenarios are constructed from the same basic 
elements. 
The common point of departure has been fixed and 
defined as the current process of spontaneous interna-
tionalization and regionallzation, accompanied by the 
spontaneous barriers, namely the physical/spatial, eco-
logical and cultural barriers described briefly above. 
That is to say that the spontaneous developments con-
stitute the back-cloth to the scenarios to be performed. 
2.3. The construction of the 
institutional scenarios 
In principle, several methods might be used to con-
struct main scenarios on which to base suppositions 
about the likely regional and spatial impacts of Norden 
upon EC territories. 
Our construction of institutional scenarios takes as its 
point of departure the spontaneous internationalization 
and regionalization processes and the spontaneous 
barriers just described. Furthermore our train of thought 
draws on the previously indicated distinction that exists 
between 'naive' and 'complex' scenarios, which natu-
rally leads to two fundamentally different concepts 
The actors are Nordic political and institutional bodies, 
whose behaviour, through their capability of making 
choices, is able to point to distinctly different sets of 
Nordic impacts within the Community. 
Within the confines of the integration scenario the total 
scene may be depicted as follows: 
Variant I (Nordic/European integration at an EEA-like 
level) is understood to follow the line intended by the 
EEA Treaty between the European Community and 
EFTA, irrespective of whether the actual treaty Is ratified 
or not. 
Variant II (Nordic/European integration at a Maastricht-
like level) is understood to follow the intentions laid 
down in the Maastricht Treaty. 
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FIGURE 11.2: Integration scenario 
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There are important differences between the two vari­
ants. 
Variant I: Norden (i.e. Norway, Sweden, Finland and 
Iceland) is integrated into Europe without gaining much 
political or institutional influence on the authoritative 
future development of the Community. Norden only par­
tially opens its internal markets and societies to 
European penetration. This means, among other things, 
that the Nordic countries are still able, in principle, to 
maintain certain economic sectors, such as agriculture 
or fishing, which are wholly or partly unexposed to inter­
national competition. 
In addition, in Variant I the Nordic nation States can be 
kept relatively intact. There will be no significant surren­
der or delegation of sovereignty to supranational institu­
tions. 
sion­making processes. However, in doing so, it would 
probably have to sacrifice its current right to shelter cer­
tain economic sectors, at least to some extent. 
In the event of a Maastricht­like Europe, we would 
experience a spread of real authority at several levels, 
depending on the nature of issues (the subsidiarity prin­
ciple) versus the old order of territorial prerogatives in all 
spheres of life. 
Consequently, in a Maastricht­like Europe we would 
most likely encounter a strengthening of two levels at 
the expense of the old territorial States — the pan­
European level, and, on the other hand, the sub­
national, or transnational, regional level. Nation States 
would, of course, still exist as powerful European 
actors, but tendentially their influence and operational 
scope would decrease. 
Variant II is very different in its effects. The Maastricht 
document advocates the building of a pan­European 
identity — politically, institutionally, legally, monetarily 
and in other respects. Once integrated, Norden would 
be ¡n a position to bring its influence to bear on the deci­
Variants I and II of the integration scenario thus have dif­
ferent implications for the balance of power and initia­
tive which is endemic to the 'nation State versus the 
regions' dichotomy. This is illustrated in the figure 
below. 
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FIGURE ll.3:Tendencies in shifts of power and initiative among State, 
regional and pan­European levels 
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Concerning the overall integration scenario we shall 
again refrain from venturing any opinion on which inte­
grationist variant (I or II in Figure 11.2 above) would ap­
pear more likely. Suffice it to mention that in all Nordic 
countries, possibly with the exception of Iceland (who 
has not applied for EC membership and where no 
strong pro­Maastricht sentiment is evident), powerful 
and influential political and socioeconomic forces can 
be found in support of either variant. It must count 
heavily in the overall picture that the governments and 
the parliamentary majorities in Norway, Sweden and 
Finland — as already mentioned — favour a full EC 
membership, i.e. the Maastricht solution. But it is equal­
ly impossible to neglect the consistent outcomes of opi­
nion polls showing strong doubts in Sweden and 
Finland and outright popular opposition to EC mem­
bership in Norway. 
The fundamental uncertainty and complexity of the en­
tire Norden­EC relationship is further accentuated by 
the current economic difficulties in the Nordic countries. 
There is simply no commonly acceptable scientific 
method of determining how prolonged economic and, 
by amplification, socioeconomic and political difficulties 
may influence the behaviour of key decision­makers, 
such as the inclination of the voters who must in the 
final analysis determine the matter. (In all three countries 
— Norway, Sweden and Finland — an eventual deci­
sion to join the Community will be contingent upon 
popular referendums as already acknowledged by the 
governments.) 
In order to construct our institutional scenarios, how­
ever, we have been forced to make some fundamental 
assumptions regardless of the complexity and un­
certainty inherent in the current situation. 
One such fundamental assumption is that some mea­
sure of institutionalized Nordic integration with Europe 
will take place. In particular, it seems a certainty at the 
moment that the Integration of all Nordic countries — 
including Iceland — at an EEA level will be realized. 
(Theoretically one might argue that the institutionally 
driven integrationist process might collapse, but this 
very dim possibility has been discounted in the present 
report. Nor would an institutional breakdown in the long 
run obliterate the effects of spontaneous internationa­
lization.) 
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A third variant of the main integration scenario has been 
considered — and rejected as a realistic assumption. 
This would involve integration at the level of the single 
market, without any Nordic institutional commitments 
or obligations to the EC integration process. This vari-
ant would entail a greater degree of Nordic economic 
and trade commitment than an EEA-llke solution. There 
would be little room for sheltered economic sectors in 
Norden. 
tions and there is no indication that this state of affairs 
within the Danish realm is about to be changed. 
In Norway, Sweden and Finland, the governments, 
together with certain opposition parties and spokesmen 
responsible for important industrial organizations, have 
indicated their wish to join the Community but, as al-
ready indicated, powerful sectors of society remain 
adamantly opposed. 
From the 'Europe 16' point of view, this single market 
integrationist variant might be described as an eco-
nomic Europe without inner borders. 
Politically, however, such a Europe would be ill-
balanced. Twelve members of this single market would 
enter into extra-economic, supranational political and 
institutional agreements, whereas the four remaining 
members would take no part. A two-speed Europe 
would be created. 
From a Nordic point of view, however, such an arrange-
ment would entail some undesirable effects. The Nordic 
countries would have to open their borders without any 
reciprocal political or institutional influence. Therefore, it 
appears highly unlikely that this variant could ever be 
accepted by any Nordic country. 
To complete the discussion of the overall integration 
scenario it bears stressing that Norden does not neces-
sarily constitute a coherent unit vis-à-vis the rest of 
Europe. 
Apart from Denmark, Norden must be divided into 
several areas: western Norden, Norway, Sweden, and 
Finland. 
Western Norden (comprising Iceland and the two self-
governing areas within the Danish realm Greenland and 
the Faeroe Islands) is likely to base its European deci-
sions on the perceived need to protect its predominant 
source of income, i.e. fisheries. As it is a widely spread 
assumption in all three societies — among govern-
ments, political parties and public opinion alike — that 
the Community is unwilling to allow local control over 
this crucial sector, it is a near certainty that western 
Norden cannot join the Community unless its fisheries 
policies are substantially changed. This western Nordic 
position has been made plain through repeated public 
statements by leading politicians as well as by resear-
chers working on this NordREFO report. Should a reva-
luation be under way, we have been unable to detect 
any trace of it. (Concerning the weight of fisheries in the 
west Nordic economies we refer to the special study on 
fisheries in Volume III of this report.) 
As already mentioned, Greenland and the Faeroe 
Islands, though not sovereign States have been accor-
ded extensive de facto authority over their foreign rela-
The anti-EC opposition appears especially well en-
trenched in Norway, particularly among farmers, fisher-
men and inhabitants of the northern counties (fylker). 
Due to Its substantial earnings from the oil and gas 
industries (see the special study on energy in Volume IV) 
there is little doubt that the Norwegian nation pos-
sesses broader options of remaining aloof from an insti-
tutional integration into the Community beyond the EEA 
arrangement than do perhaps other parts of Norden. 
(Obviously, one should not discount the possibility that 
a favourable outcome of Norwegian-EC membership 
negotiations might lead to a more pro-EC public opinion 
in Norway.) 
The situation is somewhat more complex in Sweden 
and Finland who appear especially hard-hit by the cur-
rent crisis of the Nordic model in conjunction with the 
general international economic downturn and the 
break-up of the former Soviet Union (particularly a prob-
lem in Finland). 
Especially in the case of Sweden and Finland, a lot will 
depend on the public perception of EC integration as a 
potentially attractive solution to economic difficulties 
and on the extent to which it is generally believed that 
EC membership would be compatible with a continua-
tion of traditional welfare and regional equalization poli-
cies. 
2.3.1 . The contrast scenario 
The contrast scenario is based on European political 
and institutional fragmentation. 
To avoid any danger of being misunderstood, let us 
repeat that we have chosen a deliberately different 
scenario from that of the trend-based integration 
scenario just presented. Otherwise it would not be a 
contrast scenario. Thus the contrast scenario is delib-
erately extreme and not based upon any extrapolation 
of current trends. In addition, it hardly needs mentioning 
that no measure of the perceived desirability or undeslr-
ability of any future development has influenced our 
choice of contrast scenario. 
The backcloth is unchanged. Spontaneous inter-
nationalization accompanied by spontaneous barriers 
still represents the long-term agenda. But in this case 
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Europe reacts differently — some might say irrationally 
— to the challenges and opportunities of the trend. 
Politically atavistic impulses gain the upper hand. 
Europe's quest for unity is lost, at least for a while. 
Maastricht cannot be implemented and the Community 
must return to the drawing board. Old EC institutions 
and regulations may remain on the books but fall into 
disuse, as did the Treaty of the League of Nations after 
the great depression and events in Germany in 1933. 
Norden is thus faced with having to make its choice 
against a double back-cloth of spontaneous interna­
tionalization and European political and institutional 
fragmentation — at least compared to the visions of 
European unity and cohesion laid down In many recent 
EC documents. 
In this case we would assume that the Nordic countries 
would carefully consider not only the immediate political 
and institutional crisis, but equally the fundamental 
back-cloth of spontaneous trends already described. 
Consequently it appears most likely that the individual 
Nordic countries would opt for choice No I In the illus­
tration below, which means that they would strive to 
secure sectoral integration with Europe as a substitute 
for the kind of comprehensive political and institutional 
arrangement which is no longer workable. 
Therefore, national adaptations to European sectoral 
solutions, which might be labelled a sort of sectoral 
confederation, would seem the most likely contrast-
based scenario. 
Possible sectoral areas of cooperation between Norden 
and the Community might be asylum policy, free trade, 
environmental protection, human rights protection, law 
enforcement and infrastructure. Some of these potential 
areas of sectoral cooperation, of course, emanate 
directly from the back-cloth of spontaneous inter­
nationalization. 
FIGURE II.4: Fragmentation scenario 
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As indicated in the overall fragmentation scenario, 
another Nordic option has been considered, i.e. a 
'Nordic solution' as an alternative to European integra­
tion. 
This possibility has already been introduced into the 
Nordic public debate. A Nordic solution could mean 
anything ranging from the creation of a Nordic federa­
tion of States to an economic union, or even to a Nordic 
military and security policy union. 
Plans of this nature have been discussed at regular 
intervals ever since the mid-19th century when the 
Danish realm came under pressure from nationalists 
who wished to split the Danish-German-speaking mon­
archy along national lines. But every time such Nordic 
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or Scandinavian solutions were suggested, it turned out 
that the Nordic countries were too different in terms of 
economic and military interests or foreign obligations for 
the scheme to be realistic. 
Even today the Nordic picture is far from uniform. 
Norway, Denmark and Iceland are members of NATO, 
whereas Finland and Sweden are not. Denmark is a 
member of the Community, whereas the self-governing 
areas within the realm, i.e. Greenland and the Faeroe 
Islands are not. Nor are the other countries within 
Norden. Norway and Finland have hinted that they may 
wish to join the Western European Union. Denmark is 
opposed, and so on. 
Nor can it be said that Norden is absolutely uniform in 
terms of political culture. Characteristically, in spite of 
several decades of Nordic institutionalized cooperation 
through the Nordic Council of Ministers (governmental 
cooperation) and the Nordic Council (parliamentary 
cooperation), which, let it be said, have achieved some 
most excellent results such as the Nordic passport 
union and a free inner labour market, it is a fact that 
whatever free trade exists among the Nordic countries 
is due not to the results of Nordic cooperation but to the 
achievements of EFTA. Free trade among all Nordic 
countries (including Denmark) will only come about as a 
result of the Nordic countries' ratification of the EEA 
Agreement, i.e. as a result of a 'European' impulse. 
In spite of the shortcomings of Nordic cooperation it 
would be wrong to assume, however, that it is on its 
way out. Irrespective of any Norden-EC settlement and 
of how many Nordic countries or self-governing areas 
decide to join or stay outside the Community, Nordic 
cooperation will continue — rooted as it is in strong 
popular sentiments and backed by governments and 
parliaments who wish to see it carried on. 
One indication of the strength of Nordic commonalty 
is the combined membership of the various Norden 
Associations (Foreningerne Norden) in all Nordic 
countries and self-governing areas, which exceeds 
100000. 
As a recent declaration by the five Nordic prime min-
isters (the so-called Bornholm Declaration of 17 August 
1992) makes clear, the specific aims and modalities of 
Nordic cooperation are to be adjusted to the new rea-
lity of greater Nordic integration with Europe. This might 
entail a stronger emphasis on Nordic cultural coopera-
tion and a greater degree of thematically oriented pri-
orities, but the prime ministers made it plain that there 
is no question of downgrading inter-Nordic endeavours 
nor of cutting financial allocations for inter-Nordic 
governmental cooperation (currently approximately 
ECU 90 million per annum). 
The fundamental commitment to a specific Nordic 
dimension in Europe was underlined by the current 
chairman of the Nordic Council, Sweden's Prime 
Minister Carl Bildt in his address to the 42nd session of 
the Nordic Council on 1 March 1993. In particular, 
Mr Bildt stressed the need for a Nordic dimension in the 
Community's regional policies in order that the Nordic 
countries may get their fair share of the Structural 
Funds with reference to the particular geographical, 
physical and climatic characteristics in Norden. (We 
refer to this point in Part III, Volume I of this report.) 
Mr Bildt further referred to the stipulation in the EEA 
Agreement that Nordic cooperation shall be allowed to 
continue and to Sweden's expressed desire that an 
eventual Swedish membership of the EC shall consti-
tute no impediment to its further development. 
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Part III 
Overview of impacts of Nordic developments 
on EC territory 
3,1. Introduction 
The aim of Part III is first of all to define three specific 
impact dimensions on EC territories which will enable us 
to classify potential Nordic impacts. The nomenclature 
developed below will be employed throughout this 
study. 
We then proceed to enumerate a great number of 
potential Nordic impact factors derived from the 11 
special studies presented in Volumes II to IV and to 
order these impacts according to the three dimensions 
just developed. What is intended is a catalogue of 
potential impacts regardless of whether these must be 
considered potentially weak or strong. 
In this sense Part III also serves the purpose of providing 
an initial key to a further immersion in the special 
studies. 
Dimension II: The meso-regional dimension 
When the likely impact is defined as meso-regional, we 
are talking in terms of regions which are greater in phy-
sical size and based on other criteria than those of the 
NUTS nomenclature. Moreover, these regions often 
cross national frontiers and embrace several border 
areas of juxtaposed nations.. 
Dimension III: The macro-regional or pan-European 
spatial dimension 
In some instances the potential Nordic impact may be 
so uniform as to be deemed of little interest to the pur-
pose of the overall study. In other instances even the 
most widespread impact may prove of considerable 
importance. 
Two such instances spring to mind: 
3.2. Impact dimensions 
It is important to note that Nordic impacts upon EC ter-
ritories may unfold within distinctly different dimensions, 
For the purpose of this study we have identified three 
such dimensions: 
Dimension I: The micro-regional dimension 
Some special studies point to measurable impacts on 
reasonably definable geographical micro-regions within 
the Community. In terms of size, a micro-region would 
be the equivalent of perhaps a large English county, a 
German Land, a city region such as the greater Paris 
region, or an island such as Zealand in Denmark. 
(a) impacts that somehow tend to shift the previous 
'European balance', for example, from the south-
west towards the north-east; 
(b) pan-EC Nordic impacts, for example, stemming 
from increased Nordic political or institutional influ-
ence, which may motivate the Community to modify 
its priorities concerning regionally or spatially rele-
vant policies, for example, the allocational principles 
governing the distribution of Structural Funds. 
Both of these possibilities will be treated in greater detail 
¡n Part V of Volume I. 
What follows ¡s a summary of the most important 
potential impacts of Nordic development upon the 
Community's regional development and spatial organ-
ization which may be derived from a closer scrutiny of 
the special studies. 
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These impacts are classified according to impact 
dimensions (micro-regional, meso-regional and macro-
spatial) as just defined. 
Later ¡n Part IV we shall deal more thoroughly with a 
number of impacts which appear to be particularly 
strong. These will be illustrated by a number of maps. 
Please note that a thorough cross-analysis of a number 
of potential Nordic impacts in light of our two institu-
tional scenarios — the integration scenario and the 
fragmentation scenario (developed in Part II) — will fol-
low in Part V of this volume. 
In order to make this summary survey of the impact 
findings of the special studies transparent, we have 
ordered them according to likely impact dimensions: 
micro-regional, meso-regional and macro-spatial. 
Under each heading the findings are presented accor-
ding to whether impacts are anticipated to occur in 
European peripheral or in European core regions and 
whether the Nordic impacts are likely to be to the over-
all advantage or disadvantage of the respective regions. 
Again based on the findings of the special studies, we 
shall further attempt an initial evaluation as to whether 
impacts must be considered potentially weak or strong. 
In accordance with the prevalent scenario assumptions 
of the special studies, the tentative conclusions presen-
ted here are based on the overall integration scenario 
outlines in Part II of this volume. 
3.3. Potential impacts at the micro-
regional level 
3.3.1. Potentially advantageous Nordic 
impacts on peripheral European 
micro-regions 
As mentioned ¡n the special study on regional policy 
(Volume II), a potential conflict may be emerging be-
tween a traditional Nordic concept regional policy (in the 
narrow sense of that word) and the principles governing 
the distribution of EC Structural Funds. It is furthermore 
reasonable to assume that this discrepancy will be-
come more acute in the event of a closer Nordic institu-
tional integration with the Community. 
What distinguishes Nordic regional policy to a greater 
extent than that of the Community is the desire to 
employ regional policy measures in order to stabilize the 
settlement pattern of the remoter, peripheral areas and 
stave off rural depopulation. This is especially true of 
Norway. 
As also indicated in the special study, there are, how-
ever, differences between the Nordic countries. Sweden 
operates a regional policy which focuses somewhat 
more on achieving social welfare goals. As a result, the 
related physical, cultural and educational infrastructure 
has tended to attract the rural population to the larger 
provincial towns. 
Recently Nordic regional policy has been hampered by 
the prevailing economic recession. This causes an 
increase in population migration to the larger provincial 
centres, which counteracts the efforts to stabilize set-
tlement in the thinly populated areas. Rural/urban 
migration in the remoter areas concentrates problems 
in the provincial towns where social friction and 
unemployment show a marked increase. The battle 
intensifies between the different geographical regions 
as they fight for an adequate share of the limited resour-
ces offered by restricted State budgets, 
Exchanges of documents in preparation for Norway, 
Sweden and Finland's forthcoming membership nego-
tiations with the Community have highlighted the man-
ner in which Norden, through its regional policies, has 
successfully minimized the living standard gap between 
its core and periphery, a problem which is so common 
to other countries. The average GDP per capita of the 
wealthier southern regions of Norden is only 13% 
above that of the Nordic peripheral areas. 
It seems appropriate to compare this relatively minor 
Nordic difference to the vast differences existing within 
the Community. Recent findings indicate that the 10 
least developed regions within the Community, primar-
ily located in Greece and Portugal, have average in-
comes per capita which are less than a third of those 
enjoyed in the 10 most developed regions located in the 
Community's northern core areas (R. Hall and D. Van 
der Wee in Nord Revy, No 5/6, 1991). Furthermore, 
national differences in individual Member States appear 
much greater than within the individual Nordic coun-
tries. 
This minimal regional inequality in living standards has 
been the result of a long tradition of transference of 
resources to the peripheral areas in order to maintain 
and improve agriculture, fishing, education and social 
services. This is reflected in the peripheral regions being 
characterized by an unusually high percentage of their 
work-force In the primary and tertiary Industrial sectors. 
The tertiary sector is actually just as well represented in 
the northernmost regions of Norden as it is in the south. 
All in all, employment in the tertiary sector is 12 % above 
the EC average. This high tertiary sector employment 
figure compensates to some degree for the lack of 
secondary sector employment opportunities, i.e. in 
manufacturing. Geographically, manufacturing is con-
centrated in the mid-Nordic region. 
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As long as an Institutionally integrated Norden pursues 
its quest to at least partially maintain its traditional com-
mitments to the relative equality in regional living stan-
dards, it is fair to assume that this will have spin-off 
effects within the Community, that is, supporting the 
case of increased regional support to other EC peri-
pheral regions which possess similar characteristics to 
those of Norden's own peripheral areas. 
One such peripheral region is the Scottish Highlands 
and Islands region which does not receive subsidization 
from the national government on the same scale en-
joyed by Nordic peripheral regions. One result is that 
unemployment is relatively higher in the Scottish peri-
pheral regions than in the Nordic periphery. 
Nordic regional policy support for industry has wavered 
slightly in recent years. For many years the official policy 
was to grant subsidies to individual enterprises to aid 
investment and reduce running costs. However, this 
individual treatment has recently been partly replaced 
by a harder policy line. There is greater caution and 
scrutiny. Loans to industry are now dependent on pre-
vailing market circumstances rather than on purely indi-
vidual company needs. Although far from foreign to 
Norden, regional policy is becoming consciously more 
infrastructurally oriented and in that sense more akin to 
the policies pursued within the Community. 
Recently, the argument that the Community ought to 
acknowledge low population density as a regional sup-
port criterion was forcefully made by the Nordic coun-
tries. Whether they shall succeed In this endeavour is as 
yet undecided, as is the eventual fate of other Nordic 
demands for EC recognition of long distances and 
harsh climate as grounds for preferential treatment. 
Should the low population density criterion fail, the 
Initiation of special programmes based on resource-
based industrial sectors might compensate to some 
extent. However, within certain primary industries, 
especially fishing and forestry, EC regional development 
or compensation (equalization) programmes would 
most likely benefit few micro-regions in Norden due to 
its technological advantage over its European neigh-
bours. 
Finally, it should be pointed out that an EC policy aimed 
at compensating technologically advanced Nordic fish-
ing and forestry regions might conceivably lead to a 
micro-regional 'scramble' for the benefits from the limi-
ted number of primary industry support programmes. In 
the case of the fishing and forestry industries, which will 
be dealt with more comprehensively in the next para-
graph, the advanced Nordic micro-regions would be 
likely to face strong opposition from fishing regions 
along the Danish and United Kingdom North Sea 
coasts as well as ¡n Ireland. 
3.3.2. Potentially advantageous Nordic 
impacts in core European 
micro-regions 
Several of the special studies show that commercial 
integration between Norden and the Community is 
already highly developed, and that the interaction is 
expected to continue, particularly in the service, tourist 
and energy industries. While greater political cohesion 
as a result of Nordic integration might well further 
encourage commercial integration, politics in itself is not 
the engine. The driving-force in fact lies outside the po-
litical sphere of influence. It is spontaneous business 
decisions, operating under free market conditions, 
which rejuvenate demand. This ought to be advantage-
ous to some European micro-regions. 
Three of the special studies have in particular focused 
on the likely effect of Nordic development on European 
core micro-regions: 
(a) general industry (primary/secondary industries) 
(Volume III), 
(b) the business service industry (Volume III), 
(c) the tourist industry (Volume II). 
The special study on industry 
(primary and secondary) 
This special study has considered the future for employ-
ment, investment and internationalization. Certain In-
dustrial branches have been analysed in greater depth 
as they are very representative of Nordic industry. 
Due to the modern, high-tech exploitation of the vast 
forest reserves which occupy a large percentage of the 
total land surface of the Fenno-Scandinavian area, cer-
tain Nordic industries have gained world importance — 
forestry, timber, and the pulp and paper-processing 
industries. Swedish and Finnish primary and secondary 
industrial concerns predominate. The competitive 
advantage enjoyed by the Nordic countries due to their 
high-tech equipment and modern processing plants 
has allowed them to win a prime share of the total 
European market. 
The question remains as to how long the Nordic-based 
industries will be able to maintain their competitive edge 
on their EC rivals if the EC integration process is com-
pleted. 
However, the special study suggests that the greatest 
increase in employment within these industries will 
actually occur in central Europe, rather than in Norden 
itself. This is because there will be advantages to be 
gained through a more market-oriented industrial loca-
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tion of the processing Industries. The European core 
has several large urban agglomerations in which the 
related processing industries are already established: 
central England, eastern Holland, Belgium, southern 
and western Germany. As a whole, the industry will be 
able to take advantage of new market trends, particu-
larly an increasingly differentiated market, and pay heed 
to changing environmental preferences. For example, 
besides being close to the client, the 'in vogue' paper 
recycling industry will have the added advantage of 
being located right in the very heart of its recycled 
material source. 
The possibility that European integration might have a 
dampening effect on the Nordic forest, timber and pulp 
and paper industries worries many Nordic communities, 
as many of them are almost totally dependent on these 
industries for their economic livelihood. There are 
usually no alternative industries in the vicinity. 
Furthermore, many settlements are remote, making 
them unattractive relocation candidates for other in-
dustries. 
Another important secondary industry in Norden is the 
transport production industry. Sweden has clearly the 
best vantage point due to its broad production range, 
while Finland and Norway tend to concentrate on 
favourable market niche production areas. The most 
drastic geographical effect of European integration is 
likely to be felt within the automobile industry. Sweden, 
with its important automobile production, has already 
taken steps to achieve closer cooperation with its EC 
neighbours. The Swedish automobile industry operates 
with much of its production phase (component manu-
facturing and assembly) in central European locations: 
Germany (Lower Saxony, North Rhine-Westphalia, 
Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria), France (Paris, Paris 
basin, East), Italy (Turin/Milan) and England (West 
Midlands). Suppliers and assemblers are also found 
elsewhere in Europe, in all, 35% of the people employ-
ed In the Swedish automobile industry work abroad. 
The Internationalization of the Swedish automobile 
industry is an obvious advantage for the micro-regions 
of central Europe. However, it may not be long-lived. 
Competition from Japan is a constant menace. 
Moreover, production costs are uncompetitively high 
compared to those of other continents, partly because 
manufacturing occurs in the high-income regions of 
Europe. Finally, due to the worsening economic reces-
sion, the north European demand for cars is falling. 
The business service industry 
The future for the European micro-regions is harder to 
predict with regard to the tertiary industrial sector (note 
that tourism will be dealt with separately in the next sub-
paragraph). 
Barriers to location and development differ according to 
the nature of the service. Some will concentrate upon 
specific geographical nodes, others will locate more dif-
fusely. 
Generally, the special study and its selected sources of 
reference do not foresee any great effect on micro-
regional development by this industrial sector as a result 
of Nordic integration with Europe. 
The most likely small effects may be briefly described 
here. 
The special study indicates that barriers will be fewest 
where areas are geographically close or where cultural 
similarity exists. Advocates of increasing tertiary indus-
try concentration predict that it will take place in existing 
major population centres such as London, Paris, and 
the Randstad (the Netherlands), while opponents see 
areas with a favourable climate, such as the South of 
France, attracting an increasing number of service in-
dustries. Within Scandinavia, southern Sweden or Den-
mark might become favourite choices for the relocation 
of Nordic tertiary enterprises due to the low cultural 
barrier. 
The close geographical, historical, and above all the 
increasingly strong political bond that now exists be-
tween the Nordic countries and the new Baltic nations 
must favour Nordic service industries being able to 
establish themselves in the east Baltic area. 
Taking the Nordic countries as a whole, the integration 
process within the sen/ice sector itself is likely to have a 
slightly negative effect. However, there are branches 
which may benefit enormously. This may be true of the 
Norwegian shipping industry or the sale of Norwegian 
know-how through the establishment of technical advi-
sory services replacing less competent local services 
abroad within the oil and gas extraction industries in 
places such as Jutland in Denmark, western Holland, 
eastern England and Scotland. 
The special study also reports that Finnish engineering 
companies already enjoy a strong international reputa-
tion. They will be well placed in view of the anticipated 
expansion of the physical infrastructure. Furthermore, it 
is obvious that the Baltic Sea regions will represent an 
excellent market opportunity for the Finns, due to the 
low cultural barrier, notably in Estonia where there are 
linguistic similarities. 
Factors which might encourage business services to 
remain 'at home' in Norden include the easy access to 
the well-educated labour market and a highly de-
veloped university network offering research possibili-
ties. 
As a supplementary piece of information, the study on 
business services shows that the peripheral areas of 
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Norden have a highly trained workforce, in fact, as far 
as Sweden is concerned, the level of competence is 
generally higher in the periphery than in the more 
densely populated south of the country. 
The tourist industry 
The special study on tourism is based on three de-
velopmental hypotheses: (i) the first prognosis foresees 
development along existing lines, with an exodus of 
Nordic tourists to the sun-traps of southern Europe and 
alpine ski-resorts; (ii) the first alternative foresees an 
increasing fascination with areas of cultural interest; 
while (¡il) the second alternative predicts that the grow-
ing concern for the natural environment and greater 
interest in 'green holidays' will also become a major fac-
tor affecting tourism. 
Of particular interest to the micro-regions of central 
Europe is the prospect of an increase in culturally based 
tourism. Nordic clients are currently a very important 
source of tourist revenue in the micro-regions of the 
Mediterranean. However, a shift to other European 
micro-regions of 'greater' cultural Interest might occur. 
An increase in culturally based tourism will initially favour 
the culturally rich capital cities of central Europe: Paris, 
London, Amsterdam, Berlin, Prague, Vienna and Buda-
pest. Provincial towns of particular cultural Interest will 
also prove increasingly attractive: Sienna, Florence, 
Gerona, Bruges, Delft, Bath, York, Chester, etc. 
Barring the capital cities, Oslo, Stockholm and Helsinki, 
the Nordic towns are less well known (perhaps insuffi-
ciently known) as places of cultural interest. A move 
towards culturally based tourism may be to the detri-
ment of Norden as a whole. 
3.3.3. Potentially disadvantageous Nordic 
impacts on peripheral European 
micro-regions 
A decline in economic growth and living standards may 
be experienced in European peripheral micro-regions 
dependent upon a particular resource if the integration 
of Norden into the EC opens the door to better orga-
nized, more competitive Nordic concerns. 
The fishing and fish-processing industries 
An excellent example of this event happening is within 
the valuable fishing industry. Iceland and Norway are 
already major exporters to the European market, while 
Sweden and Finland have no fishing industry of impor-
tance. Iceland and Norway might be able to increase 
their European market share significantly once 
European integration has been achieved. 
However, this might be disadvantageous to certain 
European peripheral regions such as in Denmark and 
the United Kingdom, particularly if the Icelandic and 
Norwegian fish-processing industries increase their 
hold on the production and market shares. Micro-
regions that will suffer include the western fishing com-
munities of Jutland In Denmark, such as the fishing 
ports of Esbjerg and Skagen, as well as the North Sea 
coastal fishing towns of the United Kingdom such as 
Grimsby, Hull, Aberdeen and Peterhead. 
Yet it must be said that there are many circumstances 
that could affect the actual course of events. Fish pro-
cessing in the rest of Europe is hardly likely to dwindle 
into oblivion. Denmark, for example, will probably 
remain an Important processor of the Norwegian catch. 
Furthermore, if the tendency to process fish closer to 
the customer wins favour, the opposite situation might 
occur, with an increase in fish processing at the best-
suited coastal sites within easy access of a major 
European market. 
Energy 
Norway supplies much of Europe with oil and gas for 
energy production and consumption: electricity, petrol, 
etc. However, EC integration will probably have only a 
minor and rather diffuse effect on the rest of Europe. 
Energy production is highly capital-intensive, so 
changes are not likely to affect the employment situa-
tion in the other European production areas to any sig-
nificant degree. Norway has much experience and 
know-how within the energy industry that might be 
valuable to countries bordering the North Sea, under 
which lie rich reserves of oil and gas. The Netherlands, 
the United Kingdom and Germany might be affected. 
The nature or extent of Nordic Influence is not possible 
to gauge at this stage. 
It is thought that significant reserves of oil and gas lie 
beneath the Barents Sea, which is owned partly by 
Russia and partly by Norway. Once the political and ter-
ritorial issues have been resolved, the exploitation of 
these resources might lead to the installation of pipe-
lines southwards through northern Norway and Finland 
to the main European distribution network. Eco-
nomically, it will mean the rapid growth of micro-regions 
such as the Finnmark area of northernmost Norway and 
parts of Lapland in northern Finland. 
The nature of the energy flow-lines, costs involved, 
demand and competition, etc. will all determine how 
and where other micro-regions shall flourish, or whether 
currently active micro-regions engaged in exploiting the 
existing North Sea reserves will decline. As yet, it is too 
early to see how this development will unfold. 
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The particular potentials of the creation of a Barents 
region will be investigated in greater detail in Part V, 
dealing with transborder regional scenarios. 
3.3.4. Potentially disadvantageous Nordic 
impacts on core European 
micro-regions 
As a result of stronger integration, spontaneous or offi-
cial interaction between Norden and the Community will 
increase. Pressure on the existing infrastructure will 
augment. The special study on transport (see Volume 
IV) reports on a dramatic growth in goods transport be-
tween Norden and the Community in recent years. 
There is no evidence to show that this trend will 
change. 
Goods transport uses certain fixed physical corridors, 
for example, the major European river valleys such as 
the Rhine and Rhone. These will be subject to ever-
increasing bottlenecks, particularly if the growth in road 
transport, notably caused by an increase in large heavy-
goods vehicles, continues to accelerate at the current 
rate. The worst congestion is experienced on the 
German road network south and west of Hamburg. The 
limited number of major alpine road passes in 
Switzerland, Austria and Italy is a'crucial problem need-
ing a satisfactory remedy. Unfortunately, the foreseeable 
integration of Norden into the Community is only likely 
to create more traffic between North and South and 
exacerbate the problem. 
The areas within or adjacent to these traffic corridors 
suffer from unacceptable noise and pollution levels. It is 
a heavy price to pay. This is true of the greater Hamburg 
region and the Rohr. German unification means that 
national priority will be given to an improvement of the 
transport communications network from west to east, 
rather than north to south, within the country. Micro-
regions in the Netherlands, France, Italy and England 
are also suffering from an unacceptable over-concen-
tration of traffic along a limited number of major routes. 
Whether the Maastricht model or the EEA model is 
employed ¡s immaterial. Norden's entry into Europe will 
exacerbate the traffic problem. 
Congestion creates barriers to growth for the micro-
regions which suffer from it. Transport time is length-
ened, adversely affecting the effectiveness of compa-
nies for which speed is a first priority. This may weaken 
their position and at the worst lead to closures and job 
losses, not to mention the severe pollution that per-
vades the region, contaminating the atmosphere, cor-
roding materials, killing plants, jeopardizing health and 
eventually reducing the life expectancy of those who live 
or work in the region. 
Within the Scandinavian or Nordic context, there are 
naturally micro-regions which suffer from congestion 
and pollution. The Øresund region, representing the 
border zone between Denmark and Sweden, is a good 
example. Greater Copenhagen/Elsinore and greater 
Malmø/Helsingborg already suffer from serious traffic 
problems. However, congestion in Norden is certainly 
not on the same scale as that suffered throughout 
much of central and southern Europe. 
With EC approval, the German Government has re-
acted to the problem by planning to introduce distance-
related and possibly environment-related toll payments 
for the use of its motorway system. Likewise, the 
Community ¡s considering ways of ensuring a more 
sensible distribution of traffic across its land surface, as 
well as introducing penal measures such as the imposi-
tion of duties to encourage users to operate with new 
or modified vehicles and fuels which are less harmful to 
the environment. At the same time, attempts will be 
made to try and make people use alternative modes, 
such as rail or water transport. 
No business will shift to an alternative transport mode, 
however, unless the cost advantage is apparent. 
Besides, other considerations might still prevent the 
desired change. Old habits die hard. The 'just-in-time' 
principle is engrained in business philosophy as it is the 
most profitable. Consequently, much stock is literally 
'on the road'. 
A considerable shift in transport mode (to rail or ship) 
might lead to the establishment of new micro-regions or 
to the rejuvenation of old ones. It might give the kiss of 
life to some of Europe's slowly dying ports, once 
thought beyond resurrection. This could well be true of 
some Baltic Sea and North Sea ports. Likewise, the 
most navigable canals and rivers may become impor-
tant inland routes and rejuvenate waterway transport in 
Europe. 
All in all, however, the special study on transport tends 
to be pessimistic in its outlook. The future problems 
seem to outweigh any minor benefits caused by new 
policies, regulatory measures and changes in habit. In 
particular, it takes a dim view of the potentials of in-
creased rail traffic. Far too little is being done to create 
European standards for such essentials as signals or 
width of tracks to make it credible that rail traffic can 
alleviate road congestion in the foreseeable future. 
The study hints that this sorry state of affairs may well 
lead to a lower degree of pan-European division of 
labour than that anticipated as a result of the introduc-
tion of the single market, perhaps leading to a greater 
degree of micro-regional self-sufficiency. 
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3.4. Potential impacts at the meso-
regional level 
3.4.1. Potentially advantageous Nordic 
impacts on peripheral European 
meso-regions 
Given certain circumstances, there will be a strength-
ening of competition within the agricultural and tourist 
industries at the European meso-regional level as a 
result of integration between Norden and the 
Community. 
Agriculture 
The special study on agriculture shows that this indus-
try is particularly beset with intricate regulations and 
subventions, 
In Norden, agricultural policies have been much used as 
a regional policy instrument. It can be wielded in such a 
way as to anchor the existing settlement pattern in peri-
pheral areas so as to keep remote highlands and low-
lands adequately populated. However, this policy is 
beginning to wane due to the current deepening econ-
omic recession, and a more liberalist attitude is likely to 
be forthcoming. This will allow market forces and con-
sumer choice to make their impact felt more strongly. 
Moreover, a tendency for the old Nordic agricultural 
policy regime to be undermined may well follow in the 
wake of the countries' Institutional integration with the 
Community. 
Much of the Community enjoys a higher standard of 
agricultural productivity than Norden. Compared to its 
European neighbours, much of Norden suffers from a 
combination of mountainous terrain and a malevolent 
climate. Only in Skåne (the southern tip of Sweden) 
does Norden possess an agricultural region on a par 
with a neighbouring country — the geographically simi-
lar Denmark. 
The integration of Norden into Europe, via the 
Community or the EEA, may well be to the benefit of 
European agricultural meso-regions at the expense of 
Nordic ones. One possible scenario is based on the 
anticipation that Norden-EC agreements will reduce the 
competitiveness of Nordic agriculture and make life dif-
ficult in Nordic regions, part of whose livelihood has 
been based on arctic or subarctic agriculture. 
But the special study on agriculture also makes clear 
that prognostications in this area are very uncertain as 
the whole matter of Nordic agriculture's future is being 
— or about to be — negotiated. 
The great transport distances separating many Nordic 
agricultural regions and markets from European sup-
pliers or markets may be judged both favourably and 
disfavourably. It could protect the Nordic home market 
for easily perishable products. By contrast, the long 
distances will add unfavourable additional transport and 
refrigeration costs to the export of Nordic products to 
the markets of central and southern Europe. 
A further factor to be overcome, in all parts of Europe, 
is dietary tradition. How does one break down tradi-
tional, perhaps culturally determined, eating habits 
when trying to break into a new market? However, the 
special study pays little attention to this marketing 
problem, regarding it at this stage as being of minor 
importance. 
Much of the Nordic region is likely to be subject to mar-
keting attacks from the agricultural products (particu-
larly food) of the highly modernized and efficient adja-
cent meso-regions of northern Germany, Denmark and 
Benelux. These meso-regions will also have an advan-
tage over their southern counterparts due to their 
closer proximity to Norden. Transport time and costs 
are assumed to play an important role in the choice of 
market. However they will not have the same products 
on offer as their southern counterparts, exotic fruits or 
wines for example, although how much these products 
are to be judged as alternatives to Nordic products is 
tentative. All ¡n all, this development may well entail 
severe competition to the agricultural and food-proces-
sing industries of Norway, Finland, and to a lesser 
extent Sweden. 
Tourism 
Nordic tourists represent an important source of income 
for the tourist industry of southern Europe, particularly 
the sunny, coastal regions of the Mediterranean. 
An analysis of tourist behaviour reveals that Nordic tour-
ists have begun to show a preference for eastern 
Mediterranean destinations rather than western ones. 
This is based on a 'quality for money' decision. Either 
prices in the western half have to fall and/or the resorts 
of Portugal, Spain, Italy and France have to improve 
their quality and reduce pollution, or else the eastern 
Mediterranean (Greece, and the non-EC countries of 
Turkey, Cyprus, Israel and Bulgaria) will be the winners. 
In itself, European entry is unlikely to improve the 
purchasing power of the Nordic tourist. Therefore, if 
they remain unimproved, the meso-regions of the 
western Mediterranean are likely to continue their 
decrease in popularity. 
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3.4.2. Potentially advantageous Nordic 
impacts on core European 
meso-regions 
Industry 
Manufacturing industry is likely to be greatly affected in 
the European core meso-regions by the integration of 
Norden into Europe. The special study predicts that the 
spatial effects of an increased adaptation to European 
norms and increased cooperation will benefit the core 
region. The reason is the enormous concentration of 
population in these areas and the market potential that 
it represents. 
At present, the sources of information to confirm likely 
changes are sparse. This is probably a natural conse-
quence of cautious market behaviour. However, Invest-
ment flows have been analysed as they may provide 
some indication of future development if trends persist. 
Apparently, Nordic investment in Europe is greater than 
European investment in Norden. This is particularly true 
of the production phase. Swedish and Finnish com-
panies have Invested considerable sums of money in 
France, Germany, the Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom. Even Icelandic investment has been directed 
towards Europe. Apart from Ireland, investment in 
countries who are substantial beneficiaries of EC 
Structural Fund support are less attractive to Nordic 
Investors, i.e. Portugal, Spain, Greece and Italy. 
It has, unfortunately, not been possible to divide the 
investment data into meso-regional proportions. 
3.4.3. Potentially disadvantageous Nordic 
impacts on peripheral European 
meso-regions 
The transport situation 
Circumstances affecting transport Influence decisions 
on industrial location and marketing. The special study 
highlights certain barriers to efficient transport com-
munication between Norden and Europe. Essentially, as 
explained earlier, these problems are the overloading 
and congestion of certain parts of the total European 
road network, notably in central Europe. This will 
increase the transport time for goods sent from the 
European periphery to the European core, or vice versa. 
The knock-on effect of the extra costs will be represen-
ted in an increase in end-user sales price, particularly in 
connection with farm and food products, although the 
price of consumer durables and tourist holidays may 
also increase. The potential welfare advantages of 
Nordic integration may be counteracted by any in-
crease in transport communication problems. 
In order to alleviate the problem affecting the link be-
tween Norden and Europe, alternative routes ought to 
be considered. This may be possible in Denmark and 
selected parts of northern Germany, for example, the 
proposed Fehmarn bridge/tunnel link, or perhaps some 
time in the next century future tunnel links from the 
Rügen/Zingst peninsula of Pomerania to Gedser in 
Denmark and to Trelleborg in Skåne, Sweden. 
Assuming that production techniques are not too special-
ized and markets fairly stable, alternative thinking may 
be the solution at the supplier to industry level. 
Suppliers located on the Iberian peninsula already 
suffer from the burden of increasing transport costs and 
delays in supplying their Nordic customers. They may 
find their solution in relocating in the new market econ-
omies of Poland and the Baltic States which are alter-
native low-production cost countries. This will naturally 
be to the detriment of Iberian peripheral areas such as 
in Portugal, whilst alternatively Baltic countries such as 
Lithuania may stand to gain. 
Concrete documentation for this tendency is not forth-
coming in the special study on transport, although the 
textile industry is mentioned as an industrial branch that 
might witness relocation, partly due to the transport 
time/cost problems. 
Tourism 
The European meso-regions are particularly vulnerable 
to rapid changes in market behaviour resulting from 
world events or changes in attitude. With regard to atti-
tude it has already been shown that a shift in interest 
towards holidays of greater cultural or environmental 
Interest may reduce the market share for the traditional 
sunshine resorts of the Mediterranean. Holidays In the 
most important cultural cities will increase. The un-
tapped potential of the vast tracts of beautiful, mini-
mally polluted land In Norden may benefit from an 
increase In demand for environmentally pleasant holi-
days, as the current European Green Movement 
becomes more popular. 
Tourism will also be negatively affected by the likely 
increase of duties, tolls and taxes on transport to re-
duce pollution and congestion. Interaction will decrease 
to the detriment of more distant destinations of the 
European periphery. 
Fishing 
The Nordic fishing and fish-processing industries have 
great potential both in the volume of their catch and 
their productivity. As mentioned in the section on micro-
regions, certain localities in northern Europe may be 
faced with severe competition from Nordic concerns 
once integration has occurred. 
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The more diffuse nature of the European fishing industry 
in peripheral areas, such as Iberia, may prevent them 
from being greatly affected by Nordic competition. It 
depends on the degree of dependence upon fishing as 
the staple livelihood. Furthermore, the fish species 
caught in Nordic sea areas are not necessarily the same 
as in the Mediterranean or Iberian Atlantic waters, and 
traditional dietary habits in Spain and Portugal may 
therefore shield the Iberian fishing industry somewhat. 
Possessing rich fishing grounds is not the only condi-
tion for being successfully competitive. Market control is 
a major factor too. Nordic dominance will not neces-
sarily be achieved by trying to out-manoeuvre the South 
by fusions. Strong reaction by the rest of Europe, pos-
sibly through protectionist moves, may weaken trade 
connections and jeopardize the Nordic fishing industry 
as a whole. Therefore fish-processing close to the large 
consumer markets of England, Germany and Benelux 
will probably be a wiser Nordic policy to pursue. 
Meanwhile, in the event of entry into the Community, 
Norden would continue to work for an alteration in the 
allocation of the European Structural Funds, so as to 
retrieve a larger share of its potentially high contribution 
in order to boost certain areas of its economy. Support 
would likely be forthcoming from other EC areas show-
ing similar or analogous physical or climatic characteris-
tics as Norden. Undoubtedly, Norden would encounter 
opposition — particularly from disadvantaged regions in 
southern Europe — if it were to pursue a policy of 'pro-
Nordic' modifications in the previous allocational criteria 
determining the distribution of the Structural Funds. 
Recently, as already indicated, several Nordic countries 
have switched their regional policies towards a course 
closer to that of the Community. This new policy tends 
to diminish direct aid to individual enterprises and 
moves more strongly towards broader project-oriented 
aid programmes. Similarly, the EC policy of improving 
the basic infrastructure — road networks, educational 
and cultural activities — is also receiving higher Nordic 
priority. 
3.4.4. Potentially disadvantageous Nordic 
impacts on core European 
meso-regions 
Due to the limitations and nature of the research 
methods employed, the special studies have been un-
able to point to any potential weakening of the 
European core at meso-regional level. The effects seem 
to be more significant at micro-regional level, as des-
cribed earlier. 
3.5. Potential impacts at the macro-
spatial level 
The macro-spatial level is in fact the total European sur-
face area. As already indicated in our discussion of 
impact dimensions at the start of Part III, Nordic inte-
gration into Europe will not be confined purely in effect 
to small localities, geographical regions or even nations. 
Certain effects will be universally felt across the whole of 
Europe, that ¡s, they will be pan-European. 
This paragraph looks at the integrational impact on the 
North-South balance in Europe. 
From the way in which the European Structural Fund 
policies to aid the weaker European regions are orga-
nized at present, it is clear that the entry of the relative-
ly wealthy Nordic countries into Europe might be a wel-
come plus factor. The weaker nations of southern 
Europe would probably continue to receive Structural 
Fund and cohesion transfers beyond the year 2000 at 
approximately the present rate. 
The worsening budget situation has also made it more 
difficult for the Nordic nations to carry on their regional 
policy of maintaining settlement densities and patterns 
in remote areas by means of-the decentralization of ser-
vices, a policy which has, up till now, been very suc-
cessful in creating jobs in these areas which would 
otherwise suffer from high regional unemployment and 
witness severe rural depopulation. 
The special study on regional policy (see Volume II) 
claims that Norden will surely advocate a strength-
ening of European regional policios, and that with its 
vast experience in this area, Norden would be able to 
play a major role in advising on relevant and essential 
criteria for the benefit of Europe as a whole. 
Businesswise, both for manufacturing industry and agri-
culture, European entry may have a generally negative 
effect on Norden. The competitive edge in certain 
industries might well be blunted. Nordic production 
might in some instances be forced to relocate in the 
European core area due to the advantages of being 
closer to large markets. This might mean job losses In 
Norden itself. 
A loss of Nordic protective subsidies might weaken 
Nordic agriculture and subject the Nordic market to 
attack by European companies. However, the market 
potential is only 18 million people compared to 344 mil-
lion people in the rest of Europe. 
Gains may also be had by European business services 
at the expense of their Nordic counterparts. However, 
Europeans would have to overcome Nordic culture and 
language, and there is no guarantee that European 
companies would be able to break through as success-
fully as they may wish. 
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Psychologically, the very fact that Norden undoubtedly 
is a European geographical periphery may be con-
strued to imply a number of 'natural' Nordic advan-
tages: a clean environment, vast open spaces, beauti-
ful nature, invigorating climate and large raw-material 
resources which could be enjoyed, or exploited, parti-
cularly by the European core area. The excellent rec-
reational potential is obvious. 
On the other hand, further analysis presented in the 
special study on Norden's peripherality (Volume II) 
shows that a population drift towards Norden purely on 
the basis of the abovementioned advantages is ex-
tremely unlikely. This is due to a stronger human pref-
erence to live in countries with warmer climates. 
Furthermore, there is the centuries-old, economically 
created, rural-urban migration trend in Europe, which is 
a legacy from the agricultural and industrial revolutions. 
Economic factors seem to outweigh all other factors, 
and definitely environmental ones, when it comes to 
choosing a place to live and work. One can, therefore, 
readily assume that any environmental advantages 
enjoyed by Norden will not in themselves be enough to 
attract industry and create new jobs. 
Nevertheless, Norden must be on its guard that its high-
ly valuable environmental assets are not turned into the 
future European 'dumping ground' for relocating 
heavily polluting industries from the European core 
areas. A strict environmental protection policy must be 
enforced to avoid this disastrous potential threat beco-
ming a reality. In this respect, Nordic resilience is very 
strong. This can be seen by the current, concerted 
efforts to avoid an increase in pollution in the Kola 
Peninsula and the Barents Sea region (see the treat-
ment of the Barents Sea initiative in Part V, Volume I). 
The special study on tourism considered the increasing 
public and political interest in environmental protection 
and greater interest in wildlife among the European 
population as a possible future scenario. However, the 
study concluded that prevailing forces affecting the 
macro-spatial level will continue. Holidays to the sunny, 
seaside resorts of southern Europe will predominate, 
while several factors, including greater environmental 
awareness, may cause a very slight increase in the 
number of Nordic people taking their holidays in their 
homeland or may encourage some southern Euro-
peans to visit the North. 
regard to trade between the two regions. There are 
pluses and minuses. Any pluses must be seen in the 
light of a hidden form of 'protectionism' in which a per-
ceived transport hindrance to the desired optimal trade 
flow may cause some businesses to defer marketing 
their wares to more distant markets, thus 'protecting' 
home markets for domestic goods. However, it has not 
been possible for the special study on infrastructure to 
specify which products or industrial branches are likely 
to be most affected. 
Close proximity to the Baltic States and the new market 
economies of Poland and the Russian Federation must 
give Norden a clear advantage over many other Euro-
pean countries in establishing new profitable links. Yet, 
the opportunity has not yet been fully grasped by the 
Nordic countries, and there is a danger that many use-
ful connections may be established by German initia-
tives due to that country's exceptionally broad industrial 
base and experience. 
Not all initiatives are based on economic gain. There are 
equally important issues to be solved through political 
cooperation with regard to pollution, migration and 
security. In this area, Norden is showing greater urgen-
cy and initiative to shape the course of future events. 
Politically it may also be said that the opening-up of the 
Baltic States and the Russian Federation will increase 
the overall importance of Norden once it becomes a 
fully integrated member of the Community. Threats to 
safety, security or the environment will then be taken 
much more seriously by the other Member States. This 
may lead to a flow of resources to Norden to reduce 
and check threats, and of course tendentially result in a 
decline in importance of the southern European areas. 
In this connection, it ought to be mentioned that in the 
event of Norway and/or Finland joining the Community 
as full members, the Finnish-Norwegian eastern bor-
ders would become the Community's only border with 
ex-Soviet areas. The importance of this fact can proba-
bly be inferred from the extraordinary circumstance that 
the Community has officially decided to join in the en-
deavours of the Barents region initiative although neit-
her the initiating power, Norway, nor the other States 
whose territories are directly involved are as yet mem-
bers of the Community. 
At macro-spatial level, the development of European 
energy supplies will be diffuse, due to the gradual evol-
ution of a pan-European network in which the Russian 
Federation is also involved. Norden will play its part in 
this evolution where cooperation and practical compro-
mise are going to be vital ingredients rather than iso-
lated market decision-making. 
Transport problems are more diffuse at the macro-level 
as they affect both Norden and Europe adversely with 
3.6. Conclusions 
The special studies reveal that the finer the resolution 
level the more accurate is the identification of effect, 
This has been true of the Nordic study's attempt to pin-
point the impacts of Nordic development on the re-
gional development and spatial organization in the 
Community. The micro-regional level represents the 
finest level, i.e. the most specific impact dimension. On 
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the other hand, an alternative philosophy advocates 
that effects often occur unexpectedly, diffusely or even 
at random, making a more universal, i.e. scalar, 
approach to matters of cause-and-effect wiser. 
As would have been reasonable to expect, It has not 
been possible to tackle all the problems even at the 
finer resolution levels of meso-regions and micro-
regions. 
Regarding the whole spectrum of subject areas studied, 
it has become apparent that it is absolutely Impossible 
to identify one simple result of Nordic integration with 
Europe. Nordic entry will cause many different effects 
which will be dispersed differently at various regional 
levels throughout Europe. 
The special studies are multifarious and thorough. Even 
so, they have not tackled every single aspect of poten-
tial Nordic impact. In spite of this, the task of portraying 
lucidly the negative impacts as they may be perceived 
by the Community has not been insurmountable, even 
when tackling vital Nordic interests such as fishing and 
its related industries, or, indeed, other raw-material 
based industries. 
A series of problems regarding the Nordic peripheral 
areas ¡s likely to grow as a result of EC-European pene-
tration. One of the worst effects will be the disintegra-
tion of the widely dispersed population settlement pat-
tern in remoter areas which has until recently been 
maintained by prudent Nordic regional policies. The 
result may be a significant increase in rural-urban migra-
tion, and consequently the rapid growth of small pro-
vincial towns with above-average unemployment. 
Not unexpectedly, integration will have a much greater 
impact on the Nordic economies than on the EC econ-
omies. Yet, Norden is well suited to fending off any 
'attack' due to its highly educated and well-trained 
population and its high level of welfare services which 
will, even if It comes to the worst, continue to maintain 
a standard of living above the European average for 
many years to come. 
For certain Industries it would seem that it is not so 
important whether integration takes the form of the 
Maastricht model or the EEA model. These industries 
include manufacturing, business services, tourism and 
energy. This is because they have already undergone 
much deregulation and internationalization. 
On the other hand, some of the major primary industries 
such as agriculture and fisheries will be greatly influen-
ced by the agreements reached during an integration 
process. They have up till now constituted a mainstay 
of Nordic regional policy. Ideologically they are regarded 
as very important, in fact more important than their 
mere numerical contribution to the social value-added. 
EC membership would undoubtedly make Norden a net 
contributor to the Community's cohesion policies while 
receiving comparatively little Structural Funds support in 
return — thus benefiting the southern members of the 
Community and Ireland. 
Nevertheless, in spite of its low population, there is no 
doubt that Norden would become a significant member, 
particularly in influencing future European regional poli-
cies where it has valuable experience to draw upon. 
Undeniably, however, this might incite a North-South 
conflict concerning priorities and therefore allocations, 
as mentioned earlier. 
Norden would no doubt attempt to take existing EC 
ideologies at their word, such as the principle of greater 
cohesion, more subsidiarity within the Community, solv-
ing environmental problems, allowing more room for 
interregional — perhaps transborder regional — coope-
ration and interaction. 
The efforts are likely to take the following forms: 
(i) the identification of raw material resource-based 
regions which deserve development aid pro-
grammes. This might create a better alliance bet-
ween Norden and the southern European countries 
with regard to the forestry, timber and pulp and 
paper Industries, or with central Europe and the 
United Kingdom with regard to the iron and steel 
industry and other metal manufacturing industries; 
(ii) the demand for greater subsidiarity, even autonomy, 
with regard to how regional and industrial aid is 
administered at the local level. This will of course be 
related to modifications of European regional poli-
cies; 
(iii) the establishment of a 'northern dimension' within 
the Community in relation to the overall European 
need to establish common policies dealing with the 
challenges and opportunities emanating from 
Norden's proximity — and by amplification the 
Community's proximity, should the Nordic States 
become members — to the Russian Federation and 
the newly liberated Baltic States in matters such as 
security, demographic stabilization, environmental 
protection and the utilization of the vast natural 
resources and industrial potentials of such regions 
as the Barents Sea area. 
These suppositions must be considered with reserva-
tion. Future EC regional policies, geopolitical priorities 
and the implications of a potential Nordic entry into the 
Community constitute a very uncertain political, regional 
and spatial arena in which many acts will be performed 
before definite shapes and strategies have emerged. 
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Part IV 
Identifying potentially strong Nordic impacts 
4.1. Introduction 
Whereas the preceding Part III undertook a broad dis-
cussion — in more or less catalogue form — of a vast 
spectrum of potential Nordic impacts regardless of 
whether they might be perceived as weak or strong, and 
ordered according to the three impact dimensions de-
fined in this study, we shall now, in Part IV, narrow the 
focus to a number of Nordic impact factors that we 
determine to be potentially strong. 
To facilitate this determination, we have applied a rough 
quantitative tool allowing us to compare Norden and the 
Community. 
Based on our strength assessments, we then identify a 
number of potentially interesting Nordic sectors which 
are discussed and whose potential Impacts upon EC 
territories we attempt to determine. 
The Nordic impact factors analysed are: 
(i) nature, environment and peripherality (including 
demographic characteristics); 
(ii) industrial clusters; 
(iii) the Nordic energy sector; 
(iv) agriculture and the agro-industry; 
(v) fisheries; 
(vi) tourist industry. 
At the end of Part IV our findings are presented in 
graphic form. 
overall purpose of this study (some may be too weak to 
be of any appreciable interest) we have employed a 
rough tool as the basis of our immediate considera-
tions. 
As a point of departure it should again be pointed out 
that in terms of total population the Nordic countries are 
small compared to the total population of the 
Community. As indicated in Table IV. 1 below, the com-
bined population of Norway, Sweden, Finland and 
Iceland amounts to no more than 5 % of the total for the 
Community. 
Normally one would expect a certain correlation be-
tween this demographic fact and the likely impact of 
various Nordic sectors upon a large and populous area 
such as the Community 
It is clear that almost regardless of any imaginable 
Nordic development, one may expect little or no regional/ 
spatial impact contribution from Nordic sectors whose 
relative size vis-à-vis the Community falls below a cer-
tain level. On the other hand, it is evident that Nordic 
sectors showing relative strength compared to EC 
totals may be assumed to exert some potentially 
appreciable influence. 
4.2. Measuring impact strength 
In order to obtain some idea of the potential strength of 
Nordic impacts — and therefore their relevance to the 
Obviously, strong Nordic sectors cannot automatically 
be translated into strong impacts. It has to be taken Into 
account that barriers to flows, regardless of their na-
ture or origin, may modify or eliminate expected impact 
contributions. 
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Table IV.1 
A quantitative comparison of Norden and the European Community 
Area (100 km2) 
Population (1 000) 
Population density (km2) 
Agricultural production (1 000 tonnes) 
Corn 
Milk 
Potatoes 
Livestock (1 000) 
Cattle 
Swine 
Sheep 
Horses 
Forestry (1 000 m3) 
Roundwood removals 
Fisheries (1 000 tonnes) 
Total catches 
Atlantic cod 
Energy 
Natural gas (million m3) 
Crude oil (1 000 tonnes) 
Electricity (1 000 GWh) 
Hydroelectricity (1 000 GWh) 
Electric energy per capita 
Other commodities (1 000 tonnes) 
Iron ore 
Ferrous alloys 
Crude steel 
Aluminium 
Cut timber (1 000 m3) 
Paper and pulp 
Newsprint 
Transport 
Commercial shipping (gross tonnage) 
Private vehicles (1 000) 
Railway traffic (passenger/km) 
Norden excluding 
Denmark 
the Faeroes 
and Greenland 
1 215 
18 035 
15 
11 536 
8 263 
2 695 
7 019 
4 046 
3 308 
175 
113 474 
3 613 
506 
27 812 
81 861 
320 
209 
17 731 
14 756 
5916 
8316 
1 045 
22 602 
21 751 
4 476 
19017 
8 708 
11 964 
The 
European Community 
Including 
Denmark 
2 304 
333 296 
145 
143 396 
113 766 
42 767 
81 959 
111 338 
105 594 
1 598 
125 774 
6 193 
359 
122 905 
102 952 
1 772 
147 
5316 
5 610 
92 616 
132 168 
2 419 
34 331 
9 676 
2 761 
63 944 
124 002 
235 222 
Norden as a 
percentage of the 
European 
Community 
53 
5 
10 
8 
7 
6 
9 
4 
3 
11 
90 
58 
140 
23 
80 
18 
142 
300 
263 
6 
6 
43 
66 
225 
162 
30 
7 
5 
Sources: Nordic statistical yearbook, UN statistical survey, UN, Yearbook of industrial statistics (statistical years 1989 and 1990). 
Some specific Nordic characteristics and sectoral 
strengths of potential Importance to the flows of goods, 
services, capital and persons have been indicated by 
asterisks in the table above. 
As becomes Immediately apparent, Norden's area is 
vast compared to that of the Community. Were the 
Nordic countries to become members of the 
Community, the area of this 'Europe 16' would increase 
by 53% compared to the present 'Europe 12', i.e. if 
one leaves out Nordic areas such as Greenland, the 
Faeroe Islands and Svalbard. The justification for doing 
so may be considered somewhat dubious. They are, 
after all, very much a part of nations whose develop-
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ment is central to the entire Nordic impact study. If one 
does take Into account the entire Nordic area, including 
Greenland, the Faeroe Islands and Svalbard, Norden's 
combined area would exceed that of the present 
Community (see Figure 1.1 presented in Part I). 
As indicated in the special study on Norden's peri-
pherality (Volume II), this vast Nordic area has given rise 
to a number of Nordic special characteristics, primarily 
vast areas with very sparse population and long 
distances creating physical barriers to economic activi-
ties and the need to overcome internal Nordic cohesion 
problems by means of transport infrastructural invest-
ments (see the special study on Infrastructure in Volume 
IV). On the positive side, Norden does posses vast 
areas of virtually untouched natural beauty which might 
bode well for 'environmental tourism' (see the special 
study on tourism in Volume II). By the same token there 
¡s in Norden no lack of physical space for the location of 
economic activities — a fact that might help Europe 
alleviate the growing problem of congestion in core 
economic areas (see the special study on peripherality 
in Volume II). 
Norden's unique physical and geographical characteris-
tics may well in themselves have spatially relevant 
impacts on EC territories, particularly on the assump-
tion that the Nordic countries were to join the Com-
munity (i.e. if Variant II of the Integration scenario pre-
sented in Part II, Volume I is realized). In particular, if the 
Nordic countries were to gain EC acceptance of their 
claim that long distances, sparse population and cold 
climate should modify the existing allocational principles 
governing the disbursement of Structural Funds, this 
might well create effects throughout the EC area. 
For one thing, one might hypothesize that tendentially 
there could be a shift in balance from the South of 
Europe towards the North. For another, the general 
acceptance of 'Nordic' principles might conceivably be 
to the advantage of a number of specified regions with-
in the present Community, in particular the Scottish 
Highlands and Islands and certain sparsely populated 
areas of the Iberian peninsula (see the special study on 
regional policy in Volume II). 
Together with other quintessential^ Nordic problems — 
such as the cold climate and rough terrain — the ques-
tion of long distances has now been raised by the 
Nordic countries in preparation for their negotiations 
with the Community. Some of the features have already 
been touched upon in Part I of this volume. 
Apart from Norden's sheer size and physical/geographi-
cal characteristics, the potential effects of Nordic de-
velopment on EC regional and spatial organization may 
be evaluated on a factor basis. The preceding table 
indicates some potentially interesting areas with an ade-
quate relative size vis-à-vis the Europe of Twelve. 
4.3. Nordic economic sectors of likely 
regional and spatial relevance 
On the face of the empirical evidence, the following 
Nordic sectors ought to command some attention: 
forestry, paper and pulp, fisheries, metal mining and 
refining, and perhaps above all the strong Nordic, i.e. 
almost exclusively Norwegian, energy position in terms 
of deposits of natural gas and oil. 
One crucial Nordic sector is not featured in the table 
above — the travel industry, including both tourism and 
business travel. 
Norden's demand for international travel services is 
markedly higher than that of the EC countries. Per inha-
bitant and year, the Nordic countries generate 1.11 bed 
occupancies compared to only 0.97 in the Community. 
In other words, the 'travel inclination' among 
Northerners is 15% above that of EC Europeans. 
This aggregated figure covers both tourism and busi-
ness. We have to assume — albeit without adequate 
statistical documentation — that the level of business 
travel is rather equally distributed among advanced 
industrialized nations. Consequently, tourism would 
seem to account for the difference between Norden 
and the Community. Generally, the frequency of foreign 
holiday-making appears to be directly correlated to the 
degree of northerly location, with Norden being at the 
top. 
it must also be noted — as particularly relevant to the 
purpose of this study — that most of the Nordic 
demand for tourist services is directed toward non-
Nordic countries. Only 12 % of Nordic travel is to desti-
nations in another Nordic country. The rest of the Nordic 
travellers aim for the Continent. We may be even more 
specific — for southern Europe. 
Altogether it might well be argued that the potential 
impact of Nordic development on the travel industry is 
among the 'heaviest' contributors to regional and spa-
tial effects in the Community. 
In the light of this observation, we have extensively 
summarized our conclusions in this area at the end of 
Part IV. We also refer to the special study on the travel 
industry in Volume II. 
As evidenced in Table IV1 above, Nordic agriculture is 
not a strong Nordic sector, particularly if one takes into 
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account that a great deal of it survives on State 
transfers and would have difficulties in a pan­European 
market­place. This very fact, however, could be of 
prime importance in the event of closer Nordic integra­
tion with Europe as Nordic 'low pressure' in agriculture 
might lead to significant regional Impacts in strong and 
strategically well located EC agricultural regions. 
Norden's — and again we are primarily talking of 
Norway — huge merchant fleet is very difficult to assess 
in a context relevant to regional and spatial develop­
ments and no attempt has been made in this study. 
One would assume, however, that given a major re­
location of international sea trading routes favouring a 
north­eastern passage between western Europe and 
the Far East (a cost­cutting possibility which is cur­
rently under active investigation by Norway and Russia), 
Norwegian commercial sea power may become yet 
another factor enhancing the regional potential of the 
Barents Sea area. This entire problematic is further 
expounded in Part V of Volume I. 
4.4. Barriers to impact 
Potentially interesting impact sectors should, however, 
be analysed in the light of certain barriers to free flows. 
The long distances involved in transporting goods and 
people from Norden to the rest of Europe have always 
constituted such a barrier, for example, the distance 
from the northern Cape to Oslo equals the distance 
from Oslo to Rome! In principle it must be assumed that 
the greater the distance, the weaker the interaction. 
Other physical barriers are mountainous terrain and the 
necessity to cross seas, for example, the narrow strait 
between Denmark and Sweden has yet to be bridged. 
These geographical features play their part ¡n Impeding 
Interaction and increasing the journey time necessary to 
complete a transaction. On the whole, one must as­
sume that interaction will normally be most intense in 
the border regions between the Community and 
Norden. 
Infrastructural barriers 
Cultural barriers 
In spite of a well­developed Infrastructure, cultural bar­
riers may restrict interaction. Cultural differences reduce 
cohesion, affecting the spatial impact of European inte­
gration processes. If one regards Europe as a mosaic of 
different regions (the concept of 'the regions of 
Europe'), such cultural barriers may be perceived as 
very significant. This is as true for Nordic cultural regions 
as it is for EC regions. Conversely, these historically 
determined cultural regions, which may include certain 
border zones traversing existing State boundaries, 
ought to be the source of inspiration for transnational 
interaction. 
Environmental barriers 
These will either limit regional growth and transport 
development or influence flows, for example, tourist 
flows (see the special studies on tourism and transport). 
Acceptable, sustained growth must pay heed to eco­
logical requirements. Environmental determinants 
should be seen as positive guides to a better utilization 
of the wide­open spaces and special areas of cultural 
and ecological interest, an infrastructural development 
which respects nature, more pleasant working and lei­
sure environments and less pollution, 
Impacts — strong or weak 
In the preceding Part III of this synthesis report a sum­
mary survey of all potential Nordic impacts on EC re­
gional development and spatial organization based on 
the findings of the special studies was presented. In the 
rest of Part IV we shall emphasize a somewhat different 
focus. With a view towards the rough quantitative 
assessment tool just discussed, we shall concentrate 
on potentially strong Nordic impacts leaving out those 
potential impacts which may be deemed comparatively 
inconsequential. 
In the descriptive analysis below, the assessment 
schema will not be too strictly adhered to, but the bar­
riers and opportunities of each criterion will be analysed 
¡n relation to selected economic sectors. 
The physical barriers may naturally be reduced by 
improving physical infrastructure — roads and motor­
ways, railways, air­routes, telecommunications and 
information technology. With regard to the latter two 
frontiers of science, distance may even be 'removed' 
according to the modem high­tech principle of 'there is 
everywhere'. The major flow factors affected by infra­
structural progress are goods, passengers, movements 
of labour, movements of capital and services. The 
degree to which Nordic integration will succeed 
depends greatly on the nature of Euro­Nordic infra­
structure today and its outlook for tomorrow. 
4.5. Nature, environment and peri­
pherality — impact strength 
Obviously, Norden's vast territory compared to its 
sparse population constitutes a problem area, calling 
for careful analysis (see Figure IV.1 below). Will spatial 
and regional impacts on EC territories based on 
Norden's special geographical characteristics become 
appreciable or not of any great importance? 
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FIGURE IV.1 : Norden superimposed on Europe 
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The questions are partly speculative in character and 
may be illuminated only by presenting some observed 
geographical and environmental properties of Norden 
compared to EC regions, and by reasoning about pos-
sible hypothetical effects. Emphasis is on description, 
but even description is difficult due to lack of reliable 
comparative data. However, available data have been 
employed to provide the rough picture that Is sum-
marized below. 
Summing up, it is reasonable to conclude that the 
Nordic countries are in possession of a series of 
environmental advantages as compared with the 
Community, advantages which are clearly connected to 
the different population geography and geographical 
location. A substantially larger part of the Nordic terri-
tory is relatively virgin land, and the climatic and topo-
graphical qualities are rather different from most EC 
countries and regions (especially the geographically clo-
sest). Generally (according to our preliminary analysis), 
the level of pollution seems to be lower in Norden than 
in the Community. 
Among the most obvious explanatory factors are the 
following: 
(i) low population density makes daily life and econo-
mic activity possible without great pressure on na-
ture and its resources. In central Europe the most 
important pollution determinant Is the concentration 
of large populations in limited areas; 
(ii) peripheral geographical location in relation to central 
Europe leaves Norden outside the area most affec-
ted by external effluents. 
Based on the available data (which are most relevant to 
city areas), however, we find no dramatic disparities 
between the environmental qualities of Norden and the 
Community, but the differences in size and structure of 
city areas between the two regions make for substan-
tial disparities in the respective population's access to 
unspoiled and clean nature. Even so, the people's own 
evaluation of their local states of environment — repor-
ted by OECD — is quite similar in Norden and the 
Community. The main difference obviously lies in the lar-
gely different shares of the areas that are not taken into 
productive or residential uses, or that are otherwise 
spoiled by continuous presence of humans and human 
activity. 
The 18 million inhabitants of Norden correspond to less 
than half the population of Spain, and occupy a territory 
corresponding to more than half of the EC total area. 
The climate (based on data for the capitals) is colder 
than in the southern neighbouring EC regions, especial-
ly during the coldest winter months when the areas sur-
rounding the cities may be covered by snow for three to 
five months. 
Topographically, Norden is characterized by large 
mountainous areas, stretching along most of Norway, 
into the middle and northern parts of Sweden and the 
north of Finland. In Iceland, mountainous areas cover a 
large part of the area. In mountain areas of Norway and 
Iceland large glaciers exist, covering approximately 
11 % of Iceland's territory. Typical Nordic natural quali-
ties are also the numerous Islands and deep fjords 
along the long coastal line (especially Norway and 
Iceland) and the many rivers and lakes/inland waters 
(especially Finland and Sweden). 
Forested area covers 5 to 6 % more territory in Norden 
than in the Community. Swedish forests alone are larger 
than the total forest areas of England, Germany and 
France. 
Norden has 20 times more forest area per capita than 
the Community. A considerably larger share of the 
Nordic area is classified as protected area, compared to 
the Community. Per capita protected areas are more 
than eight times that of the Community. Measured per 
capita, national parks are 77 times larger in Norden than 
in the Community. This leaves flora and fauna relatively 
sheltered from negative influences of human activity. 
Possible regional impacts on the Community of EC-
Nordic differences in the state of nature and the envi-
ronment are difficult to Identify. Dimensions to be consi-
dered might be the influence of environmental factors 
on net migration (comprising the gross migration pro-
pensity of Nordic people to EC-countries as well as the 
migration of EC-citizens to Norden), and natural and 
environmental comparative advantage for certain types 
of industrial activity, such as ecological agriculture, fis-
heries, some kinds of tourist industry and waste depo-
sits and management. Recent migration data indicate 
that migration between Community and Norden is 
modest and dominated by Danish-Nordic migration 
streams. There are no observable indications of en-
vironmentally motivated migration, directly In the form of 
individual motivation or indirectly as a consequence of 
prior environmentally determined investment. Maybe 
the cultural barriers have been underestimated. 
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Table IV.2 
Population densities and distribution of area and population (as % of total) between regions in 
Norway, Sweden and Finland, 1990 
Region 
Population 
1960 1970 1980 1989 
% share of population 
1960 1970 1980 1989 
% share of population 
growth 
1960-701970-801980-89 
Southern/central 
Capital region 
Mid-Nordic region 
Nordkalotten area 
Norden (Iceland) 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
111 
117 
99 
100 
107 
115 
124 
102 
103 
111 
121 
133 
104 
102 
115 
65 
18 
29 
6 
100 
68 
20 
27 
6 
100 
68 
20 
28 
5 
100 
69 
21 
26 
5 
100 
103 
46 
-3 
0 
100 
76 
30 
20 
4 
100 
90 
45 
12 
-1 
100 
4.5.1. How peripheral is Norden? 
It can be demonstrated that aggregate figures of popu-
lation density are deceiving because they obscure the 
fact that a large majority of the Nordic population is re-
siding in a highly urbanized south-western to south-
eastern 'belt' occupying a relatively small share of the 
total territory, and that most of the people living outside 
this belt reside in small or medium-sized urban settle-
ments or within easy access to urban settlements — 
even to the relatively few larger cities. 
Hardly more than 10 to 15 % of the Nordic population 
may be classified as really peripheral in a national geo-
graphic context. The term peripherality in a European 
context probably applies to some degree to this 10 to 
15% of the population. As for the main part of the 
Nordic population, peripherality is a too complex and 
multidimensional concept to be employed even as a 
tentative diagnosis of the Nordic status within a rapidly 
integrating western Europe. Moreover, inter-Nordic 
differences are substantial, prohibiting rough generaliza-
tions. 
Development strengthens this allegation. The past 
quarter of a century has seen a continuous centraliza-
tion of economic activity and population settlement, 
however, at periodically varying scales and levels of set-
tlements and regions. On almost every dimension and 
regional level, urbanization has been taking place — in 
terms of modernization, standardization, integration 
and direction of change in patterns of settlement. At 
present, most of the countryside is, roughly speaking, 
highly urbanized, and the rural districts are no longer 
particularly rural ¡n the traditional meaning of the word, 
even if some sectoral division of labour clearly follows a 
regional dimension according to our three-region classi-
fication (see Figure V.4 in Part V) — with primary pro-
duction over-represented in the middle and northern 
region apart from Iceland. 
Even ¡f Important Nordic industries are producing crude, 
semi-manufactured or intermediate output, based on 
localized natural resources (there are important varia-
tions to this picture, however), geographical peripherality 
and population sparsity cannot be stated as the main 
determining factors. Distance and topographical impe-
diments certainly may be barriers to economic life and 
general accessibility — locally, as well as nationally In 
relation to the peripherally located minority of the Nordic 
population — but observations do not support an alle-
gation of general peripherality, whether at the national or 
the international level. 
However, the multidimensional and multilevel processes 
of urbanization have had the explicit effect of expanding 
the areas of built environment and economic activity 
around the already moderately settled share of the 
Nordic area, easing the burden of permanent utilization 
and potential pressure on the larger sparsely populated 
or uninhabited areas. At the same time, continuous 
integration and deliberate attempts to prevent the peri-
pheralization of the more distant settlements have 
counteracted a far stronger, underlying, national pro-
cess of demographic and economic centralization — 
keeping up a certain interregional population balance. 
These processes, however, have not been without dis-
advantages to smaller settlements distant from the 
somewhat larger centres functioning as integratlonal 
agents. 
The most probable prospects of Nordic population 
geography are that sparsely populated areas, areas 
with smaller scattered settlements and uninhabited 
districts, will experience a continuation of the process of 
demographic 'thinning-out' as a combined effect of 
lower natural population growth and net out-migration, 
while the larger urban settlements and the more dense-
ly populated regions will become steadily even more 
densely populated. 
4.5.2. Nordic demographic impacts on the 
Community 
The regional impact on Norden's southern border 
regions with EC areas seems to be relatively strong. The 
centre of population and economic gravity will continue 
to concentrate closer to the continent, the regions con-
cerned containing a growing share of the population, in 
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accordance with the observable or underlying forces 
that have been at work for several decades. Potential 
peripherality will be a 'contingent probability' to a 
steadily decreasing fraction of the Nordic population. 
The direction of the long-term development of Nordic 
population geography and regional structure will most 
probably be little affected by the choice between the 
most likely paths of closer integration into western 
European economic and social cooperation. 
The economic foundation of the 'peripherally' settled 
minority of the Nordic population is heavily dependent 
on primarily public sectors and on State transfers. 
To a large degree Nordic policies have been moulded 
by the traditionally strong influence exerted by the 
geographical periphery and by the impacts of rural 
values and interests. To the really rich, but population-
poor regions, the important question is whether these 
traditional national policies — and not least their 
welfare and transfer aspects — can be maintained. This 
would seem far more important than the isolated 
effects of changing conditions pertaining to various 
private economic sectors. 
Table IV.3 
Population densities and distribution of area and population (as % of total) between regions in 
Norden (excluding Iceland), 1990 
Region 
Southern/central Norden 
Mid-Nordic region 
Nordkalotten area 
Norden (Iceland) 
Population density 
44 
9 
3 
16 
Area 
25 
48 
27 
100 
Population 
68 
27 
5 
100 
Based upon observable trends during the preceding 
three decades, and the emerging material and ideologi-
cal development especially during the 1980s, the most 
likely development of the Nordic regional structure and 
population geography is a continuation — at a some-
what greater pace, depending on the speed and degree 
of economic integration — of the pattern of long-term 
development towards a demographically more concen-
trated and socioeconomically more urbanized and 
southward-oriented structure. Low population density 
will become a steadily less suitable characteristic of a 
growing majority of the Nordic population. 
The Nordic periphery — infrastructurally integrated, rich 
in resources and environmentally well-preserved — may 
increasingly come to be regarded as a valuable source 
of recreational welfare and profitable tourism. In both 
senses the Nordic demographic and geographical peri-
phery — and the Nordic concern about its periphery — 
will become a common European concern, and the tar-
get of European investment and political measures. The 
fading practical concern about settlement pattern pres-
ervation at the Nordic national political level, may well 
be gradually counteracted by a growing EC concern on 
the part of — environmentally motivated — recreational 
and investment interests in the larger region. 
On the other hand, the 'southern belt' of more densely 
— and more heavily — populated Nordic regions will 
tend towards becoming a more equal match in the eco-
nomic and social interchange, especially with the 
northern EC regions, within a steadily more Integrated 
and cooperating economy (see Figure 1.2, Part I). 
Specific impacts at the EC regional level are difficult to 
predict, with Denmark and northern Germany as the 
most likely arena for a multitude of diffuse, economic 
and Infrastructural effects. 
4.6. Impact strength of industrial 
clusters 
The national economies of the Nordic countries under 
consideration here account for a relatively small propor-
tion of the western European economy — their GDP is 
of the magnitude of two years' average growth of the 
EC/EEA economies as a whole in the 1980s. This is the 
simple reason why changes in their manufacturing sec-
tors cannot have any major impact on manufacturing 
industries in the EC on average. 
The clusters are leading examples of exceptions to this 
plain rule in the following two senses. Firstly, Nordic 
countries are important producers. Secondly, the clus-
ters have so far, at least to a major degree, relied on 
their (Nordic) home base in the development of their 
strategic resources. (See the special study on Nordic 
industrial clusters, Volume III, and the statistical 
appendix.) 
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The economic integration of the Nordic countries in the 
Community will be reflected in the prospects for the 
leading Nordic clusters in several ways. Yet the signifi-
cance of or the difference between the two integration 
alternatives, i.e. the Maastricht-like and EEA-llke vari-
ants outlined in Part II of this volume, should not be 
exaggerated because the dynamics of industrial clus-
ters is primarily dependent on competition in the world 
markets. Given the fact that many of the branches con-
cerned have long experience of this operational en-
vironment, they are used to adjusting themselves to 
ever-changing conditions. The most significant excep-
tions are those activities which have been cut from 
international competition. The food-processing industry 
is a representative example of these sensitive sectors. 
FIGURE IV.2: Location of manufacturing employment (ISIC 3) in Nordic countries by counties (lääni, län, fylke) 
(black segments refer to the shares of resource-based industries)1 
1 These include in Sweden and Norway ISIC branches 31, 33, 34 and 37 and in Finland sectors 11, 
14-15, 17 and, 23. In the case of Iceland the division into resource-based and other sectors refer to 
fish-processing v. other manufacturing sectors. 
Strong Nordic impacts 101 
With regard to forest industry, physical barriers are over-
come by proximity to markets and customized produc-
tion is anticipated to characterize its strategic orienta-
tion. These factors and also EC regional policies will 
probably lead to relocalization of operations in the direc-
tion of Europe. In addition, EC directives on the en-
vironment will presumably influence forest industries 
and other resource-based Nordic industrial sectors as 
well. In general, the sectors would be more motivated 
to acquire an image as local producers in the 
Community notwithstanding the Nordic countries' 
future arrangements concerning integration. 
Regardless of conscious policy strategies, political 
upheavals have probably had the most important role in 
changing the preconditions for recent industrial deve-
lopment in the Nordic area. The collapse of the USSR 
has paved the way for the appearance of the Baltic rim 
as an economic region which may become a strong 
recipient in the competition over foreign direct invest-
ments in northern Europe. Finland will especially try to 
utilize its position as a bridgehead, physically and cultu-
rally, to Russia, in particular to the St Petersburg region 
and to Estonia. (See the special study on Nordic indu-
strial clusters in Volume III). 
The prospects for the leading clusters and Nordic econ-
omies as a whole are increasingly conditioned by the 
availability of skilled labour, high-quality management 
and R&D activities in particular. A critical challenge 
enhanced by internationalization concerns the future 
domestic supply of these strategic resources. At the 
moment, there is a tendency for the most international-
ized Nordic corporations to develop their R&D opera-
tions mainly abroad. 
Developments in EC regional policies will also have an 
impact on Nordic manufacturing Industries, especially 
on the locational pattern of direct investments. Any 
assessments of this effect are, however, very tentative 
for the reason alone that the' future line of policies 
remains uncertain. For instance, differences between 
EC countries with respect to State intervention are pre-
valent. Currently, a more interventionist approach is 
Implemented in France, Italy, Belgium and also to some 
extent in Spain, while the Netherlands, Denmark, the 
United Kingdom and Germany are advocates of a less 
interventionist approach. Naturally, the possible entry of 
Nordic countries will also have an impact on the strate-
gies applied in tackling regional structural problems. 
Infrastructural barriers 
Overall, there have recently been marked changes in 
the Nordic approach to industrial and regional policies. 
Accessibility and supply capacity, i.e. infrastructure, 
have been acknowledged as key factors in improving 
competitiveness. Traffic links to the Continent are a 
prime example of the projects under construction. With 
regard to regional development, the concrete practices 
of these supply-oriented restructuring and reindustrial-
ization strategies are country-specific, because settle-
ment systems vary by country and because there are 
differences in political traditions. Probably, the Nor-
wegian approach will also in the future be most decen-
tralized whereas Sweden will represent a much more 
concentration- and corridor-oriented strategy. 
In addition to political changes in neighbouring areas, 
the weak economic performance of Nordic countries in 
the early 1990s has emphasized problems of adapta-
tion and raised the question of a possible break with 
past trends. In the final analysis, the issue at stake is the 
dynamics of the Nordic model in a wide sense. 
The basic elements of Nordic industry — clusters and 
major corporations — have evolved relatively steadily 
during the long term. From their perspective, adaptation 
is not a new issue. An important new structural feature 
is that the interdependency between the successful 
adaptation of Nordic enterprises and the growth of 
Nordic economies has become less tight. In the ever 
more integrating European and global economy, Nordic 
industrial enterprises are no longer so tightly connected 
with their original locations. This also sets new require-
ments for successful strategies for regional economic 
development. 
The impacts of Nordic industrial development on the 
regional development and spatial organization in the 
Community, seem to be quite diffuse. No map of 
Europe can be drawn where impacts of possible future 
Nordic developments may be indicated with a high 
degree of specificity. 
However, if the past may be considered a guide to the 
future, it should be rather interesting to study the follow-
ing map indicating the contact destinations of Swedish 
Industry in 1990. Clearly the focus has been on the old 
EC economic core areas. 
The regional and spatial impacts on the Community's 
territory of Nordic Industrial development will be illustra-
ted by the geographical maps (Figures IV.10 and IV.11 
at the end of Part IV). 
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4.7. Impact strength of the Nordic 
energy sector 
Norway is at present the only non-EC Nordic country 
with a production of oil and gas, and statistical material 
indicates the tremendous importance of the Norwegian 
energy sector vis-à-vis that of the Community. In the 
course of 1992 Norway has even decided to increase 
its exploitation of fossil energy resources. 
The most important barrier to production seems to be 
political. It must be taken into consideration that fossil 
energy resources are non-renewable. But the perspec-
tive is a rather long one as new discoveries are antici-
pated in the Norwegian Sea and in the Barents Sea. 
The Community has managed to keep total energy 
demand rather stable since the first oil shock in 
1973/74. Oil demand has declined, being replaced by 
imports of natural gas and domestic production of 
nuclear power. To decrease dependency on Middle 
East oil and to meet environmental concerns, a de-
crease in the consumption of oil and coal has been 
planned. Much of the Imported oil and coal will undoub-
tedly be replaced through an increase in the imports of 
natural gas, but some countries (like France) have plan-
ned to continue the construction of more nuclear power 
plants, as well. 
Table IV.4 
Energy demand in EC countries (million tonnes of oil equivalent (mtoe)) 
1973 
1979 
1988 
1989 
Total 
1 004.9(100%) 
1 080.9(100%) 
1 101.7(100%) 
1 123.4(100%) 
Oil 
621.7 (61.9%) 
607.4 (56.2%) 
497.8 (45.2%) 
501.3(44.6%) 
Gas 
115.6(11.5%) 
173.6(16.0%) 
202.6(18.4%) 
201.2(17.9%) 
Coal 
235.6 (23.4%) 
241.9(22.4%) 
237.8(21.6%) 
241.5(21.5%) 
Nuclear 
19.9 ( 2.0%) 
37.7 ( 3.5%) 
151.6(18.1%) 
163.0(14.5%) 
Hydro 
15.3(1.5%) 
41.5 (3.8%) 
20.7 (1.9%) 
15.6(1.4%) 
Projections (IEA base case USD 35/bl from 2000 no new taxes) 
1995 
2000 
1267.9(100%) 543.0(42.8%) 248.6(19.6%) 278.3(22.0%) 
1242.8(100%) 506.9(40.8%) 270.6(21.8%) 258.3(20.8%) 
177.5 (14.0%) 
84.5(14.8%) 
20.5(1.6%) 
24.5 (2.0%) 
The increased import of gas must first of all come from 
Siberia, the North Sea and North Africa. In the longer 
run, gas may also be supplied from the Middle East 
(Iran). A freer movement of natural gas is considered a 
precondition for the success of EC policies in this field. 
The European Energy Charter should, inter alia, also be 
viewed ¡n this context. 
Norway is in a unique position in Europe in the field of 
energy. Revenues from the sector are of overall macro-
economic significance for the country. Energy influen-
ces Norway's foreign policy and it has significant eco-
nomic impacts on the 'oil towns' and surrounding areas 
(Stavanger, Bergen and Oslo). 
The other Nordic countries, on the other hand, are 
importers of energy and share many interests with the 
EC countries. This implies a desire to reduce consump-
tion of oil (and coal) and to increase the use of natural 
gas and possibly also nuclear power. In addition, the 
consuming countries have a great need for Norwegian 
petroleum. 
Today the Nordic countries are not very integrated in 
European gas networks. New pipelines in the Nordic/ 
Baltic area must be constructed if gas should take a 
significantly greater share of overall energy supply. 
Some possible pipe linkages to improve this situation 
may be mentioned: 
(i) between Ekofisk centre and the Danish network — 
would open Norwegian gas to Sweden and 
Denmark in 'smaller' quantities; 
(ii) between the Norwegian shelf and Sweden. Routes 
both from mid-Norway or the North Sea are possi-
ble. These routes will supply gas to Sweden as well 
as to a potential, new Norwegian domestic market; 
(iii) between Sweden and Finland and/or the Baltic 
States. These routes will open for exports from the 
CIS to Sweden as well as Norwegian exports to 
Finland/the Baltic States if a link between Norway 
and Sweden is established; 
(iv) between Sweden and Poland, increasing the possi-
bility of increased Norwegian gas exports to Poland, 
the Czech and Slovak Republics and Hungary, if 
pipelines between Norway and Sweden are esta-
blished. Alternatively, Norwegian gas to these coun-
tries must pass through the German network from 
Emden; 
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(ν) across the English Channel. This route will give 
Norwegian gas a fourth potential route to the 
Continent (through the Frigg­pipes and the UK); 
(vi) if gas is produced in the Barents Sea, Norwegian 
and/or Russian gas must be transported to the 
markets either as LNG or through pipeline. Such a 
pipeline will most likely be routed to the south 
through Sweden, or Finland and the Baltic States; 
(vii) between Warsaw and Berlin, increasing CIS gas 
exports first of all to Poland and northern Germany. 
The construction of some of these alternatives is a pre­
condition for any larger increase in gas consumption 
within the Nordic countries, supplied either from 
Norway or the CIS. The pipelines to the Continent now 
under construction (Zeepipe and Europipe) will, In addi­
tion to the existing Norpipe and a potential route across 
the Channel supply the basis for a significant growth in 
EC imports of Norwegian gas. As networks become 
more integrated, security of supply and flexibility for 
consumers in northern Europe will improve. Crucial fac­
tors are the speed and content of the regulatory pro­
cesses, prices on oil and gas as well as the develop­
ment In the CIS. 
A 'free­flow' scenario, where all Nordic countries 
(except Iceland) enter a European economic and politi­
cal union, may politically give more power to the 
Commission and make it easier for it to impose regula­
tions on the producers. 
On the other hand, if Norway manages to use its signi­
ficant position as the major energy exporter in Europe to 
influence decision­making in this field, the process may 
be halted, at least as long as Norway has a rather reluc­
tant attitude towards the regulations. This may be true 
for the transmission of gas, the development and pro­
duction of petroleum, and the distribution of rent. The 
speeding­up of the 'concession' directives at the end of 
1992 can be viewed in such a perspective. 
In a micro­regional dimension, the opening­up of off­
shore markets to a competitive Norwegian energy 
industry may benefit the counties around Stavanger, 
Oslo and Bergen. Norwegian offshore industries may 
enter all offshore markets in Europe, both ¡n the North 
Sea and elsewhere. This is probably true even if inte­
gration were to go no further than an EEA agreement. 
In a macro­spatial European perspective an inclusion of 
Norwegian petroleum in the EC energy portfolio would 
improve the Community's energy balance significantly. 
Of course, oil and gas can be exported with or without 
any Norwegian EC membership. On the other hand, if 
Norwegian gas and petroleum could be formally inclu­
ded as an internal EC resource, it's existence might to a 
larger extent influence overall EC energy policy­making. 
With a seat at the table, however, Norway would be in 
a position to influence these policies. 
An inclusion of Norwegian petroleum in the EC energy 
portfolio would probably also strengthen the EC's desire 
to further increase North Sea production in order to 
reduce import dependency on the Middle East (oil) and 
Russia (gas). 
The outcome of this dilemma of interdependence and 
decision­making would, in turn, influence production 
decisions and contribute to generally determining the 
overall distribution of rent in the petroleum business in 
Europe, not least in northern Europe. 
The regional and spatial impacts on the Community's 
territory of Nordic industrial development will be illustra­
ted by the geographical maps (Figures IV. 10 and IV. 11 
at the end of Part IV). 
4.8. Impact strength of agriculture 
and the agro­industry 
As already shown, Nordic agricultural production — 
outside Denmark — accounts for a rather small per­
centage of total production within a 'Europe 16'. In the 
case of agriculture, however, smallness by Itself is no 
indication that Nordic development may not have an 
appreciable and clearly identifiable impact on EC 
regions. 
More precisely, it may be anticipated that in the event of 
a closer Nordic integration with the EC, agricultural 
areas of Denmark will be strongly — and positively — 
Impacted. 
Nordic integration will have only marginal effects on the 
EC as a whole, but it will probably result in a radical 
decline in agricultural production and the agro­indus­
tries in the non­EC Nordic countries except for southern 
Sweden. This is due to natural disadvantages and to 
disadvantages stemming from likely changes in agricul­
tural subsidy policies. 
Due to physical and infrastructural barriers, Nordic pro­
duction of fresh milk, potatoes and some vegetables 
may be maintained in the northern, western and 
eastern parts of the Nordic area. Extensive meat pro­
duction based on sheep may be maintained along the 
western coast of Scandinavia and in Iceland. Intensive 
production of pork, poultry and eggs may be possible, 
if cheap feeding stuff can be imported, but the invest­
ments in new production units may prove too heavy. 
Due to centrallty and geographical conditions the major 
part of the food for the Nordic markets — i.e. in case of 
Nordic institutional integration with the Community — 
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will be produced in the south-Scandinavian agricultural 
and agro-industrial area reaching from the North Sea 
coast of Denmark and through southern Sweden 
almost to Stockholm. This area is in the lead in Europe 
regarding productivity both in agriculture and in agro-
industry. 
The integration of the Nordic markets into the 
Community will increase the sale or the prices of wine, 
fruit and vegetables from the southern part of the 
Community, but only marginally. The other regions in the 
northern part of the Community could in the short term 
benefit from Denmark turning to the North. In the long 
run, however, Denmark's (and southern Sweden's) posi-
tions in other European markets are likely to be 
strengthened (see the special study on agriculture, 
Volume III). 
The quality aspects due to Nordic environmental advan-
tages will support the development of an agriculturally 
and agro-industrially strong area in southern 
Scandinavia. To some extent these aspects will tend to 
protect some special productions in other parts of the 
Nordic area as well. However, institutional integration 
with the Community is likely to result in serious agricul-
tural transformations in the outskirts of the Nordic area, 
leading to radical decline in agricultural employment in 
weak regions. 
If, however, the Community were to put more emphasis 
on the environmental aspects of resource utilization — 
not at all an unlikely supposition as stressed elsewhere 
in this report — the agriculture and agro-industry in 
geographically disadvantaged areas of Norden would 
benefit. This would, in turn, reduce the impacts of the 
integration of the Nordic countries on other regions of 
the Community. With only one or two Nordic countries 
entering the Community, the development of the south-
Scandinavian agricultural and agro-industrial area 
would be slowed down, though not halted. 
In any event, there would hardly be any noticeable 
impacts on other regions in the Community. 
The regional and spatial impacts on the Community's 
territory of Nordic agricultural development will be illus-
trated by the geographical maps, Figures IV.10 and 
IV. 11 at the end of Part IV. 
4.9. Impact strength of Nordic 
fisheries 
Norden's tremendous weight in fisheries is described in 
the special study in Volume III. 
The situation ¡n terms of potential Nordic impacts on EC 
territories, however, is not a simple one, not least due to 
the fact that future resources are uncertain. Everyone 
knows that there has been over-fishing, but how this 
translates into simple remedies is little understood. The 
'Tragedy of the commons' means that the individual 
user can always catch some fish although the entire 
resource may be in the process of being depleted. 
Even in situations where quotas are controlled, there is 
no guarantee of a return to historically prevalent condi-
tions. 
This means that politics and vested interests ought to 
assume a humbler position compared to the majesty of 
natural realities. 
It is in the fish-processing industry that three different 
scenarios may emerge. 
The first scenario might be called 'comparative advan-
tage prevails'. Here the considerable public support of 
the fisheries sector in both the Community and in 
certain Nordic countries would be withdrawn. 
Secondly, there ¡s a scenario of 'increased Nordic pro-
duction'. 
A third scenario might be called 'Norden in the 
European Community'. 
Scenarios one and two may be considered irrelevant to 
the purpose of this study. If free trade and free fishing 
are introduced, we should not be concerned with an 
impact area, i.e. the Community, which has been trying 
to introduce strong policies in this field. 
Concerning the applicable scenario — 'Norden in the 
European Community — it is the prevalent Nordic opi-
nion that Portuguese and Spanish trawlers would 
quickly devastate Nordic fishing grounds if they were 
given free access to them. 
This would of course obliterate whatever advantages, 
including jobs generated in the fish-processing industry 
in the EC — particularly in Denmark — which have so 
far been derived from the Interaction with Nordic fishing 
grounds. 
It goes without saying that fishing centres in the Iberian 
peninsula would stand to gain mightily from a compre-
hensive opening of Nordic waters to EC exploitation, i.e. 
for a relatively short period until the maritime resources 
are exhausted. 
The regional and spatial impacts on the Community's 
territory of Nordic fisheries will be illustrated by the geo-
graphical maps, Figures IV.10 and IV.11 at the end of 
Part IV. 
Strong Nordic impacts 105 
4.10. Nordic tourism in Europe and 
European tourism in Norden — 
impact strength 
As already stressed in Part IV, Nordic tourism may be 
considered among the weightiest Nordic impact sec-
tors. The reason becomes immediately apparent if one 
studies the following Figure IV.5 showing that 
Northerners have a 15% higher propensity for foreign 
travel than citizens of the Community and compares 
this to the fact that tourism counts for a big share of 
total effective demand in Norden. Another interesting 
fact is that, on the whole, Nordic countries have mar-
kedly negative travel balances, i.e. their citizens spend 
much more money abroad than their countries can earn 
from foreign tourists (see Figure IV.6). 
To this must be added that only 12% of Nordic travel 
outside the country is to another Nordic country, the 
rest is predominantly to the Continent. 
FIGURE IV.6: International tourism 
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Obviously, market Integration will have direct effects on 
tourism. Roughly they may be grouped as follows: 
(i) deregulation of the transport companies, 
(¡i) infrastructural measures in transport, 
(iii) fewer national controls of the travel sector, 
It would consequently appear rather safe to predict 
increased tourism as a direct outcome of integration. 
But the strength of this effect will depend on whether 
new barriers arise. 
Tourism is influenced by a number of paradoxes. 
Distance is certainly a hindrance to free flows — the 
amount of social interaction being invertedly propor-
tional to distance. On the other hand, distance also indi-
cates barriers between culturally and geographically 
dissimilar areas, and it is precisely this dissimilarity 
which generates travel. In other words, distance is both 
a barrier and an enticement. 
In addition, distance is a relative concept influenced by 
the available infrastructure and means of communica-
tion. Clearly, tourism is based on the gradual improve-
ment of infrastructure, but there may be limits. The very 
act of travelling may in itself be considered part of the 
total tourist experience and then again, unpleasant 
complications, burdens and insecurity may detract from 
that experience. Thus infrastructure may have a double 
nature. 
The same observation holds true for cultural dissimilari-
ties. Differences in way of life may create friction in 
regard to spontaneous economic internationalization 
but at the same time they constitute a vital motivation 
behind tourism. 
Ecological problems and concerns function in much the 
same way. To be sure, ecology sets limits to the degree 
of areal utilization. On the other hand, ecologically vul-
nerable areas of unspoiled beauty may certainly attract 
tourists. 
We shall now present some main scenarios for the 
development of tourism. 
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4.10.1. The first scenario: trends are pro-
longed; free flow without barriers 
We assume that Western Europe will be able to main-
tain a certain economic growth of the order of 2 to 3 %. 
Part of this growth will be obtained through processes 
of institutional integration, which will facilitate the flow of 
people, goods, services and capital between the na-
tions. 
This will create a strong market growth in International 
tourism, both as regards recreational and occupational 
travel. Recreational travel will grow as a result of the 
increasing purchasing power in large groups of the 
population, but also because changes in the supply 
system will reduce the prices. Mass tourism will show a 
rising trend. The dominant aspect of the supply system 
will still be the 'Fordist' tourist industry, i.e. the customer 
basis will consist of the large groups of people who are 
motivated by sunlust. This will be the market for low-
quality mass tourism. 
On the other hand, in a polarized market there will also 
be a group of people with strong purchasing power and 
with other preferences than the mass market. They will 
turn away from the Fordist tourist areas, i.e. the large 
concentrations of seaside and mountain resorts. Their 
motivation for travelling is wanderlust, and the travelling 
pattern will be characterized by multidestination 
travels. They will prefer scheduled flights and the motor-
car to package tours. As the price competition in civil 
aviation gradually increases, it will become cheaper to 
make special and flexible arrangements, and quality 
tourism will include an increasing part of the middle 
class. Customer-adapted tourism will develop from a 
distinctive elitist tourism, comprising relatively few peo-
ple, to a new form of mass tourism. Increasingly larger 
parts of Europe's middle class will become a new group 
of inter-railers, but they will go by high-speed trains or 
by air and stay in hotels. The really elitist tourists will be 
ousted to quite new destinations. 
Occupational traffic will also undergo strong growth due 
to economic integration. A number of trades will be 
dominated by international enterprises. Not only tradi-
tional industry will be internationalized; this will also 
apply to a constantly rising number of service 
businesses. 
In the occupational segment of the travel industry, too, 
polarization will occur. On the one hand, we find the 
large number of white-collar workers who will have to 
accompany the greater circulation of goods. On the 
other hand, we find the somewhat smaller groups with-
in decision-making and knowledge production. This of 
course applies to all executives at the headquarters of 
the large multinationals. The same thing also applies to 
the internationalization of the knowledge-based service 
sector: consultancy services, research and develop-
ment, as well as universities and colleges. 
Based on these premises — growth both in recre-
ational and occupational traffic — a general assumption 
of an annual growth of around 5% in the international 
travel industry does not appear excessive. An annual 
growth of 5% implies a growth in international tourism 
of 63% over a 10 year period. 
This scenario is predicated on the assumption that the 
importance of distance will steadily decrease, implying 
that continuous improvements in Infrastructure and lo-
gistics can be realised. Obviously, this would only be 
likely if Europe's institutional cooperation were to be-
come ever closer. If the Community were to prove une-
qual to the task of developing needed infrastructural 
links — possibly building up a deficit in this vital area — 
then of course the preconditions for the free flow of 
tourism would disappear. 
Another precondition is that culture is not allowed to 
become a barrier. This, however, may very well prove to 
be a dubious assumption. A culturally variegated 
Europe is undoubtedly an exiting place but it is also full 
of conflicts which may in the final analysis counteract 
the development of tourism. 
Europe's environmental problems will no doubt prove to 
become yet another barrier. General economic growth 
has a way of throwing up an unexpected amount of 
environmental disturbances. Previously, industry was 
the main culprit with respect to environmental destruc-
tion. Now, to a larger extent, it is transport and the ser-
vice sector. Even tourism can be included in these en-
vironmental accounts. 
As a first approximation, however, we shall discount 
such potential barriers in order to detect new patterns 
under conditions of free flows. And clearly, free flows in 
the travel industry would lead to new regional patterns. 
As already indicated, our first scenario implies a rela-
tively strong economic growth and as a consequence of 
that a strong increase in the demand for travel services. 
We may further assume that this demand will be the 
same all over Western Europe. A strong growth in the 
tourist markets allows expansion in almost all destina-
tion areas, but a considerable redistribution will take 
place. 
Impacts on Nordic countries 
In the past, the Nordic countries were almost pure mar-
ket areas for international tourism. Norway, Sweden, 
Finland and Iceland were on top as regards sun lust, 
and the role of these countries in international tourism 
was primarily that of demanders. Given the conditions 
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underlying this first scenario, this will still be the situation 
in the 1990s. The charter flights to southern Europe will 
still be full. When sun is combined with sand and sea, 
the Nordic countries have little to offer. The relationship 
between continental Europe and the Nordic countries 
will still be characterized by the fact that the southern 
areas have a very strong attraction. Thus, to an increas-
ing degree the Nordic countries will become a depar-
ture area. 
However, the Nordic countries obtain a somewhat 
improved balance in their tourist accounts through win-
ter tourism as they develop into a more important desti-
nation for the product combination of sun, snow and 
ski. In these market areas the Nordic countries will 
receive an increasing number of tourists from other 
countries, particularly because limits to further develop-
ment will be reached in the Alps. 
The Nordic countries will also develop into an important 
destination for summer tourism but this will never be-
come a form of mass tourism similar to the departures 
from Norden. It will remain an attractive option for the 
specially interested, i.e. the élite. As Norden becomes 
gradually more closely associated with the rest of 
Europe through economic Integration, occupational 
travel to the larger cities of the Nordic countries will in-
crease. 
To an increasing degree, élite tourism Is likely to be 
drawn to the special attractions of the Nordic Arctic 
area (north of the Arctic Circle) and Iceland. 
Most of the winner regions are Norwegian, which re-
flects the broader opportunities this country has within 
all the market segments that might be attracted by the 
north. The regions of Sweden and Finland achieve their 
ranking primarily through urban development. Through 
its investments in Lapland, Finland, too, stands to cap-
ture a considerable share of the growing north-of-the-
Arctic-Clrcle tourism. 
Impacts on Europe 
Norden will affect the Continent through an increased 
acceptance in the market, meaning that an increasing 
number of people will choose the Nordic countries as a 
destination. To a certain extent this will affect tourism in 
Europe negatively, but this will hardly be seen as heavy 
competition. The fact is that Nordic countries are in a 
position to offer something which the rest of Europe 
cannot. In addition they may help relieve the pressure 
on areas which, according to general agreement, have 
reached their limit for tourism, not least the Alps. 
Under the general development assumptions, the most 
Important contribution by the Nordic countries to 
European tourism will be on the market side. The 
Scandinavians will be an important group of customers 
for large segments of Fordist tourism. Together with UK 
citizens, Germans and Dutch, the Northerners will be an 
important force behind a further development of 3-S 
tourism, both with respect to volume and geography, 
Southern Europe: The traditional tourist regions of the 
Mediterranean, i.e. the holiday resorts in Portugal, 
Spain, France and Italy, will be saturated. In the course 
of the strong growth in tourism during the 1990s they 
will still experience growth, but this growth will con-
stantly be faced with new limitations: general over-
crowding, infrastructural overloading and strong envi-
ronmental deterioration of the holiday resort surround-
ings. The growth will level out and be directed towards 
new areas. 
At first the environmental problems in the western parts 
of the Mediterranean will turn the pressure eastwards. 
This is well In keeping with a trend that has been no-
ticed during the 1970s and 1980s. The 1990s will see 
a strong development of new tourist resorts in Greece 
and particularly Turkey. Somewhat later the European 
frontier for 3-S tourism will reach its extreme limit and 
be removed to other continents. From now on the 
really elitist tourist who is also a sun-seeker, will go to 
Africa, Asia or America. 
Central Europe: Central Europe will be the great desti-
nation for European tourism. Even if countries such as 
the United Kingdom, Belgium, the Netherlands, 
Germany and Denmark already have a high travel con-
sumption, travel intensity will continue to grow. In 
Europe as a whole it will grow from 322 arrivals per 
1 000 Inhabitants in 1990, to an estimated 400 arrivals 
per 1 000 inhabitants in the year 2000. Central Europe 
is in the lead in this development. 
Central Europe, however, is not as strongly developed 
as a destination area. Due to the growth in demand 
there will also be a development in the typical depar-
ture countries. Various thematic parks or other forms of 
integrated tourist concepts, for instance, will be devel-
oped. Examples of such places are Legoland in 
Denmark and Euro-Disney in France. In Belgium, the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom the concept of 
Centre Pares has been successful and continues to 
grow. In Central Europe the development of such cent-
res based on synthetic attractions, is continuing. This is 
a complete development of combined tourist infrastruc-
ture and superstructure. 
The Alps: In Switzerland and Austria the brakes will be 
put on. The overcrowding and the special environ-
mental problems of the Alps region will result in a very 
restrictive policy by the authorities and the tourist industry. 
The growth in the number of tourist beds will be 
halted and will actually start to go down a little. 
This development will start In the resorts that have long-
standing traditions as established tourist destinations, 
but will gradually spread not only to the rest of Switzer-
108 The Nordic countries 
land and Austria, but also to the mountain regions of 
Germany, France, Italy and former Yugoslavia. The Alps 
will begin to develop in a qualitative rather than a quan-
titative direction. 
4.10.2. The second scenario: cultural multi-
plicity will increase 
Both occupational and recreational travel is affected by 
cultural patterns. Even if the economy will allow a rela-
tively strong growth In international tourism, cultural 
forces may play a moderating role. 
In our second scenario for the travel industry we shall 
focus on culture not only as a new barrier, but also as a 
new opportunity. 
Occupational travel will take place inside the larger 
meso-regions created by developments of the 1990s. 
Let us look at the Nordic countries as an example. They 
participate in an international business culture chan-
nelled through new cultural ties. 
(i) The traditional ties have been across the North 
Atlantic — to Iceland and the USA — and across 
the North Sea — to Germany and the United 
Kingdom. This pattern will be weakened. 
(ii) In the 1990s the opening towards the East will cre-
ate a new regional trend supplementing the old one. 
At first new patterns of Arctic collaboration involving 
Russia will develop (we shall return to this theme in 
Part V below). 
(ill) Beyond the year 2000 a 'new Hanseatic League' 
will emerge involving extended cultural collaboration 
between Norden, the Baltic States, Poland and 
other areas of Eastern Europe. 
Throughout the 1990s we shall see travel behaviour in 
Europe shifting in focus from international package 
tours to more domestic tourism. Domestic tourism 
means more holiday-making both in one's own country 
and one's own region. Northerners are starting to be-
have more like the French and the Italians. Thus, it 
might be interesting to look at the trends that are seen 
exactly in these markets. 
Both in France and Italy people turn away from the 
gigantic resorts on the coast, to small places in the hin-
terland or to new destinations. In France, rural Gers is 
becoming very popular, in Italy one turns away from the 
dirty Adriatic coast to the cleaner sands of Sardinia, 
Calabria, Puglia and Campania. Rimini is largely out as 
a destination. Market shifts like these cannot simply be 
explained as the result of changes in purchasing power 
and supply. Here we are dealing with deep cultural 
trends that control the market. 
In the new process of regionalizatlon the primary iden-
tity will be related to some regional level. If the region is 
a successful one, a regional pride associated with cul-
ture in a wide sense will develop, not least with impor-
tant institutions that produce and apply knowledge and 
competence. Institutions of knowledge, such as univer-
sities and research centres, will gain important sym-
bolic meanings. This also applies to knowledge-inten-
sive ways of production and to special regional compe-
tencies. 
This shift from nation to region is part of the process 
that is often described as the liquidation of modernism. 
The State as a regulator or generator of economic 
development will gradually lose legitimacy, and a culti-
vation of the competitiveness of the regions will 
emerge. Traditional regional policies — meaning the 
policies of the State capitals directed towards the re-
gions — are likely to lose importance. In the post-
modern era the regions will play the part of developers. 
Surely, this trend is not only consequential for the re-
gions themselves but equally a matter to be considered 
in national processes of growth. 
A new city culture will emerge from this new region-aliza-
tion. The important institutions of knowledge will have a 
city-oriented pattern of localization. The regions, there-
fore, will cultivate their centres. Even if intra-
regional differences will persist between centre and peri-
phery, the periphery will accept the necessity of 
functional regions, whose strong nodes will determine the 
competitive force of the region. The ideology is that na-
tions have a very limited potential for generating 
growth, whereas the regions' ability in this respect is great. 
Even if the process of regionalization appears to reduce 
the importance of the national level, this level will in no 
way disappear. Firstly, because many regions will ap-
pear as nations. We may identify about 100 such natio-
nal regions ¡n Europe. Secondly, because the regions 
will still be part of nation States that retain an identity of 
their own. The nations themselves will derive strength 
from cultural multiplicity. Regionally divided nations will 
not be looked upon as a disadvantage, but as a source 
of strength. Regional multiplicity will be considered as 
beneficial to the nation. 
New barriers and opportunities 
European re-regionalization will certainly affect tourist 
behaviour. Generally speaking, Europeans will become 
more home-oriented, i.e. more attached to the national 
and regional arena. In a sense this may constitute new 
barriers to international tourism. 
But at the same time the cultural differences offer new 
possibilities. Nations with great cultural multiplicity will 
be attractive, partly because tourists from other regions 
find the cultural variety attractive and partly because 
people will be more concerned with their own country's 
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Figure IV.10: Micro-dimensions 
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cultural resources. This will stimulate wanderlust both at 
home and abroad, but the new regional/national iden-
tity will swing the pendulum homeward. International 
tourism will level out, and when people go to other na-
tions it will be more In order to experience a cultural 
heritage that may put one's own region or nation in per-
spective. This will make historical cultural regions 
attractive. 
Tourism will also become more city-oriented. The cities 
contain the largest concentrations of historical and cul-
tural institutions. Medieval and renaissance cities will 
become the symbols of deeper regional identities. In 
many ways the cultivation of the cities in the new re-
gional Europe will be a revitalization of the city regions 
that existed before the nation States. And from this will 
arise new barriers and conflicts formerly con-
tained by the nation State. 
Environmental problems will grow during the 1990s, but 
the process of regionalization will create a framework of 
interpretation focusing on local and regional conditions. 
The subsidiarity policy of the Community will stimulate 
this process. This is likely to imply that developmental 
projects that will change distinctive cultural landscapes, 
either in the cities or in the periphery, will be strongly 
resisted. In this situation tourism may become the tar-
get of the environmentalists as never before. 
Synthetic tourist development projects that require dram-
atic encroachments on the landscape will be resisted 
through prohibitions and restrictive consequential an-
alyses. The use of cultural monuments as part of the 
tourist product will be prevented if it means hard wear. 
Large-scale resort tourism will lose its legitimacy as it 
leads to heavy local pollution; at the same time it will 
become deprived of certain privileges in terms of 
exemptions from environmental restrictions. 
Impacts on Nordic countries 
The Nordic countries form a geographical periphery in 
Europe and will appear relatively less interesting if tour-
ist tastes turn in the direction of culture, traditions, 
cities. Even the big Nordic cities are small, and the 
urban traditions at the level below the national capitals 
are little developed. 
ory is found in southern Europe on the Mediterranean 
coast. The same kind of product is found along the 
Atlantic (Madeira and Algarve) and the Black Sea. 
The real loser regions will be the centres of mass tour-
ism whose development has taken place without any 
consideration for the environment. Costa del Sol, 
Mallorca and Rimini are examples of such regions, 
which may at best survive as second-rate tourist 
resorts. The number of visitors will gradually go down. 
Mediterranean regions with 'cultural roots' will not lose 
out to the same extent. Examples are Madeira, Cata-
lonia, Naples, the Greek Islands and Cyprus. But if such 
places are to preserve their cultural identity and prevent 
tourist overloading, the number of visitors must be kept 
down and perhaps even reduced. 
The real winner regions in southern Europe will be the 
old city regions, and in many cases these are situated 
inland and not on the coast. The renaissance cities, for 
example, Seville, Montpellier, Florence and Venice, will 
experience their second renaissance. Multidestination 
tourism between historical cities will become an impor-
tant tourist category. 
Central Europe: In the central parts of Europe, too, tour-
ism will be directed towards the cities and cultural heri-
tage. The big cities will become the most important 
destinations, not only for business culture, but also for 
the recreational tourists. The obvious winner regions will 
be the capitals and the provincial capitals as well as 
smaller, but distinctive regional centres. Even de-
industrialized regions may develop a regional identity 
which will sell on the tourist market. 
But rural culture will also flourish. Green tourism (also 
called soft tourism) will become an important travel 
category, above all in culturally rich areas where agricul-
ture has created special products or distinctive land-
scapes. The extent of this tourism, however, will be 
small. Old health resorts and mineral baths constitute a 
more specialized rural market which may be revitalized. 
The Alps: In Switzerland and Austria, cultural orientation 
will boost developments towards a more quality-
oriented tourism. Quantitatively, therefore, the Alps area 
will be a loser region, but quantitative losses may be 
compensated for through increased value. 
Impacts on Europe 
A measure of Nordic withdrawal from mass tourist 
European destinations — in particular where Northerners 
have constituted a substantial part of the market — may 
result in major setbacks in definable regions. 
Southern Europe: Perhaps the greatest loser area in this 
process would be the synthetic tourist products offering 
3-S tourism. The largest continuous belt in this categ-
4.10.3. The third scenario: new environmental 
barriers 
The reduced economic growth at the beginning of the 
1990s will lead to a levelling-out of occupational travel. 
As growth gradually resumes, the volume of occupa-
tional travel will remain relatively stable. Businesses and 
enterprises will try to reduce travel to the necessary 
minimum. 
Strong Nordic impacts 111 
The exchange of knowledge and information will to a 
larger extent take place via the ISDN network. Tele-con-
ferences will replace a number of meetings that were 
formerly dependent on personal contact and travel. And 
all necessary meetings will be better prepared through 
prior exchange of Information. To begin with, the basic 
motivation behind this change of behaviour will be cost 
reductions, but as ecological consciousness is sharp-
ened — in the business world as elsewhere — environ-
mental reasons will start to supplement economic ones. 
The holiday market will also change. Already markets 
are signalling that the era of large-scale Fordist tourism 
may be over, not least due to environmental concerns. 
Groups with strong purchasing power will prefer high-
quality products to mass consumption. Even if at pres-
ent totals may appear marginal, they will undoubtedly 
eventually reach levels where high-quality tourism will 
compete with mass tourism in economic importance. 
The Increasing quality requirements will lead to a quanti-
tative stagnation in international tourism measured by 
number of arrivals and bed nights. But measured by 
consumer expenses, profits and employment there will 
be a volume increase. 
A number of different names have been assigned to this 
new market trend. Product developers talk about low-
impact tourism, soft tourism or simply green tourism. 
Whatever the name, suppliers will have to adapt to the 
new market trends and will gradually gain the support of 
the political apparatus. 
The Community will try to produce a sustain-
able system of transport and tourism 
As the ecological crisis deepens during the 1990s, the 
Community will Introduce common overall policies to 
achieve sustainable development ¡n regard to suprana-
tional challenges. 
One important goal will be to secure 'sustainable mo-
bility' — to begin with, without any impediments to the 
free choice of transport mode. Thanks to the develop-
ment of high-speed trains, a large-scale change of traf-
fic from air and road to railway may be envisaged. To be 
sure, however, such policies cannot meet with reason-
able success unless determined attempts to stan-
dardize and streamline Europe's very diverse rail 
systems are undertaken, as stressed ¡n the special 
study on transport Infrastructure in Volume IV. It must be 
our assumption, therefore, that the Community will have 
no other option than to go ahead with this task. 
In the course of the 1990s high-speed trains will traffic 
Increasingly larger parts of Europe. Eventually they will 
not only cover the 'golden triangle' in central Europe but 
also the larger cities and most Important tourist regions 
in the Iberian peninsula and Italy. The large number of 
bottlenecks on the old European map, for example, 
large mountain ranges and straits, will be broken by 
new connections. High-speed trains will go through the 
Alps and the Pyrenees and also across the English 
Channel and Øresund, between Sweden and Denmark. 
Oslo, Gothenburg, Malmø and Stockholm will also be 
connected with the new network via the Scan-Link pro-
ject. The more peripheral parts of Scandinavia, howe-
ver, will not be linked. 
The Community will probably not develop a compre-
hensive tourist policy with a sustainable profile, but 
more likely a general policy of sustainability with obvious 
consequences for the transport and tourist sectors. 
As it becomes gradually clear that it is not possible to 
overcome the ecological crisis connected with transport 
by building more hard Infrastructure, one has to 
address the transport-generating functions in society. 
Tourism will be hard hit since this is a luxury production. 
To an increasing degree, recreation will be diverted 
towards domestic tourism. 
The environmental programme is based on a combina-
tion of supranational measures and use of the subsi-
diarity principle. It will most likely be left to the regions 
themselves to determine the degree of control in their 
tourist Industries, but the Community will introduce 
common rules for transport and the use of energy. 
These rules will lead to a strong increase in the price of 
energy, which will in turn Increase the price of transport. 
Impacts on Nordic countries 
Undoubtedly, the Nordic countries shall have cause to 
be pleased with a growing trend towards green tourism 
as a certain share of the total European market ¡s chan-
nelled towards the North. To a certain extent this will be 
at the expense of the market basis of continental busi-
nesses. 
Iceland, Norway, Sweden and Finland will come to con-
stitute very interesting destinations for north Europeans. 
As Eastern Europe gradually recovers, particularly the 
Baltic States, nature-oriented tourists from the East will 
also arrive in Increasing numbers. Finally, the vitalization 
of the southern European economies will result ¡n 
smaller, but altogether important flows of tourists from 
Spain, Italy and Greece. 
The Nordic countries, however, will not become an area 
of mass tourism. Even if the flows from central and sou-
thern Europe are multiplied, they will constitute a rela-
tively small proportion of the total tourist flow. A consi-
derable part of the visitors to the Nordic countries will 
also be self-catering tourists, which implies fewer hotel 
development projects and other tourist activities gene-
rating large revenues. The appeal of the Nordic coun-
tries lies in the possibility for the tourist to manage on 
his own with a minimum of commercial consumption. 
Chalets, caravans and camping, hiking and fishing, 
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sports and activities will form important elements in the 
new Nordic tourism. Tourists who are attracted to the 
Nordic countries will resemble their inhabitants, i.e. they 
will prefer to manage on their own and to contribute 
something to their own recreation. 
The winner regions in the Nordic countries, therefore, 
will be those that can offer forests, mountains and 
coastline — preferably under extreme conditions such 
as in the north-of-the-Arctic-Circle area. Iceland can be 
regarded as a culture region, but just as much as a 
nature region with an attraction value for wilderness 
tourism and tourists who take a special interest in un-
usual aspects of nature. 
biggest loser regions will be the Portuguese and 
Spanish Costas, the large resorts on the French and 
Italian Riviera, and gradually the Increasingly over-popu-
lated Greek Islands. 
Central Europe: At the beginning of the 1990s this is a 
leading departure area, but by the beginning of the next 
century it may to an increasing degree become a desti-
nation area — for its own tourists. The increasing 
domestic tourism does not only mean holiday-making 
in one's own country, but to an increasing degree in 
one's own region. The consequence of this will be that 
countries like Germany and the United Kingdom will 
receive increasing flows of tourists — from themselves. 
Impacts on Europe 
All in all, a development in accordance with the princi-
ples of sustainability will lead to a considerable setback 
for tourist regions in Western Europe. 
Southern Europe: The area around the Mediterranean 
will be hardest hit by this shift towards sustainable tour-
Ism and transport. Not even massive purification efforts 
can clean up the Mediterranean in the short term. The 
The Alps: This is the region that first set upper limits to 
how much tourism the area could stand. There ¡s no 
reason to believe that this will not continue, and this 
may lead to further reductions in the capacity of a large 
number of resorts. Switzerland and Austria will lose in 
quantity, but will be winners In the contest for high-
paying tourists looking for quality. 
The regional and spatial impacts on the Community's 
territory of Nordic tourist industry trends will be illustra-
ted by the geographical maps, Figures IV.10 and IV11. 
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Part V 
Transnational regional scenarios 
5.1. Introduction 
As already Indicated ¡n the executive summary, Norden's 
participation in transnational region-building must be 
considered Norden's heaviest, regionally and spatially 
relevant, Impact contribution to the new pan-European 
architecture, the one which has the clearest and most 
easily demonstrable effects on well-defined regions 
within the Community, and which offers the weightiest 
Nordic contribution to European cohesion. 
We now turn our attention to this most Important class 
of impacts. 
We shall emphasize three main questions. 
(1) How will regional development and spatial organiza-
tion ¡n the Community be impacted by the inter-
action between Norden and adjacent regions of the 
former Soviet Union? 
(2) In what manner may northern EC regions such as 
Denmark, Schleswig-Holstein and Mecklenburg-
Western Pomerania become affected by 'Baltic' 
Integrative efforts? 
(3) What may happen to the regions bordering on the 
North Sea as a result of impulses towards meso-
regional integration? 
For each of these problem areas the potentials related to 
transnational region-building will be assessed. 
We shall emphasize three projects of transnational 
region-building (see Figures V.4 and V.12 below) which 
will be called: 
(i) the greater Baltic Sea region, subdivided into the 
core Baltic Sea region and the west Baltic Sea 
region; 
(il) the greater Barents region, with the subregion, the 
core Barents region; 
(ili) the greater North Sea region; 
The choice of these three regions ¡s by no means acci-
dental. They are all, by nature, functional transnational 
regions, at least embryonically. They are all involved in 
various forms of institutional cooperation or partner-
ships, out of which official transnational political Institu-
tions have evolved or may. evolve. Agreements have 
been signed establishing the Baltic Sea Council and the 
Barents Council. 
These two councils are thus political realities, and there-
fore it is quite in order to consider both as established 
regimes. 
The analysis and assessment are, of course, complex. 
Nevertheless, we shall attempt to present simplified 
visual representations of our main findings. 
5.2. A theoretical perspective 
it ¡s known that functional regions may be either hori-
zontally or vertically integrated. Consequently, an analy-
tical schema to evaluate these two types of regional 
organization and their potential impact strengths is pre-
sented. 
The vertically Integrated functional regions will be 
assessed on the basis of the presence or absence of 
economically dynamic urban agglomerations. The verti-
cal regions may be said to be the equivalent of the clas-
sical development of settlement hierarchies, for ex-
ample, as Identified and described by Christaller, who ¡n 
1933 derived a general spatial organization on the basis 
of the distribution of central places ¡n southern 
Germany. Normally, it is expected that central places 
provide the most sophisticated range of goods and ser-
vices, labour division, etc., and thereby command a 
vast market area, geographically speaking. 
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The essential point is that they are dynamic, influencing 
their surrounding territories. Spatial hierarchies within 
the settlement pattern develop, based on the existence 
of these central, economically dynamic, urban agglom-
erations. 
Central place theory is based on the idea that very spe-
cialized functions and services are only able to 'survive' 
by being located at central places (e.g. urban agglom-
erations, capital cities or large county towns) which are 
well situated geographically to command wide markets. 
At a certain distance, surrounding the central place, 
secondary centres of importance are found which, it 
must be underlined, may also have their specializations. 
Then, there are minor settlements surrounding each 
secondary centre. A settlement hierarchy based on ver-
tically interacting cities is thus identifiable. 
Today, one could say that there is also a system of inter-
acting cities which ¡s based on a highly developed infra-
structure. 
The greater the degree of centrality enjoyed by a settle-
ment, the greater its influence on the surrounding hin-
terland with regard to region-building. 
In Europe one might talk of axes of linked central 
places. These functional axes have been comically dub-
bed as visually representing 'banana shapes' on the 
map of Europe. The 'blue banana' starts in the English 
Midlands and stretches through London, Brussels, the 
Ruhr, Frankfurt, Munich to reach Milan and Turin. 
Likewise, the 'green banana' (or the 'sun belt') starts in 
Milan and stretches west through Marseilles and Lyons 
to reach Barcelona. These two axes represent Europe's 
greatest continuous urban agglomerations: the two 
European core regions. 
However, smaller agglomerations are necessary bases 
for more limited region-bulldlng. Cities might function as 
growth nodes, perhaps as a result of some specialist 
superiority ¡n a particular field, for example, the result of 
highly specialized industrial clusters, or as specially 
selected regional growth centres. 
Nevertheless, the dynamic spin-off advantages of the 
large conurbations are today being eroded by increas-
ing problems related to traffic congestion, environ-
mental degradation, and demographically ageing popu-
lations (increasing proportion of inhabitants retiring, due 
to age, from active economic life). The apparent advan-
tages of flexible production specialization systems and 
technologically advanced service communications and 
transport infrastructure are thus diminishing. 
This makes a stronger case for a regional mosaic devel-
opment, away from centralization tendencies. This 
movement is likely to Increase in momentum towards 
the year 2000, as is outlined in the following statement 
taken from the EC strategy document 'Europe 2000'; 
'First it is clear that market forces have encouraged 
many firms to locate or relocate away from the high-
cost central areas (European core)... . Secondly, the 
Community's core area is becoming characterized by 
an ageing population structure (demographically top-
heavy — with an increasingly inactive population, econ-
omically, due to the large increase in the number of 
senior citizens)... . Thirdly, new development in advan-
ced transport and telecommunications will eventually 
alter 'time geography', to the advantage of areas remo-
ter from the congested centres of activity... . Fourthly, 
the rising costs of congestion in the central areas of the 
Community — delays, pollution, etc. — are likely to act 
as increasingly powerful deterrents to new investment in 
the same areas'. 
Yet, to all Intents and purposes, It has to be admitted 
that the spatial organization in Europe and Norden 
resembles the hierarchical settlement pattern perceived 
by Christaller, caused by predominantly vertical func-
tional forces: the little village settlement or farming com-
munity on the European periphery at the bottom of the 
hierarchical scale, and the'large information capitals 
and industrial conurbations of the European core at the 
top. 
Moreover, vertical, hierarchical functlonalism is re-
inforced by being accepted as the most natural basis 
for current planning. A good example ¡s the EC FAST 
programme. Highly specialized research and develop-
ment requires the high-tech service network that only 
top central places can provide on site. Therefore, R&D 
continues to be concentrated within the large urban 
agglomerations, leaving the subsequent spread of inno-
vation, service benefits or resultant products to filter 
slowly down through the hierarchical network from the 
central place. Many outlying areas may receive no 
benefit at all as they command a low purchasing power. 
The question remains how this trend may be reversed if 
money for research, administration, business head-
quarters, etc. is continually pumped Into the core areas 
rather than the periphery. Once again, the hierarchical 
spatial pattern is reinforced by a complacent accep-
tance of the status quo. 
Research on manufacturing and service industry dy-
namics has shown that the central place, vertical func-
tion suits the way in which many businesses are orga-
nized. The general advantages of Industrial concentra-
tion are apparent: nearness to a large labour market, 
the opportunity of realizing economies of scale, near-
ness to services and public utilities, low transport costs, 
an abundance of suppliers or buyers to choose from. 
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No wonder that the outcome has been industrial con-
centration (including industrial clustering) and areas of 
high population density. 
In summary, it is true to say that the advantages of 
agglomeration appear to outweigh any advantages of 
Isolation (although certain industries are forced to lo-
cate close to their raw material or energy source which 
may lie in very remote regions, for example, aluminium 
smelting at hydroelectric power stations along high-
velocity rivers in Norway). 
The following analytical schema may help in evaluating 
and categorizing the developmental potentials upon 
which to base EC-relevant regional impact scenarios. 
FIGURE V.2: Analytical schema to assess and categorize functionality 
Functionality 
Vertical 
Agglomerations 
Horizontal 
Poorly developed 
urban agglomerations 
Development potential based on degree of functionality 
Well-developed interregional 
networks and alliances 
Optimal conditions 
for development 
Likely to become 
regional winners 
Potential for positive 
development 
Urban growth is a main 
strategic feature 
Poorly developed interregional 
networks and alliances 
Dynamic urban potential for 
some positive development 
Seeking interregional 
partnerships is a 
main strategic feature 
Potential regional losers 
The above analytical tool introduces the concept of 
horizontal functionality, according to which regions co-
operate and establish partnerships across frontiers, i.e. 
along horizontal axes. 
Through horizontal functionality, region-building ¡s 
achieved independently of the vertical functionality of 
urban agglomerations. 
In recent years many regions built on horizontal func-
tionality have arisen in Europe, partly compensating for 
the lack of larger urban agglomerations. The process is 
gathering speed. 
Quite simply, regions can improve their competitive 
edge through political and economical partnerships, 
whether they be cooperative ventures related to re-
source exploitation, industrial production, environ-
mental conservation, tourism, or other matters. 
systems. Hitherto, they have been administered and 
kept under control by often far-away national capitals. 
It ¡s a noteworthy fact that many of these border regions 
share common historical, physical, economic and cul-
tural features with adjacent regions in neighbouring 
States. But this is hardly surprising in view of historical 
circumstances: many border regions have in the past 
belonged to the same State (e.g. until 1864 Denmark 
and Schleswig-Holstein were parts of a united king-
dom), and as recent European experience has shown, 
old memories die hard. 
Naturally, some of these border regions have suffered 
from neglect, being regarded as distant buffer zones 
rather than focuses of development. However, within an 
integrating Europe, these zones will be perceived very 
differently. They will be given higher priority as actors in 
the region-building, acquiring more power both politi-
cally and economically. 
To apply these theoretical observations to the task at 
hand, it is amply clear that new challenges in the EC-
Norden border areas require new forms of cooperation. 
As everywhere in Europe, these border regions belong 
to in most cases not very old — centralized State 
Attempts to counteract the regionally debilitating 
effects of impenetrable State boundaries have acquired 
a long-standing legitimacy ¡n Norden through the estab-
lishment of Nordic transborder cooperative regions 
crossing the frontiers of all Nordic States including 
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The following illustration, Figure V.4, complements the 'European' picture by indicating four 'Nordic' transborder 
regions that should be of interest ¡n a study of Norden's likely impact on EC areas. 
Figure v.4: Nordic Transborder Integrative Endeavo 
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Denmark. These endeavours have for many years been 
financed by the Nordic Council of Ministers and admin-
istered by the high-level, Inter-Nordic advisory commit-
tee NERP (the Nordic Committee of Senior Officials for 
Regional Policy). 
Consequently, in the event of a closer Nordic integration 
with the Community, one should not assume that 
Norden would be a European novice in the field of 
regional partnerships. Nor should one assume that 
countries within the Community would be, as 
evidenced in the following presentation of European 
transregional cooperation. 
In general terms Figure V.4 shows potentials for Nordic 
region-building at the meso-regional level in the 
broadest sense. The east Atlantic region may be consi-
dered less relevant with respect to Norden's influence 
on the Community. 
5.3. The greater Baltic Sea region — 
a potential core region in Europe 
The abortive Soviet coup d'état of August 1991, in fact, 
created not only a new political Europe, it also opened 
an enormous economic frontier between Western and 
Eastern Europe with Norden — and in particular 
Norway and Finland — as new Western front-line 
States bordering on old Soviet territory. 
In a broader sense all States around the Baltic Sea have 
been forced into the role of partners. These States are 
Denmark, Germany, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, 
Russia, Finland, Sweden, and, less directly, Norway. 
This area already has its representative body, the 
Council of the Baltic Sea States, established ¡n March 
1992. At the founding meeting, former German Foreign 
Minister, Hans Dietrich Genscher invoked the idea of a 
'Europe of regions' and pointed to the Baltic Sea region 
as yet another exponent of this ¡deal. 
The participants in the founding Baltic Conference in 
Copenhagen made clear their commitment to tackle a 
series of tasks through regional cooperation: the devel-
opment of infrastructure, securing human rights, im-
proving the environment, strengthening democratic 
institutions and the eventual Incorporation of all the 
Baltic States into the Community. 
Above all, the Conference stressed the need to streng-
then regional cooperation as a supplement to the tradi-
tional cooperation of States. 
However, great uncertainty exists with regard to the 
future development of the Baltic Sea region. 
What knowledge do we possess which may be 
employed to ensure the Baltic Sea region's political 
stability and sustainable economic growth? 
Evoking historical constellations such as the former 
Hanseatlc League ¡s inspiring, but hardly practical 
today. What Is required for the Baltic Sea area is to 
appreciate what it has to offer in terms of functional 
cooperation, regional partnership and the establish-
ment of rational future networks. It is also important to 
understand that the Baltic Sea area itself may be sub-
divided into numerous functional subregions. 
One impetus in the creation of functional regions in 
Norden and the Baltic Sea area is the need for devel-
oping an East-West cohesion as explained in the speci-
al study, 'The Baltic connection' (Volume IV). The deep-
ening economic and social gap dividing the various 
Baltic Sea regions must be eradicated to guarantee fair 
cooperation. Today there is obviously a geographical 
cohesion due to the binding force of the Baltic Sea it-
self. A further cohesive element might well be the tradi-
tionally high standard of education in the region as a 
whole, particularly at university level, which has already 
become the basis of International university cooperation 
and ought to be the springboard to even greater inter-
action and maturer relations. 
But economic and social cohesion is definitely unsatis-
factory at the present time. There is still the age-old 
national security problem all along the extensive border 
zone with Russia. The security issue is of primary im-
portance to region-building all the way from the Barents 
Sea region to the Gulf of Finland in the south. 
The likelihood of a Baltic Sea region emerging is sup-
ported by the findings of the special study on transport 
(Volume IV). The study Identifies several pressing prob-
lems. The fact is that the European road network will 
not be able to support the prospective increase in traf-
fic. Goods transport is increasing faster than road capa-
city, and the changeover to rail transport is slow. Full 
road capacity will soon be reached. Bottlenecks on the 
motorways of the European core and northern Ger-
many will become common. 
120 The Nordic countries 
Figure V5: The Baltic Sea Region as Europe's Third Core Region 
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FIGURE V.6: Motor traffic on main international traffic arteries, 1985 
Motor traffic 
on main international traffic arteries 
1985 
O 
Source: 
EUROPE 2000. Outlook for the development 
of the community's territory. 1991. È & ^ ^ 
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Figure V.7: Transportation Funnel for Norden 
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Attempts to redress the problems of congestion and 
pollution have already been made by the German 
Government (subject to EC approval), the idea being to 
impose motorway tolls based on distance travelled and 
to invest in motorway development west­east, Instead 
of north­south, in order to remove traffic congestion in 
central Europe. The implementation of such ideas 
would probably favour development in the northern 
border regions, including the Baltic Sea region. 
One knock­on effect of the Increasing problem of traffic 
congestion is that it is becoming a new industrial loca­
tion determinant. To reduce the aggravation of transport 
delays and foreseeable tolls, companies are taking 
steps to shorten transport distance, and thus remove 
the danger of likely increasing transport costs. 
Companies are relocating closer to their end­user mar­
kets, and suppliers closer to their industrial clients, 
This could make certain regions more attractive as 
growth nodes, such as the greater Baltic Sea region 
because of its location north of the bottlenecks. The 
general picture of motor traffic congestion emerges 
from the following two Figures V.6 and V.7. 
If a viable Baltic Sea region could be established — and 
it is by no means assured that the creation of the 
Council of Baltic Sea States or Indeed other integrative 
efforts will guarantee such an outcome — it is clear that 
the greatest economic growth potential Is found in the 
southern part of the region below a west­east line from 
Oslo, through Stockholm and Helsinki to St Petersburg. 
Within the north­south longitudinal territorial zone stret­
ching from Lapland to Kaliningrad, there are 17 million 
inhabitants, which is equal to the combined populations 
of Denmark, Sweden and Finland. The urban popula­
tion density (based on towns with a population greater 
than 50000 inhabitants) is lowest in Schleswig­Holstein 
(27%) and highest in greater St Petersburg (82%). 
Within that range lie the national urban density averages 
of Denmark (32%), Finland (35%) and Sweden (50%). 
If urban population size is an Important growth criterion, 
then the Baltic Sea region seems well poised. 
This southern zone is the most populated and most ur­
banized area of the region (see also Figures 1.2 and 1.3 in 
Part I). It also possesses the most Important Industrial 
clusters. 
Staatskanzlei Schleswig­Holstein has made a list of 
more than 30 different initiatives for strengthening and 
stimulating functional Integration in the greater Baltic 
Sea region. 
Moreover, certain large municipal authorities in the 
Baltic Sea region ('Hansetage der Neuzeit' — consis­
ting of 100 Hanseatic towns) have already organized to 
promote Industrial and cultural development. Other 
cooperative bodies Include: the Baltic Chambers of 
Commerce Association (BCCA — promoting free trade 
in the area), the Baltic Ports Organization (BPO — also 
involved in solving coastal environmental problems), the 
Baltic Tourism Cooperation (BTC — promoting tourism 
in the area), the Baltic university programme (organizing 
student exchange within the region) and the 
Conference of Baltic University Rectors (CBUR — 
stimulating cooperation in education and research). The 
initiative is also being taken to develop telecommuni­
cations, new sea ferry routes, motorways (also in 
connection with the Scan­Link and Via Baltica). 
Obviously, the political ambition from a Nordic point of 
view is to change the pattern of trade and cooperation 
in the Baltic Sea region from situation A to situation Β 
(see Figure V.9 below). This can by achieved by the 
establishment of a Baltic Sea regime, including both EC 
regions, Nordic regions and East European regions. 
We must, without a doubt, be cautious in our estima­
tion of a future vertically Integrated, functional region ¡n 
the Baltic Sea area, particularly when referring to our 
analytical schema on potential functionality (see above). 
Viewed ¡n that context, the Baltic endeavour might be 
most suitably categorized as 'possessing a potential for 
positive development'. 
In particular the political and cultural barriers still existing 
in the region should be stressed. To become successful 
— and perhaps successfully integrated with the 
Community — the greater Baltic Sea region must 
significantly reduce the political barriers which exist 
today. Successful efforts to accomplish this task would 
automatically strengthen the economic development of 
the Baltic Sea area as a whole. 
Crucial to the establishment of a functional region will be 
the improvement to the infrastructure: roads, railways, 
ferry and air routes, and telecommunications. Certain in­
itiatives are already in the planning phase or under imple­
mentation — the Øresund Bridge linking Denmark and 
Sweden, and the Fehmarn project linking Germany with 
Denmark. A motorway expansion in eastern Germany is 
the inevitable result of German unification. The motorway 
network will extend to the eastern Baltic Sea area as the 
'Via Baltica', and road and rail development will take 
place all the way north to the Kola Peninsula. New ferry 
links will also be established to link the coasts of the 
Baltic Sea (see Figure V.10). 
Precisely how this planning will be coordinated, how­
ever, is as yet unclear. 
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FIGURE V.9 
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FIGURE V.10: Transport links in the Baltic Sea, year 2000 
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Figure V. 12: Prospective Transnational Core Regions 
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5.3.1. Potential patterns of subregion-
building in the Baltic Sea region 
Against this background, two subregions may be identi-
fied within the Baltic Sea area and certain prerequisites to 
regional development may be defined more precisely. 
Our identification of two subregions is certainly not 
based on any politically authorized plans under Imple-
mentation. We have merely attempted to foresee likely 
developments, given the interplay of selected criteria. 
Our assumptions may consequently be best under-
stood as hypotheses aiming to provoke and stimulate. 
As such, they may nevertheless be useful and even 
instrumental in the shaping of future policy, In this case 
regional policy. 
The subregion's high urban density gives it a great 
potential for vertical integration. The core agglomeration 
of the west Baltic Sea region will no doubt be the twin-
city hub of Copenhagen/Malmø which boasts a com-
bined population of 2.5 million in addition to various 
other advantages such as one of northern Europe's 
major international airports (Kastrup outside 
Copenhagen) and two of Norden's oldest and most 
respected universities (Copenhagen and Lund). 
At the beginning of 1993, Danish and Swedish central 
and local authorities established the Øresund Council, 
whose function is to exploit to the full the development 
potential connected with the completion of the Øresund 
bridge/tunnel which will give the two countries their first 
ever fixed land transport link by the turn of the century. 
It is our basic assumption that two Baltic Sea areas — 
a west Baltic area and a core Baltic area to the east — 
will soon become fast-growing functional regions. 
With reference to the analytical schema above, this will 
occur because dynamic urban agglomerations, com-
bined with the development of interregional infrastruc-
tural networks, and successful collaboration through 
regional and national alliances will provide optimal con-
ditions for growth. Relatively speaking, both areas will 
be European regional winners by the year 2000. 
European competition is not purely a question of 
nations fighting for market shares or growth factors. 
Regions compete as well, and they are becoming more 
important as central actors on the politico-economic 
scene, often helped by their central governments as 
well as the Community through the Structural Funds, 
Interregional programmes, etc. 
As already indicated, the west Baltic Sea region's 
northernmost limit will undoubtedly be the Norwegian 
Lillehammer district, which will enjoy the attention of 
world sporting interests in 1994, when it hosts the 
winter Olympics. 
In the Lillehammer region, the winter Olympic prepara-
tions have necessitated large investments in the local 
building industry and access infrastructure. Rail and 
motorway sections intended to become part of the 
Scan-Link project are under construction. This new 
infrastructure will connect Lillehammer more effectively 
with Oslo and Gothenburg and later, through the pro-
posed west Baltic axis, to the Øresund bridge/tunnel 
between Copenhagen and Malmø, ultimately leading on 
to the envisaged Fehmarn connection which will give 
Denmark and Germany an alternative border-crossing 
point to the traditional Jutland peninsula rail-and-road 
routes. 
The map above (Figure V.12) illustrates part of our rea-
soning for Identifying two Baltic subregions. Firstly, the 
largest urban agglomerations are found in two geo-
graphical locations, the south-west Baltic Sea area and 
the mid-east Baltic Sea area. These two areas both 
have well-developed Infrastructural plans and are focu-
ses of coming central government investments. 
The trends leading to this conclusion are as follows. 
The west Baltic Sea region has or is ¡n the process of 
establishing an Infrastructural basis which links a net-
work of towns, forming a relatively compact urban 
agglomeration. Growth occurs along an axis starting at 
the Norwegian town of Lillehammer, passing through 
the Norwegian capital city of Oslo to the Swedish town 
of Gothenburg, southwards to Malmø, on to the Danish 
capital of Copenhagen, before ending at the three 
German seaports on the Baltic Sea coast, Kiel, Lübeck, 
Rostock and their hinterlands. 
The removal of other barriers is also on the agenda — 
not least political barriers — as the region has a long 
common history and linguistic ties with the neighbour-
ing border regions of Denmark and Germany. 
Environmental barriers are, however, likely to play a part 
in the Scan-Link project. Recent Swedish objections 
have cast doubt on the ecological sustainability of the 
Sound bridge as originally planned. It remains to be 
seen whether these Swedish environmental concerns 
may delay the completion of the bridge connection or 
possibly prevent the entire plan from being carried out 
(in spite of the fact that the Danish-Swedish agreement 
to construct the bridge has the form of an internationally 
binding treaty). 
Another distinct possibility jeopardizing the Sound 
bridge might be that more centrally located Swedish 
economic Interests, for example, around the Stockholm 
area, might feel little inclination to co-finance infrastruc-
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ture which would no doubt lead to the strengthening of 
a competing urban agglomeration to the south. In this 
connection it is noteworthy that the infrastructural Ideas 
of the Stockholm County Council in terms of closer link-
ages with Germany and the Continent seem to pay 
scant attention to the Øresund bridge and, on the face 
of it, to favour ferry links with Germany which bypass 
Malmø and Copenhagen (see the map outlining the two 
potential Scan-Link routes, Figure V.16). 
The region as a whole has a high degree of urbaniza-
tion: the large towns and cities have a total population 
of 14 million. The planned infrastructural improvement 
will accelerate integration. With regard to transport, this 
will include better road, rail, air and sea ferry connec-
tions. The proposed motorway, the 'Via Baltica', will 
effectively connect the region to the Continent and the 
EC countries (see the special studies on infrastructure 
and transport — Volumes II and IV respectively). 
The other subregion, the core Baltic Sea region, (see 
Figure V.12) may be seen as a scenario for region-build-
ing in the eastern part of the greater Baltic Sea region. 
It is based on trends which point towards the evolution 
of a functional region, offering the possibility of eco-
nomic growth based on regional integration. 
The region lies along an axis which starts with the grea-
ter Stockholm/Uppsala city zone in the west, crosses 
the Baltic Sea eastwards (to include the city regions 
along the coasts of the Gulf of Finland: Turku (Åbo), 
Helsinki and St Petersburg) and southwards (to include 
Tallinn in Estonia and the Riga city region in Latvia). 
Like the west Baltic Sea region, this eastern region is 
not formally recognized by any form of treaty. It is there-
fore not an 'official' region, but an expression of institu-
tional collaboration on a horizontal integrational basis. 
In 1990, however, Russia and Finland signed a pact of 
mutual cooperation which fixed the following goals for 
the development of their common border regions: 
(i) to create the conditions for economic cooperation 
so as to benefit both countries; 
(ii) to support measures which lead to greater political 
and economic stability in the border zones; 
(iii) to strive to reduce the possibility of harmful epi-
sodes and confrontation. The long-term aim is to 
implement comprehensive preventive measures. 
In 1991-92, Finland's contribution to this collaboration 
was FMK 182 million. Aid is given right along the 1 270 
km border zone with Russia. On the Finnish side, the 
area of transborder cooperation covers four counties 
(län). Much of the area is very thinly populated and suf-
fers from serious economic growth problems. In our 
functional regional scenario, it is the southern part of 
this border zone, i.e. the axis section of St Petersburg-
Helsinki, which is regarded as a vital growth node for 
the core Baltic region. Greater Helsinki (Nyland County) 
has a population of 1.1 million, while greater St Peters-
burg has 6.7 million. 
More importantly, commercial interests are at stake, 
and this must be seen in the light of other foreign invest-
ment interests in the area. In comparison with their 
investment in other countries, both Sweden and Finland 
seem highly motivated to become involved in the Baltic 
States and the St Petersburg city region. 
There are several reasons for this strengthening trend. 
Firstly, the geographical nearness of potential markets 
is obvious. Secondly, there are very significant historical, 
trading and political ties, going back many centuries. 
Finland has a particular advantage as it ¡s the western 
country with most experience ¡n dealing with the 
formerly State-run economies of the East. Furthermore, 
the Finnish and Estonian languages resemble each 
other, having Flnno-Ugric origins (unique in Europe, 
apart from Hungarian). This considerably facilitates 
communication between the two neighbouring coun-
tries (see the special study on the Baltic connection, 
Volume IV). 
The greater Stockholm city region is relatively densely 
populated, with 1.5 million Inhabitants. It is the centre of 
high technology and the service industry in Sweden, 
and therefore represents a potential growth node in the 
core Baltic Sea region. 
Infrastructural improvement is a prerequisite to suc-
cessful functional regional development. In the past, the 
Stockholm transport and communication network has 
always been oriented towards Gothenburg, thus estab-
lishing the connection with the Scan-link and Nordic 
link. The recent renaissance of the eastern Baltic Sea 
area, and European development in general, forced 
Stockholm County Council in 1992 to try to answer the 
question: 'Is Stockholm county capable of competing in 
the Europe of the future?' 
The conclusion was that future success would hinge on 
improving European connections through Infrastructural 
Investments. The figure below was drawn up to propose 
how the new infrastructural development ought to take 
place. It is interesting, as it shows the new infrastructural 
orientation towards the east as integration with the rest 
of Europe and the Community approaches. Further-
more, the plans seem to reinforce the concept of a func-
tional core Baltic Sea region, with Stockholm as one of 
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the central actors. The future impact of the European 
border regions will cause a further shift of gravity in eco-
nomic growth towards the east and the greater Baltic 
Sea region, and probably lessen the pressure on Schles-
wig-Holstein and the Copenhagen city region. 
Summing up, the potential functional strength of the 
two Baltic subregions — referring to our analytical 
schema — may be assessed as follows. 
The west Baltic Sea region is to be placed ¡n the cate-
gory of 'optimal conditions for development — likely to 
become a regional winner' in European development. 
This conclusion is based on the existence of dynamic 
urban agglomerations. As long as the infrastructural 
development is relatively effective, the outlook for hori-
zontal Interaction will be good. 
The scenario based on the core Baltic Sea region is to 
be placed in the category of 'potential for some positive 
development'. The core Baltic Sea region has the 
potential to strengthen its position through 'developing 
horizontal interregional networks and alliances'. 
This conclusion is based on the existence of several 
dynamic city regions, and by the year 2000, St Peters-
burg may also become a significant contributor to the 
realization of this potential. However, the trend towards 
developing an interregional network and system of part-
nerships must be considered weak primarily due to 
impediments imposed by the historical fact that until 
recently a major part of this potential meso-region was 
subjected to the dislocating effects of the Communist 
system. Moreover, the development of an effective 
infrastructure in the new eastern zone will not take 
place before the year 2000. 
Returning to the west Baltic Sea region, it should be 
stressed that different patterns of development may 
emerge. Northern German transportation bottlenecks 
may contribute to concentrated growth along a Baltic 
arc from Copenhagen/Malmø to Rostock. No bottle-
necks would seem to occur along this Scan-link be-
cause the Nordic link from western Norway through 
Jutland will relieve some of the traffic problems. In addi-
tion, Sweden has opened new routes directly across 
the Baltic Sea to Poland and the Mecklenburg-Western 
Pomerania coastal region. 
The two following visual scenarios (Figures V.15 and 
V.16) illustrate these alternative, developmental pat-
terns. 
In the first spatial scenario, both Nordic arms of the 
Scan-Link converge in an axis emanating at the Copen-
hagen/Malmø urban agglomeration and pointing south-
west across the Fehmarn connection towards contact 
points in Schleswig-Holstein and Mecklenburg-Western 
Pomerania. This scenario is based on a intense utiliza-
tion of a coming Øresund bridge creating a Danish-
German-Swedish micro-region of 'enhanced agglom-
erative effects' — a type of region which we have label-
led 'interferency region'. 
Undoubtedly, this regional constellation might well 
cause problems of traffic congestion at least in the long 
run. 
Our alternative scenario (Figure V.16) would to some 
extent alleviate the drawbacks of a southern Nordic 
zone exposed to congestion and the concomitant 
problems of concentrated environmental exposure. 
Perhaps the alternative scenario is best interpreted as a 
supplement to the first one. In other words, it may well 
become an important feature ¡n Scandinavian-
Continental relations regardless of whether the Øresund 
bridge ¡s built or not. 
5.4. The greater Barents region 
Figures V.4 and V.12 show the geographical position of 
the greater Barents Region. 
In nature, it is an entirely different type of region from the 
previously discussed Baltic Sea regions. 
The Barents region may be described as a politically 
initiated meso-region being the product of an initiative 
taken by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
In the words of the former Norwegian Foreign Secretary, 
Thorvald Stoltenberg at the Inauguration of the Barents 
region in 1992: 'We regard the establishment of a 
greater Barents region as the most natural next step 
following the creation of the greater Baltic Sea region. 
While the latter will concentrate on the development of 
the Baltic Sea areas and the southern border regions of 
Norden, the establishment of the Barents region will 
contribute to the attention paid to the northernmost 
part of Norden, fostering understanding and inspiring 
cooperation to mutual advantage'. 
The local basis of cooperation stems from seven ad-
ministrative regions: Norwegian Nordland, Troms, Fin-
mark, Swedish Norrbotten, Finnish Lapland, and the 
Russian counties of Murmansk and Archangel. The 
autonomous Republic of Karelia within the Russian 
Federation has also expressed its wish to participate in 
the work. The aim of the association is to establish a 
functional region on the basis of horizontal integration. 
Interestingly, though the initiative has been very much a 
national one, it is the expressed desire of the Norwegian 
Foreign Office that eventually the momentum of these 
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cooperative endeavours should devolve to the local 
counties and the several indigenous populations of the 
greater region. 
In the long run it is the intention that the Regional 
Council take over the central responsibility for the pro-
gression of the project. 
As a consequence, the institutional organization is 
double, Involving both a national and a regional regime. 
The Barents Council and the Barents Regional Council 
are the Important administrative and political bodies. 
The Barents Council is made up of governmental repre-
sentatives from Norway, Sweden, Finland, Iceland, 
Denmark and Russia. In addition — and significant in a 
pan-European perspective — the greater Barents re-
gion accord of January 1993 has been ratified by the 
European Commission, who has thus indicated its in-
terest in and commitment to this Norwegian initiative 
although none of the core partners in the endeavour, 
i.e. the countries with regions belonging to the greater 
Barents area, are as yet members of the European 
Community. 
A number of other major international powers have 
agreed to participate in the effort In the capacity of 
observers. 
It would probably be true to say that the commitment of 
the European Commission is not least motivated by a 
desire to cooperate in the stabilization of potentially 
turbulent ex-Soviet regions bordering on what may well 
in the future become prime focuses of Community 
developmental efforts. 
The Regional Council consists of actors from the ad-
ministrative regions involved. In addition, it Is the ex-
pressed desire of the project's initiators to involve repre-
sentatives of the area's indigenous peoples on an equal 
basis. 
Its task is to promote region-building through mobilizing 
private and public investment and commitment. It is 
also the declared objective of the regional forces to 
work for the creation of a strong regional identity and to 
establish Barents region institutions adequate to the 
coming political and administrative responsibilities. 
Though the moving forces behind the greater Barents 
initiative have been traditional national actors — as 
already mentioned — the project gains a distinctly 
European regional relevance through the growing role 
entrusted to regional and other bottom-up forces. 
Consequently, it would be apt to characterize the 
Barents initiative as a prime example among many 
European attempts to further the idea of regional part-
nerships — and one which should command the atten-
tion of European observers committed to cooperation 
not only within Western Europe but also between 
Western Europe and former State-dominated econ-
omies. 
The secretariat is based in the Norwegian town of 
Klrkenes, and for the year 1993 the Norwegian 
Government has granted NKR 250 million as a start to 
the envisaged regional development. 
The Finnish Government has also been involved in spe-
cific projects, such as research in the Murmansk region 
and the gathering and analysis of statistics. Finland is 
strongly engaged in the solution of the region's environ-
mental problems. 
An expressed aim, integral to the treaty, is that devel-
opment should adhere to EC policy. It is to be a natural 
part of the concurrent political and economic integration 
process between the Community and Norden. 
Owing to its particular Institutional form and special 
construction, the greater Barents region is unique in 
Europe. It will be Interesting to see whether other trans-
national regions which cross the former Iron Curtain will 
try to imitate this construction, perhaps involving the 
European Commission as a signing partner. 
Obviously, the ambition is to establish a pattern of trade 
and cooperation in the Barents region which is similar to 
that of the Baltic Sea region as indicated in the figure 
below (Figure V.17). 
Transnational regional scenarios 133 
FIGURE V.17: International economie framework of the greater Barents region 
The Nordic countries 
and regions located by 
the Barents Sea 
Trade and cooperation 
EC countries and regions 
The Republic of Russia 
and regions located 
by the Barents Sea 
The main characteristics of the greater Barents region 
may be defined as follows: 
(i) a vast territory; 
a harsh climate; 
a dispersed low-density population; 
iv) a co-existence of several indigenous peoples; 
(v) a wealth of untapped resources. 
As the statistics accompanying the special study on the 
Baltic connection (see Volume IV) clearly Indicate, the 
area's natural resources are truly enormous, so enor-
mous, in fact, that they have caused knowledgeable 
observers to talk of the greater Barents region as both 
Europe's coming 'Middle East' (due to the deposits of 
gas and oil thought to be buried under the Barents Sea) 
and its coming 'Ruhr' (due to the wealth of valuable 
minerals in the Kola Region). But these natural re-
sources are by far not the only ones to be found in the 
area. 
The region-building policy tasks that will form the basis 
of interregional and transnational cooperation within the 
greater Barents region are as follows: 
(I) how to exploit the natural resources; 
(ii) how to develop commerce and trade relations; 
(ili) how to solve threatening environmental problems; 
(¡v) how to maintain peace, security and demographic 
stability in the wake of the disintegration of the 
Soviet Union or even the threat of a break-up of 
Russia itself. 
It ¡s a certainty that the collaborating powers and re-
gions will attempt to exercise strong control with regard 
to the exploitation of the various natural resources. 
Furthermore, and particularly relevant to the last point, 
top priority will be given to protecting unique arctic eco-
systems and rare flora and fauna. 
At the same time, there is a desire to increase trade and 
develop sea-routes from Europe to Asia via the north-
east passage. However, the latter will require heavy 
Investment in ice-breaking activity during the long win-
ter season. Should this dream ever be technologically 
fulfilled as well as economically viable, another door to 
economic prosperity will be open for the Barents region. 
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FIGURE V.19: The north-east passage 
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The routes indicated are the most navigable. During the very short ice-free period (in most places at most three months of the year), the north-east pas-
sage from Europe to the Far East is twice as fast as the traditional route through the Suez Canal. 
Source: Nord Revy, 1991. 
Should the north-eastern route become viable, there ¡s 
no question that there would be strong spin-off effects 
on land, particularly in Norway's Finnmark county and 
Russia's Kola Peninsula where a whole range of ser-
vices would be in demand: harbour facilities, pilot and 
weather forecasting services, aerial surveillance, ice-
breaking assistance, repair facilities, to mention the 
most Important. 
In addition to developing its economic and trading 
potentials, the Barents region seeks to establish its own 
identity. The northern tip of Norway has maintained 
close trading ties with neighbouring regions to the east 
for much of the past 1 000 years, most notably the so-
called 'Pomor trade' that lasted until the beginning of 
this century. However, this trade was severed after the 
Bolshevik Revolution in Russia of 1917. It has yet to be 
re-established, although the way may now be clear 
after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the 
tentative moves towards a 
newly independent Russia. 
market economy in the 
A sense of common identity ¡s certainly lacking in the 
greater Barents region today. There are strong linguistic 
contrasts, for example, Russian, Finnish and Norwegian 
are all totally different from each other, not to mention 
various Samic (or Lapp) dialects in addition to other lan-
guages spoken by peoples Indigenous to the area. This 
linguistic variation Imposes a serious barrier to com-
munication, which has to be constantly overcome. 
Furthermore, there are cultural differences and traditio-
nal ways of life that are dissimilar from place to place. 
This does little to unify the region, and attempts to do 
so are naturally regarded with some scepticism by 
minority populations as further threats to their disap-
pearing, yet cherished, livelihoods. 
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As a consequence of these cultural dissimilarities in the 
widest sense it is at present difficult to see how the 
greater Barents region could develop into a proper 
identity region. Therefore it seems currently destined to 
evolve functional strengths instead. 
As serious environmental and security problems have to 
be overcome, the development of a functional region to 
achieve solutions seems assured. Various strategies 
may be proposed, but the most important point is to 
ensure that the local and regional actors become mobi-
lized and engaged in solving the problems through co-
operation. 
The greater Barents region will also develop horizon-
tally as a product of increasing European integration 
and the need to establish firmer links with the rest of the 
Continent. 
Tromsø, as these already sizeable population concen-
trations will be well placed to act as centres for the 
management of resource exploitation, processing of 
raw materials, and major ports of call along any sea 
routes which might eventually open up the north-east 
passage (see Figure V.12). 
5.5. The greater North Sea region 
Current trends seem to make a case for a scenario 
based on a functional North Sea region. Among the 
countries that comprise the 'Nordic Four', Norway is 
the only participant in this region. The integration of 
Norway into the Community would clearly stimulate the 
development of such a region, which, due to its 
incorporation of vast adjacent land areas, shall be 
named the greater North Sea region. 
Vertical integration will, on the other hand, be more dif-
ficult, due to the enormous uninhabited or only thinly 
populated areas (area: 145000 km2 (for the core area); 
population density: 8 inhabitants/km2), which contrast 
sharply with the localized pockets of large urban popu-
lation in the city regions of Murmansk and Archangel, 
where the urban population density is as high as 92%. 
Using the analytical schema to evaluate the strength and 
potential of functional regions, the greater Barents region 
would seem to be best placed in the following category: 
'potential for some positive development'. The region is 
able to further strengthen its position through 'devel-
oping interregional networks and alliances'. 
The greater North Sea region distinguishes itself from 
both the greater Baltic Sea and greater Barents regions 
by not having any treaty or agreement of a broader 
scope signed by its constituent nations or regions. 
Nevertheless, there are functional similarities. A series of 
initiatives and economic activities are in place, and this 
region has a long history of trade, cooperation and cul-
tural exchanges. 
The North Sea coast is lined with many ports, both 
great and small. As such, vertical Integration does not 
exist, and there is no identifiable association of physi-
cally linked urban agglomerations to create such a 
region or a growth axis in the future. 
The reason for this assessment is the enormous wealth 
of natural resources in the region which await exploita-
tion. Furthermore, there is already a number of very 
large towns which are dynamic in behaviour. Towards 
the year 2000, there is likely to be an opportunity for 
greater integration and the development of Interregional 
networks and alliances. 
A variant of the scenario foresees the crystallization of a 
subregion, the core Barents region, based on the major 
towns of Murmansk, Archangel, KlrkenesA/adsø and 
However, some of the towns have entered into a form 
of horizontal cooperation through the establishment of 
an organisation known as the Association of North Sea 
Societies. The members are; Stavanger, Esbjerg, 
Bremerhaven, Groningen, Antwerp, Dunkirk, Hull and 
Aberdeen. The aim of the organization is to unfurl the 
common historical and cultural ties of the North Sea 
region and to stimulate a feeling of common identity and 
promote cultural activities, while at the same time pro-
moting commercial activities and influencing authorities 
by means of newsletters and lobbying. 
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FIGURE V.20: The greater North Sea region 
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FIGURE V.21: Europe's most important routes and their relationship with the North Sea region 
as foreseen beyond the year 2000 
Source: Miljöministeriet, Copenhagen, 1992. Large Cities arid Capital Cities 
Infrastructural development and planning are central 
themes of this functional region. A good example of the 
progress being made is the construction of the Channel 
Tunnel between England and France. Another example 
might be the development of the west link: the Improve-
ment of the north-south transport communications link 
from Norway to Germany via Denmark. In the north, the 
motorway network will be naturally built to link up with 
the Nordic link. The west link will necessitate better ferry 
services between the Danish port of Hirtshals and the 
Norwegian port of Kristiansand. West Norwegian and 
Jutland local authorities have started to cooperate in 
connection with the west link as they seek to promote 
commercial activity and tourism through Infrastructural 
improvement. 
Norway ¡s also keen on a more effective sea ferry ser-
vice to the United Kingdom as perhaps an alternative 
route south to continental markets. Although seemingly 
rather optimistic, the traffic congestion which is notor-
ious ¡n northern Germany could ¡n this way be avoided. 
However, the most important assumption behind the 
developmental scenario for the greater North Sea re-
gion is based on the exploitation of oil and gas reserves 
under the North Sea, as well as the connected petro-
chemical, refining, alternative processing and service 
Industries. 
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FIGURE V.22: Oil and gas fields, December 1992 
Oil and gas fields 
on lhe Danish and Norwegian sectors 
of the continental shelf 
Source: Yearbook of Nordic statistics, 1992. 
Pipelines stretch across large sections of the North Sea 
bed to reach many nations along its shore. Pipelines 
know no boundaries and bind regions together in a net-
work, attracting capital and specialized labour (see the 
special study on energy in Volume IV). 
With reference to the analytical schema for evaluating 
and categorizing the developmental potential of func-
tional regions, the greater North Sea region has been 
placed under the following definition: 'potential for some 
positive development' but it really 'needs to strengthen 
its position through developing its horizontal function-
ality and establish legitimate interregional networks and 
alliances'. 
This categorization is based on the significant resource 
base and the historical tradition of trade and coopera-
tion, as well as the high number of dynamic urban cen-
tres. The scenario represents a possibility for the direc-
tion of development towards the year 2000. Until now, 
its potential for horizontal integration and cooperation 
has not been sufficiently developed. 
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PartVI 
Synopses of Nordic impacts 
Impacts on the regional development 
and spatial organization in the European Community 
Macro-spatial dimensions 
1. Synopsis of regional policy impacts 
Regional policy scenario: 
Allocation principles of the EC Structural Funds are changed to recognize sparse population, 
long distances, cold climate and Arctic agriculture as legitimate objectives. Norden's Interest is 
maintaining settlement patterns and socio-geographical cohesion. 
Statements: 
Based on the special studies on Nordic regional policy and agriculture (Volumes II and III), the 
following statements may be derived: 
Trend integration scenario — EEA-like: 
(i) Nordic regional policies are not part of the agreement. 
(ii) EC Structural Fund objectives remain unaffected. 
Regional and spatial impacts on EC territory 
None 
Trend integration scenario — Maastricht-like: 
Alternative 1 : 
(I) Nordic regional policies adapt to EC regional policies after transitional arrangements. 
(ii) Structural Fund objectives will encompass 'Nordic' criteria. 
(iii) The Interreg programme covers the entire area of EUR 16. 
Regional and spatial impacts on EC territory 
Relatively strong and geographically well-defined regional and spatial impacts in EC areas with 
geographical and climatic characteristics corresponding to those of Norden, the reason being 
that such areas would become eligible for structural support. 
EC border regions with Norden and/or other regions who have entered into functional part-
nerships with Nordic regions would experience appreciably positive effects. 
Alternative 2: 
(i) The prospect that a number of current EC regions might raise 'Nordic' demands for support 
creates concern in the Community. 
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(ii) EC support for Arctic agriculture is accepted by the current members as a compensation for 
not meeting other Nordic demands for changes in Structural Fund allocational criteria. 
Regional and spatial impacts on EC territory 
None, as there are no Arctic (agricultural) climatic zones within the EUR 12. 
Contrast fragmentation scenario: 
(i) EC regional and spatial policies are weakened as are all other general policies. 
(ii) In some cases, nations are able to resurrect national regional and spatial policies to com-
pensate for the weakening of pan-EC policies — in some cases they are not. 
Regional and spatial impacts on EC territory 
(i) Considerable, negative regional and spatial impacts as the absence of EUR 12 or even 
EUR 16 cohesion policies would In many cases be compounded by the de facto weakening 
of nations' ability to back Nordic-EC functional regions and transborder regional partner-
ships. 
(ii) In the event that transborder functional regions and regional partnerships are able to pro-
ceed and thrive in the face of pan-European fragmentation (not at all an unlikely proposition 
where economically prosperous and socio-polltically strong regions are involved), the 
effects could hardly be labelled as Nordic impacts on the Community in any meaningful 
sense relevant to this study, i.e. unless the Community were to change its complexion from 
an assembly of States to an assembly of subregions or transnational regions. 
2. Synopsis of the impacts of a Nordic growth area 
Nordic growth area scenario 
A 'third European core area' develops in Norden as a consequence of the enormous economic 
potentials inherent in a Nordic-Eastern commercial and resource-management partnership, 
general European and international integration and a 'new deal' in the pan-European division of 
labour as a result of transport congestion and the high environmental and economic costs of 
further agglomeration in European 'banana' areas. 
Statements 
Based on the conclusions in Parts IV and V of the synthesis report, the following statements 
may be derived: 
Trend integration scenario — EEA- and Maastricht-like: 
(i) Russian and Baltic State border zones adjacent to Norden may be defined as a new eco-
nomic frontier and indeed as a new European frontier. 
(¡i) There are enormous resources of partially unexploited natural riches and unspoilt nature in 
the greater Nordic area including previously Communist-ruled border regions. 
(ili) Politically and indeed institutionally, the Community has already commenced its engagement 
in the region through its signing of the Barents Sea accord and its declared commitment to 
the Baltic Sea cooperation. 
(iv) The undisputed existence in the greater Nordic area of environmental, political, security 
policy and demographic challenges to Norden and by amplification to all of Western Europe 
142 The Nordic countries 
would, if anything, seem to call for an even greater EC commitment to developing the vast 
potentials which might offset such threats. 
(v) The southern part of Norden is relatively densely populated — with a number of dynamic 
urban agglomerations — facilitating mutually advantageous regional partnerships with north-
ern regions of the Community. 
(vi) Interregional cooperative schemes involving both Nordic, 'Eastern' and EC regions and 
countries, such as the greater Barents Sea region, the Baltic region and, embryonically, the 
greater North Sea region are already unfolding. 
Regional and spatial impacts on EC territory 
The general, macro-spatial effects would be appreciable as there would be a marked tendency 
towards a shift from south to north within the Community. In the Community's northern 'border' 
areas with Norden (most notably in Denmark and a number of northern German Länder) a 
closer integration with a new (greater Nordic) European growth area might contribute to sus-
tained economic growth. 
In central parts of the Community, the growing burdens of congestion (delays, pollution, rising 
costs of location) would be reduced. 
In the southern parts of the Community, the impacts would be small or negligible due to the 
remoteness of the greater Nordic area. A greater EC absorption in northern Europe might 
easily be compensated through a larger pan-European revenue base. 
Contrast fragmentation scenario: 
(i) The Community's engagement in and actual ability to further Nordic development would 
wane. 
(ii) National interests both among EC Member States and in Norden would be impelled to 
assert their sovereignty over regional matters and spatial policies within their borders. 
(iii) The greater Nordic area would suffer from a lack of cooperation. Growth potentials would 
not be realized — meaning that the threats of environmental, political and security disloca-
tions emanating from Eastern regions would be harder to contain. 
(iv) There would be no pan-European shift of emphasis from south to north (not least because 
there would be no pan-Europe to undertake such a shift). 
(v) Intra-European barriers to trade and other economic activities would re-emerge, including 
barriers between current EC Member States and Nordic countries. 
(vi) Pan-European cooperation would become decidedly sector-oriented dealing with selected 
problems such as environmental issues, illegal immigration and organized crime. 
Regional and spatial impacts on EC territory 
A fragmentation scenario would have decidedly negative impacts on EC regions compared to 
the forfeited potentials of the Norden-EC integration scenario. Hardest hit would be EC border 
regions with Norden. 
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Β 
Impacts on the regional development 
and spatial organization in the European Community 
Meso-regional dimensions 
3. Synopsis of transborder region­building 
Transborder regional scenario 
The Baltic Sea region, the Barents region and the North Sea region establish themselves as ver­
tically and horizontally integrated regions. The same applies to their subregions; the west Baltic 
region, the core Baltic region and the core Barents region. Nordic transborder regions are able 
to compete in a 'Europe of regions'. 
Statements 
Based on Part V of the synthesis report, on the special study on producer services (Volume III), 
the special study on the Baltic connection (Volume IV) and the special study on the Baltic en­
vironment (Volume IV), the following statements may be derived: 
Trend integration scenario: 
(i) Administrative regions, centres of competence such as universities and research centres, 
and local enterprises gain growing importance as actors in functional regions. Money from 
the EC Interreg programme acts as catalyst in the process. 
(ii) Functional regions have begun forming political and administrative institutions. 
(ili) Urban agglomerations in primarily the west Baltic Sea region and the core Baltic region are 
well positioned to take the lead in a dynamic region­building. Even in the North Sea region, 
cities have begun to cooperate, and transport infrastructural developments point to a poten­
tial future of increased networking. 
(iv) In the greater Barents region physical infrastructure is being developed with a view towards 
creating corridors in the direction of Europe and towards overcoming the east­west trans­
portation and communication impediments of the past. 
(v) In the southern Baltic regions the Via Baltica from northern Germany towards St Petersburg 
and with further connection to Helsinki is under construction. 
(vi) A similar objective has been realized by Scan­Link connected to the projected bridge 
connection over Øresund and the Fehmarn Belt. The Nordic link will connect Norway and 
parts of Sweden to the Continent via Jutland in Denmark while the west link is intended to 
facilitate traffic between the south­western part of Norway via the Skagerrak and Jutland 
eventually to connect with the Nordic link. 
(vii) The transportation bottlenecks in west­central Germany are becoming increasingly more 
severe. 
(viii) The Community has indicated its initial desire to invest in reducing or eliminating the many 
environmental 'bombs' ticking away in the north European border zone with the ex­Soviet 
Union. No doubt such commitments would have positive economic effects in the core Baltic 
region and the core Barents region. 
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Regional and spatial impacts on EC territory 
The general meso-regional impacts of successful Nordic transborder region-building in adjacent 
EC areas would be considerable. 
In concrete terms, positive effects would be noticeable throughout the entire area from Zealand 
and Jutland to Schleswig-Holstein and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania where intensified 
economic development and urban agglomeration should be expected. 
Particularly the northern German regions should benefit from closer linkages with the core Baltic 
region through the Via Baltica — in addition to the benefits they would undoubtedly reap from 
the planned bridge connection between southern Sweden and the Copenhagen area with 
further connections to the south. 
EC regions all around the North Sea from northern Jutland to Bruges and Aberdeen would 
benefit from the establishment of a more integrated North Sea region. Jutland would appear to 
gain most from development of the Nordic link. 
Meso-regional impacts in the Community of potential developments in the greater Barents 
region would be difficult to detect. Impacts would be of a macro-spatial character, i.e. they 
would tend to influence regional development and spatial organization throughout the 
Community. 
Contrast fragmentation scenario: 
(i) Development of the functional EC-Nordic-Eastern transborder regions would stop or be-
come severely impeded. 
(ii) Stimuli for the regional initiatives are weakened because regional competition is no longer so 
important. National competition — and protection — prevails. 
(iii) The great Nordic infrastructural projects intended, among other objectives, to create geo-
graphical cohesion among regions in the greater Nordic area get lower priorities by national 
governments. Some may never be fully carried out. 
(iv) As part of a survival strategy the Nordic governments will continue their environmental co-
operation with Eastern countries and/or border regions and they may well seek to maintain 
a modicum of political and economic cooperation for the same reason. 
Regional and spatial impacts on EC territory 
A fragmentation scenario would have heavy negative meso-regional consequences compared 
to the lost potentials. 
4. Synopsis of impacts from agriculture, fisheries, tourism and transportation 
Industrial scenarios 
Given certain circumstances, there would be a strengthening of competition within the agricul-
tural, fishing and tourist industries at the meso-regional level. Iceland and Norway might be able 
to increase their marketing share of fish significantly once European integration has been 
achieved. Transport barriers in central Europe will change the market conditions in favour of the 
Community's northern and southern regions due to their increased industrial competitiveness. 
Statements 
Based on the special studies on agriculture and the agro-industry and fisheries (Volume 
tourism (Volume II) and transport (Volume IV), the following statements may be derived: 
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Trend integration scenario: 
(i) Though agriculture is particularly beset with intricate regulations and subventions, and 
though prognostications must be very uncertain due to EC-Nordic membership negotiations 
under way, it would seem fair to conclude that in case of closer integration much of the 
Nordic four would become subjected to marketing attacks from core agricultural areas of 
the Community. In particular, it may be predicted that a southern Nordic agricultural centre 
would emerge encompassing Denmark and southern Sweden whose producers are close 
to the tastes of other Nordic consumers. However, the beneficial influence might be felt in 
northern Germany and the Benelux countries. 
(ii) The Nordic fisheries and fish-processing countries of Iceland and Norway should be able to 
benefit from a close integration with the Community. 
(iii) Tourism is particularly vulnerable to rapid changes in market behaviour resulting from world 
events or changes in public attitudes. According to two of the three developmental scena-
rios presented in the special study on the travel industry, the traditional mass tourism, 'sun-
lust' resorts of the western Mediterranean would stand to lose from envisaged changes in 
the behaviour of Nordic tourists who have, until now been important customers. 'Cultural' 
destinations in and around historic cities would stand to gain from Nordic tourism. It is 
doubtful to what extent European integration or fragmentation would influence tourist be-
haviour. 
(iv) Transportation bottlenecks and EC-wide environmental taxes on energy use — both very 
conceivable results of increased physical transportation due to growing European integra-
tion — would appear to benefit outlying regions north and south of the traditional 
bottlenecks, increasing their industrial competitiveness. 
Regional and spatial impacts on EC territory 
The integration scenario indicates positive impacts of Nordic development on strong agricul-
tural regions in Denmark, northern Germany and Benelux barring political developments as a 
result of membership negotiations or fluctuations in general EC agricultural policies. 
Due to pan-European transportation difficulties it predicts an enhanced competitive position in 
northern regions such as Denmark, Schleswig-Holstein and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania 
who are able to easily expand their trade with less congested areas. 
The prevalent indications in the tourist study are that sun belts in primarily the western 
Mediterranean will lose Nordic customers whereas eastern Mediterranean — less polluted and 
more inexpensive — destinations stand to gain as do 'cultural' inland locations in central and 
southern Europe. Alpine resorts may lose marketing shares to Nordic destinations, but tourism 
in the Alps would have to be reduced anyway due to overcrowding threatening the environment. 
At the meso-regional level the fisheries scenario predicts the strongest impacts in coastal com-
munities of Denmark and other areas around the North Sea whose fish-processing industries 
are located close to the large consumer markets of the United Kingdom and Germany. 
Contrast fragmentation scenario: 
(i) In all likelihood the Nordic countries would to the best of their economic ability continue their 
strongly regulated and subsidized agricultural policies keeping out agricultural products from 
other countries. 
(ii) They would continue their current strongly regulated fisheries policies and attempt to gain 
access to overseas markets in order to compensate for losses in EC markets. Denmark 
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might well lose its current position as major importer of Icelandic and Norwegian fish for pro-
cessing for EC markets. 
(iii) Trends in tourism would probably be relatively unaffected. 
(iv) European transportation bottlenecks would become less of a problem because European 
prognoses for the increase in transportation due to expected free flows would quickly be-
come less ambitious. 
Regional and spatial impacts on EC territory 
Again the effects in northern regions of the Community — Denmark, Schleswig-Holstein and 
probably Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania — would be decidedly negative as they would lose 
important developmental potentials. 
C 
Impacts on the regional development and spatial organization in the European Community 
Micro-regional dimensions 
5. Synopsis of impacts from fisheries, manufacturing industry, producer services, energy, 
tourism and transportation 
Industrial scenarios 
Given certain circumstances, there will be stronger micro-regional competition within the areas 
of the fishing industry, manufacturing industry, producer services and tourism. Icelandic and 
Norwegian fish-processing industries may increase their hold on production and market shares. 
Transport difficulties might change market conditions in favour of northern and southern EC 
micro-regions. Oil and gas production will continue to increase in the North Sea, and new off-
shore activities will open in the Barents Sea. 
Statements 
Based on the special studies on tourism (Volume II), fisheries, manufacturing industry and pro-
ducer services (Volume III), the following statements may be derived: 
(NB: Some statements of relevance at the micro-regional level in particular concerning fisheries, 
tourism and transportation have already been cited in Synopsis 4 immediately above and will 
not be repeated here). 
Trend integration scenario: 
(i) Nordic forestry, timber and pulp and paper industries, and the Swedish transport industry 
tend to expand in the core regions of Europe. 
(ii) Norway supplies much of Europe with oil and gas for energy production and consumption. 
Norwegian oil and gas pipelines are spread out from offshore stations to harbours all 
around the North Sea, creating jobs in local communities. 
(iii) Norway has much experience and know-how within the energy sector which might help 
generate jobs in producer services in certain micro-regions around the North Sea board. 
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Regional and spatial impacts on EC territory 
The internationalization of certain Nordic industrial clusters, like the forest and transportation 
industries, will mean obvious advantages to certain micro-regions of central Europe. 
The same conclusion must be made concerning the impact of Nordic producer services, but it 
must be added that regional and spatial impacts of this latter sector are anticipated to be very 
slight. 
The impacts of the Norwegian oil and gas production and related industries might become 
valuable in micro-regions located on or close to the North Sea coast in Denmark, Germany, the 
Netherlands, Belgium and the United Kingdom. 
In addition we must mention some potential micro-regional impacts from fisheries and tourism. 
An expansion of Nordic fishing industries might conceivably hurt certain fisheries-dependent 
micro-regions in Jutland and the United Kingdom from Grimsby to Peterhead. A Nordic shift 
towards 'cultural' and 'green' tourism and away from traditional sun destinations would 
undoubtedly cause certain southern European micro-regions to suffer heavily. 
Contrast fragmentation scenario: 
Apart from what has already been said of fisheries, it would be difficult to state opposing 'con-
trast' assumptions. Neither tourism, nor the trend towards the internationalization of Nordic 
industrial clusters nor indeed the development of the Norwegian oil and gas regime in the North 
Sea area would seem to be greatly influenced by the threat of European fragmentation. 
Regional and spatial impacts on EC territory 
These would seem slight at the micro-regional level. 
148 The Nordic countries 
Political implications 
This study is being undertaken at a time when three of the Nordic countries, Finland, Norway and Sweden, are in-
volved in membership negotiations with the European Community. In addition, these three countries plus Iceland 
have all ratified the EEA Agreement with the European Community. 
As a direct consequence of the fact that important negotiations are taking place involving the Community and most 
of the Nordic countries, the political implications of Norden's regional and spatial impacts on the Community can only 
be dealt with in the broadest of terms. For example, crucial Nordic concerns like regional policy, the preservation of 
settlement patterns, the maintenance of geographical cohesion, agriculture, fisheries and coming oil and gas regimes 
are currently matters for negotiation whose outcome it would be unwise to predict. 
On top of this, to attempt to give very specific and detailed political advice to one party or another would amount to 
an even greater lack of wisdom. 
Within the framework of this study's trend scenario, the institutional integration scenario, the case has been made, 
however, that certain important policy areas relating to EC regional development and spatial organization could be 
strongly influenced by a closer Nordic participation. 
Even so, it must be understood that this Nordic influence, with few exceptions, will not emanate from economic mat-
ters such as the free flow of goods and services or more open competition. This is because Iceland, Norway, Sweden 
and Finland have a population of only 18 million representing a relatively small market and creating little economic pro-
duction compared to the Community. 
It is only within a few areas that Nordic influence might be sufficiently strong to make a real difference in terms of 
Europe's future regional and spatial development. 
The study has identified five major areas where Nordic influence is or could be of decisive importance. Equally, these 
areas ought to be the subject of political considerations and become incorporated into the objectives of European 
strategic planning. 
1. 
This study identifies first and foremost certain primary industries, and their related secondary and tertiary industries, 
as being fundamental to the Nordic countries' national economies. Some regions are totally dependent on a specific 
industry for their survival. 
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Clearly, some of these industries may have competitive advantages seen within the wider context of a single Euro-
pean market. In addition, Nordic raw-material-based extraction and production may have important effects, both 
quantitatively and strategically, on EC regional development and spatial organization. 
The major Nordic, resource-based economic areas identified by the study are as follows: 
(i) fishing and fish processing, 
(ii) forestry and related processing industries, 
(iii) oil and natural gas extraction, and related industries, 
(iv) energy-based metal industries, 
(v) tourism. 
These production areas are strategically important for the development of the Nordic regions. As the study has re-
vealed, developments in these areas could lead to both positive and negative impacts on European regions. Politically, 
the EC would be well advised to pay heed to the unique position of the above industries in Norden and to their often 
crucial role in maintaining Nordic regional cohesion. 
The entire matter of Nordic integration with Europe might well be condensed to the following question: 'Is it in the best 
interest of the EC to incorporate a still functioning and internally coherent Nordic European core area, or would it be 
better to attempt to impose existing EC political principles and regulations on Norden, thus running the danger of 
having to deal with an area containing large internal peripheries in the socio-economic sense?' 
What type of political and institutional regime could be established to further both the main interests of the EC, which 
are based on free market competition and free movement of capital, labour, goods and sen/ices, and simultaneously 
protect the economic base upon which the settlement pattern and economic cohesion (within a European context) of 
these regions and local communities may be preserved? 
Planning and use of the vast Nordic area ought to be subject to political considerations also in the EC. The contrast 
between the Community and Norden with regard to the wide expanses of untouched nature and low population ought 
to be exploited according to these stark differences. For example, the 'green' movement gaining pace within tourism 
ought to be exploited within the Nordic areas, while more culture-oriented tourism ought to be focused on the existing 
EC regions. 
On the other hand, such a policy move, would, of course, mean increased exploitation of Norden's natural resources 
and possibly greater environmental pressure on very vulnerable Arctic and sub-Arctic areas. Sensible exploitation 
would require a special political approach which ought to commit the Community to establishing environmental 
regimes instead of just economic ones. In other words, economic regimes must be given a definite environmental 
dimension in order to protect the vulnerable nature, restrict the extraction of non-renewable oil and gas reserves, 
renew fish stock and forest reserves, and maintain the existence of the resource-dependent Nordic regions and com-
munities as an integral part of EC regional cohesion policy. 
150 The Nordic countries 
For the Community, the development of interregional cooperation must be given first priority, even when it concerns 
the transborder regions of adjacent nations. This new priority is a natural result of the goal of 'a borderless Europe'. It 
is, furthermore, a goal for Norden where it has in fact been practised throughout much of the post-war period, as part 
of both internal and transnational strategy. Inter-Nordic cooperation, as manifested in the Nordic Council and the 
Nordic Council of Ministers, has given priority to exactly this kind of regional development through its support for bor-
der regional cooperation in Norden. 
Seen from the European integration perspective, the functional region-building of Norden and Europe is important, 
and in this context border regions are very special. Two such important initiatives are concerned with Baltic Sea and 
North Sea regional cooperation. 
Politically, this implies the need for much greater focus on objectives and measures to develop these border regions 
which physically connect Norden to the Community. It means in particular the planning and development of infra-
structure between Norden and the Community. How can future development avoid the current traffic problems of con-
gestion and missing links? How should this be planned and undertaken? There appears to be an immediate need for 
the establishment of institutionalized, coordinated planning in this area, but of course, particular attention must be paid 
to the planning laws of respective countries. 
Norden's — that is to say Finland's long and Norway's short — strategically delicate borderline with the powerful 
Russian nation holds special political and economic consequences for Europe's future. The currently unstable situa-
tion in Russia makes greater efforts to guarantee security and safety for the Community and Norden all the more 
necessary as we approach the year 2000. 
This study indicates how important it is to conceive of the 'new' Eastern Europe as a frontier region in which gigantic 
security and environmental problems must be solved. Their complete and immediate solution would automatically 
overburden Western economies. All the same, great economic development opportunities will result in the long term. 
Strategic planning and long-term political objectives are required. 
One conclusion of this study is that a possible regional strategy in this connection would be to develop functional 
transborder regions which would come under the auspices of regimes deliberately established to that end. This move 
should not be restricted to Norden but embrace the whole of the Community for reasons of security, economic 
growth and environmental protection. These regimes would be able to make the necessarily mature political consid-
erations. Within the integration scenario of this study, the practical consequences are that such common strategic 
political regimes ought to be established to these ends. 
Political implications 151 
It might be prudent to consider the basis for the newly established regime which deals with cooperation and coordi-
nation within the Barents Sea region, signed by the Nordic countries involved, the border regions Involved, Russia and 
even the Community. Is it possible for this political construction to act as a model for future transborder cooperation 
in the eastern frontier regions? 
An expansion of EUR 12 to EUR 16 will automatically bring different forms of politics and administration together. The 
European Commission has announced that the planning laws of member countries will be described on a compara-
tive basis in a compendium which may at a later date be extended to Include all the EEA countries. 
Perhaps the same kind of attention might be paid to the regional policies of different countries. Such an endeavour 
would Illuminate how functions are distributed among administrative levels and how the various regional policy ap-
paratuses work in practice. 
Within the existing EUR 12, regional economic and social Inequalities are greater than in Norden. The political focus 
should centre on how the Community can benefit from a close examination of the way in which the regional policy of 
the Nordic countries is aimed strongly at removing regional disparities and establishing regional balance in order to 
stabilize the settlement pattern and thus maintain the geographical cohesion of the entire Nordic territory. 
Sustainable development In the North ought to be the subject of increasing political awareness. In particular, the recent 
political events involving the greater North Sea region, the greater Baltic Sea region and the Barents region ought to 
be scrutinized closely with regard to future development. 
The Community ought to set up a forum, which must include the Nordic countries. Through such a body, cases could 
be presented, and discussions related to the new reglonallzation movement in Europe could be held. Issues affecting 
the development of former Eastern bloc regions would automatically be treated. Visionary, long-term strategic regio-
nal politics might well be the way to describe the function of such a forum. 
This might, in turn, facilitate the establishment of regional regimes equal to such challenges as security, the environ-
ment and the safe exploitation of natural resources. 
The Barents Sea region is an example of such a fledgling regime, in which the Community is involved. However, many 
other Euro-regimes may be seen from this angle. This is, no doubt, a perspective that ought to be pursued yet 
further in the interest of both the Community and Norden. 
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